The evolution of EU communications law and next generation networks: the limits of legal flexibility by Makarovič, Andrej Boštjan
The evolution of EU communications law and next generation networks:
the limits of legal flexibility
Makarovi, Andrej Boštjan
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/8609
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND  NEXT   
GENERATION NETWORKS: THE 
LIMITS OF LEGAL FLEXIBILITY
 
PhD Thesis
Candidate: Andrej Boštjan Makarovič
College: Queen Mary University of London
Supervisors:
Professor Ian Walden and Professor Richard Nobles
b  ostjan@aphaia.co.uk  
26 December 2011
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Ian Walden and 
Professor Richard Nobles for encouraging me to thoroughly explore the subject 
of this thesis. I am also grateful to my former colleagues at APEK and the ERG 
who have enabled me to use the regulatory work process for further learning. 
Finally, I owe my parents my interest in academic research. 
2
DECLARATION
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own.
Signature
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the evolution of the EU legal regulatory framework for 
electronic communications in light of the changes in the law's technological and 
business environment, namely the shift to Next Generation Networks (NGN).
Using systems theory as its central research method, the thesis explores 
communications law as a self-referential phenomenon which, despite its internal 
attempts to promote itself by means of responding to the changing environment, 
remains locked-in by its own autopoietic structures.
This is demonstrated by the law's traditional focus on voice telephony as the essential 
communications service provided in the public interest. Whereas the idea of 
'technological neutrality' has enabled the law to embrace new applied technologies 
such as VoIP, it could not move its attention away from its autopoietic concepts to 
NGN-related issues such as net neutrality.
Even though legal concepts without reference to any particular technology are 
increasingly used in regulation, as is the case with competition law images of 
'relevant markets' and 'market power', the shift to NGN only remains visible to the 
law on its 'internal screen'. This becomes evident when the implementation of new 
technologies fails to achieve the results implied by the legal system, namely effective 
competition among different access infrastructures.
Systems theory keeps a distance from both neo-liberal ideas that ideologically reject 
regulation, as well as from the autopoiesis of the NRAs' and the Commission's 
harmonising efforts, which inevitably result in more legal rules. Whereas the 
'efficiency' of NGN investments cannot be implied based on the mere absence of ex 
ante regulation, the expected further proliferation of regulation based on the law's 
autopoietic programmes, although more cognitively open than before, will not be 
able to take on board all (possibly desirable) solutions that are not foreseen by the 
EU legal framework.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
BEREC Board of European Regulators on Electronic Communications
EC European Community
ECTA European  Competitive  Telecommunications  Association  – 
organisation of European alternative / new market entrant operators
ERG European Regulators’ Group – a body of European NRAs intended for 
reflection, debate and advice for the European Commission in the elec-
tronic communications field
ETNO European  Telecommunications  Network  Operators’  Association  – 
organisation of European incumbent operators
EU European Union
FCC Federal Communications Commission – federal telecommunications 
regulatory authority in the United States of America
FTTC Fibre  to  the  Cabinet  –  access  technology  whereby  fibre  optics  is 
deployed from the operator’s premises to the street cabinet, whereas 
the subscriber is connected to the street cabinet by means of a copper 
wire pair, i.e. copper local loop
FTTH Fibre  to  the  Home  –  access  technology  whereby  fibre  optics  is 
deployed from the operator’s premises to the subscriber’s home
FTTP Fibre to the Premises – equivalent to FTTH, except that connection is 
provided to a business subscriber’s premises
HSDPA High-Speed  Downlink  Packet  Access –  enhanced  mobile 
communications protocol based on UMTS that enables up to 42 Mbit 
download speed  
HSUPA High-Speed  Uplink  Packet  Access –  enhanced  mobile 
communications  protocol  based  on UMTS that  enables  up  to  5,76 
Mbit upload speed  
IBP Internet  Backbone  Provider  –  entity  commercially  providing  high-
speed  and  high-capacity  internet  links  in  the  backbone  /  trunk 
transmission network
IP Internet Protocol – communications protocol that was originally used 
in internet communications and is now broadly used in various types 
of telecommunications
IPTV Internet  Protocol  Television  –  transmission  of  television  broadcast 
signals by means of Internet Protocol
IRG Organisation of European NRAs that resembles the structure of the 
ERG,  with  the  exception  that  the  European  Commission  is  not 
involved in its work
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ISP Internet Service Provider – usually a commercial entity that provides 
the  subscriber  with  a  connection  to  the  internet  and  associated 
services,  such  as  email.  Following  the  advent  of  xDSL and  other 
broadband  technologies,  ISPs  are  also  able  to  offer  broadband 
connections  based  on  line  rental  or  bitstream  service  of  a 
telecommunications  network operator.  However,  ISPs may often be 
the same entities as telecoms operators
LTE Long Term Evolution – a name for the fourth generation of mobile 
telephone networks
MPLS Multiprotocol Label Switching – a mechanism in high-performance 
telecommunications  networks,  which  enables  different  types  of  IP 
traffic (voice, data, television broadcast, video, corporate) to be given 
different priority
NGA Next Generation Access Network – access network used to connect 
the subscriber to the operator’s point  of presence,  whereby at  least 
some part of the access network is made of fibre optics instead of, say 
copper wire
NGN Next  Generation  Network  –  a  telecommunications  transmission 
network  based  on Internet  Protocol  used  to  carry  various  types  of 
traffic, including internet, voice, television broadcast, and video
NRA National  Regulatory  Authority  –  a  general  term  for  a  European 
Member State national regulator
NRF New  Regulatory  Framework –  set  of  Directives  regulating  the 
European electronic communications market that were passed in 2002
ONP Open Network Provision, a common name for the set of directives and 
regulations introducing competition to the European communications 
markets
PATS Publicly Available  Telephone Service – according to  the  Universal 
Service Directive, a service available to the public for originating and 
receiving  national  and  international  calls  and  access  to  emergency 
services through a number or numbers in a national or international 
telephone  numbering  plan,  and  in  addition  may,  where  relevant, 
include  one  or  more  of  the  following  services:  the  provision  of 
operator assistance, directory enquiry services, directories, provision 
of  public  payphones,  provision  of  service  under  special  terms, 
provision of special facilities for customers with disabilities or with 
special social needs and/or the provision of non-geographic services
POTS Plain Old Telephone Service – a name for traditional analogue 
telephony
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network – traditional telephone network 
employing  copper  wire  in  the  access  part  and  switching  among 
circuits at different levels of the network hierarchy
QoS Quality of Service – relates to quality parameters, key performance 
indicators or other indicators of quality of a certain communications 
service
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SMP Significant Market Power – legal standard for a market position that 
serves  as  a  threshold  for  imposition  of  legal  obligations  on  a 
telecommunications operator. Initially, a 25% market share was set as 
a  general  threshold.  In  2002 the  same standard  became practically 
equivalent to the competition law standard of dominance.
TCP/IP Transmission  Control  Protocol  /  Internet  Protocol  -  is  the  set  of 
communications  protocols used  for  the  internet and  other  similar 
networks
UMTS Universal  Mobile  Telephony  System  –  third  generation  of  mobile 
telephone networks, integrating digital voice and high-speed IP mobile 
radio transmission
US United States of America
VoB Voice  over  Broadband  –  VoIP  service  provided  via  a  broadband 
subscriber  connection,  generally  of  a  quality  that  can  resemble 
traditional telephony
VoD Video on Demand – service usually based on IP that enables live video 
transmission at the individual request of a subscriber
VoIP Voice  over  Internet  Protocol  –  transmission  of  voice  by  means  of 
Internet  Protocol.  Some  types  of  VoIP  fully  resemble  in  their 
functionality traditional telephony.
xDSL Digital Subscriber Line – a group of technologies that enable digital 
high-speed  broadband  data  transmission  over  traditional  copper 
telephone lines, whereby ‘x’ indicates the specific type of technology 
such as ADSL or VDSL
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1 INTRODUCTION
The body of European electronic communications law as  known today has emerged 
from the liberalising political agenda of the 1980s and 1990s. Starting with the UK, 
the EU and its Member States introduced statutory rules in order to, on the one hand, 
introduce  competition  to  the  market  previously  determined  by  state 
telecommunications  monopolies  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  protect  end-users  by 
means of universal service obligations on the part of the incumbent operators. This 
has been pursued by two separate sets of legal rules: pro-competitive rules on market 
access and the rules on end-user rights.1 While the first set of rules has primarily 
been about network interconnection and other forms of access to the communications 
infrastructure, the second set has largely focused on voice telephony and its features 
that should in the public interest be made available to consumers.  
From the beginning of these processes,  both the politics of setting the regulatory 
agenda and the law itself have pursued a competitive market whereby regulation has 
only been treated as an intermediary step on the way to full  competition.  Sector-
specific regulation was seen as 'holding the fort' until competition arrives,2 whereas 
the  preference  should  be  given  to  general  competition  law  once  the  market 
developed.3
However, the electronic communications market today may be very different from 
what could possibly be expected in the 1980s or even 1990s. On the one hand, the 
European landscape, particularly the fixed access infrastructure with the exception of 
some larger cable operators in countries such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands or 
Slovenia, is still dominated by those incumbent operators that previously held legal 
1 See e.g. Walden, I., 2009, p. 11-12.
2 See e.g.  Regulation of British Telecommunications profitability, Report by Stephen C. Littlechild, 
Professor of Commerce, University of Birmingham, for the Secretary of State for Industry, HMSO, 
1983, para. 4.11.
3 See Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology  
sectors, and the implications for regulation, COM(97)623: 'A further key issue is the balance between 
competition rules and sector-specific regulation, with many arguing for a preference to be given to the 
application of competition rules to individual cases within a converged environment, rather than the 
further development of extensive regulation.'
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monopolies. This holds particularly true for fixed local access, where investments in 
new fibre-based access infrastructures are primarily carried out by the same entities. 
On the other hand newly built mobile networks and fixed broadband access largely 
provided  by new market  entrants  have  provided  end-users  with  choice  that  was 
beyond imagination in the early days of liberalisation.
While  the initial  duopoly concept  of  liberalisation  in  the  UK, the  country which 
largely served as the prototype for the rest of Europe, relied on a highly unrealistic 
idea of  constructing parallel  competitive fixed copper-based telephone networks, 
notable new opportunities for competition have later emerged in the mobile sector 
and broadband internet access, the latter also thanks to the (very reluctantly imposed 
and belated) unbundling of fixed local infrastructures.4  It was not until 2000, i.e. 
more than ten years after the initial liberalising efforts by the European Commission, 
that  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  passed  the  Regulation  (EC)  No 
2887/2000  of  18  December  2000  on  unbundled  access  to  the  local  loop,  which 
enabled  the  sharing  of  bottleneck  local  infrastructures  controlled  by  European 
incumbents  and  paved  the  way  for  local  competition  in  services.  Before  that 
harmonised  access  conditions  in  Europe  focused  on  the  interconnection  of 
independent  networks.5 Whereas  European  local  loop  unbundling  followed  the 
example of the 1996 US Telecommunications Act, it was in practice only the later 
technological convergence of broadband data, voice and video that actually made 
local competition a feasible and attractive option, both within one single network and 
among different network platforms.6
Accordingly, from the historical perspective, the lack of synchronisation between the 
legal system and its technological and economic environment seems obvious. While 
market  liberalisation  and  network  access  regulation  have  undoubtedly  facilitated 
4 Unbundling of local loops means wholesale access of competitors to the incumbent operators' local 
telephone network, traditionally built of copper wires.
5 See  Directive  97/33/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  30  June  1997  on  
interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability  
through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP).
6 This  technological  convergence  enabling  the  transport  of  the  same  type  of  data  over  different 
network platforms has been noted by the European Commission in 1998, when the Green paper on 
the  convergence  of  the  telecommunications,  media  and  information  technology  sectors,  and  the  
implications for regulation, COM(97)623,  identified the IP technology as “the most relevant example 
of […] platform independence”. However, it took some years after the passing of the 2000 Regulation  
before convergent broadband packages became wide-spread in Europe.
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commercial deployment of new technologies and broader choice for end-users, the 
changes of the recent years can hardly fit into the legal programmes that initially 
opened up the European telecommunications markets. In this respect, the neo-liberal 
paradigm can be offered as an explanation: do the market and the technology always 
get it right, whereas legal regulation only plays a marginal role?
Of  course,  the  relevance  of  the  legal  framework  as  to  the  development  of  the 
markets, not to mention the economic efficiency of legal regulation, is far more than 
a matter of prestige for the lawyers (and politicians, who are ultimately responsible 
for the passing of statutory frameworks). Currently one can witness a technological 
and  commercial  shift  that  is  progressively  turning  the  world's  traditional 
communications  networks  into  convergent  Next  Generation  Networks  (NGNs), 
whereby data, voice and video are all transported by means of Internet Protocol (IP), 
while access to end-users is increasingly provided by means of fibre optics, forming 
part of the so-called Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. The ability of the 
legal programmes to take on board the issues raised by this new environment may 
ultimately  have  an  impact  on  investment  decisions  or  the  market  dominance  of 
certain players.
Notwithstanding possible  scepticism as  to  the law's  ability to  deal  with this  new 
environment, one should bear in mind all the efforts made since the late 1990s to 
bring the law more in line with the technological and business evolution. Following 
the  Commission's  Green  Paper  on  Convergence,  the  so-called  'New  Regulatory  
Framework' (NRF)  has  emerged  in  2002,  placing   more  focus  on  technological 
neutrality7 and  replacing  universally  applicable  regulatory  measures  with  a  more 
tailor-made approach based on regular market analysis and general competition law.8 
These efforts have not only been made at the legislative level, but also at the level of 
the practical application of the legal framework by means of regulatory decisions. In 
addition to regular market reviews by the European National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs) that sometimes resulted in previously unseen remedies, such as functional 
separation9 in the UK, these efforts included both Recommendations by the European 
7 Technological neutrality can be described as a notion that the law does not discriminate among 
different technologies.
8See e.g. Walden, I. in: Walden, I., Angel, J., 2005, p. 148.
9 Functional separation can be described as a regulatory remedy or requirement, whereby a telecom 
operator is obliged to provide certain wholesale (network) inputs to itself or its own retail arm under 
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Commission and soft law in the form of ERG Common Positions and Reports. It 
should further be noted that the preparation of these documents has been subject to 
actual  observations of  market  developments and consultations  with the interested 
public, which makes it more difficult to criticise the gap between the legal rules and 
'social reality'.
Of course, in line with the neo-liberal idea of superiority of market forces, it could 
also be argued that the law adapts to the environment as much as it is necessary,10 
which should result in 'efficient' legal concepts being developed based on the needs 
of  the economy.  Nevertheless,  the lack of synchronisation addressed above gives 
sufficient reason to be sceptical about drawing direct links between legal evolution 
and market developments. Therefore, against this background, this thesis will apply 
systems theory as an approach that explains how legal concepts primarily evolve 
from other legal concepts and how the law, instead of re-inventing itself based on the 
changes in the environment, primarily re-cycles and re-uses its existing concepts to 
create a new image of business and technology it has to face.
In the 'systems theory' one can separately observe different social systems, including 
the law, as autopoietically closed systems where contacts between the systems are 
isolated as 'structural couplings', regular indirect links that enable one social system 
to  establish  its  own  image  of  another  social  system.  For  example,  in  legal 
proceedings, economic or engineering arguments may be quoted, but the law decides 
how far they can be admitted as evidence. Similarly, in legislative decision-making, 
the politics play a vital role but in order for the political will to  have a legal effect, it 
must  be  drafted  as  statute,  recognising  the  law's  language  and  principles. 
Accordingly,  by means of  analysing these links,  one can keep track of  the law's 
evolution  in  relation  to  other  social  systems  or  non-social  phenomena  such  as 
technology  that  are,  nevertheless,  reflected  in  various  social  systems  such  as 
engineering or economy. On the other hand, these links are a reminder that the law's 
change is essentially a self-change and that one should not expect new  technologies 
or business ideas to be able to directly shape the law.11 This approach can therefore 
exactly the same, strictly controlled conditions as to its retail competitors.
10 See e.g. Posner, R A., 2003, p. 4. This could be assumed based on the idea of humans as rational 
utility maximisers.
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be used to expose both the opportunities and the limits for the evolution of law in 
relation to its business, technological and political environment.
Using the case studies of the two key traditional areas of communications law i.e. 
end-user telephony services and wholesale network access and interconnection,12  this 
thesis  will explore the re-shaping of the legal rules governing communications in 
relation  to  the  shift  to  NGN in  telecommunications  business  and  technology.  In 
addition, net neutrality13 as a brand new challenge for the legal regulation of NGN 
imported  from  the  US  to  the  EU14 will  be  addressed  in  order  to  explore  the 
possibilities for a change of the focus of the law to new issues raised by technology. 
The  changes  in  the  said  areas  will  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  the  European 
institutional  and  procedural  framework  for  the  adoption  of  legal  rules,  as  this 
framework has during the recent years seen important changes introduced with the 
intent of improving the flexibility and adaptability of the law.15
Looking  at  the  developments  of  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications during the late 90's and the first decade of the 21st century, one can 
identify two main substantive approaches the law has taken in order to take account 
of the changes in its economic and technological environment.
First, communications law has attempted to be more technology neutral, not only by 
means of  an explicit  principle16 but  also by means of  re-defining the  established 
concept of voice telephony, which was one of the initial targets of legal regulation 
following market liberalisation and remained one of the key features of the EU legal 
11 When this seems to be happening, at first glance one can usually assume that lobbying on a large-
scale is taking place. An interesting case is presented by Drahos and Braithwaite as to the expansion 
of the scope of patents in the area of biological research. Drahos, P., Braithwaite, J., 2002, p. 155 et  
seq.
12See e.g. Walden, I., 2009, p. 11-12. See also e.g. Melody, W. H. and Garnham, N. in: Melody, W.H.,  
1997, p. 53 and 207.
13 Net neutrality can be described as regulation of equal access by applications and services at the level 
of the internet service provision, so that a service provider is not allowed to block or prioritise certain 
content or services.
14 While no uniform legal formula is used across the Atlantic, the issue addressed is perceived in a  
uniform way and efforts in this direction are generally supported by the same civil society movements. 
See Le Coz, 2009.
15  See e.g. Walden, I., 2009, p. 169 et seq.
16 See Article 8(1) of the 2002 Framework Directive. See also Walden, I., 2009, p. 53.
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framework even after the 2009 review. In relation to voice telephony, technology-
neutral  approach  is  supposed  to  prevent  discrimination  between  IP-based  voice 
services (VoIP)17 that in an NGN environment increasingly replace traditional circuit-
switched services, and the latter.18
Second, communications law has attempted to come closer to 'economic reality' by 
means of seeing telecommunications as 'markets' rather than 'technologies'. This has 
been effected by means of borrowing concepts such as 'relevant markets' or 'market 
power'  from  general  competition  law,  using  them  as  the  basis  for  regulating 
wholesale  network access  and network  interconnection.  This  approach is  a  more 
specific version of technological neutrality, as it introduces economic substitutability 
criteria to the legal analysis as to whether certain services should be treated equally.
These  developments  will  be  explored  by  using  systems  theory  approach  as  the 
internal  developments  of  the legal  system and not  as  functions  of  technology or 
economy, bearing in mind that legal responses to the telecom market must ultimately 
be  expressed  in  the  legal  code.19 Contrary  to  the  classical  'law  and  economics' 
formula, these internal developments cannot be seen as a guarantee that the law is in 
the process of finding the most efficient ways of regulating the NGN environment. 
Instead they should be seen as an attempt of the communications law to promote 
itself20 as  the regulating system in a changing environment by taking changes on 
board as part of its programmes. Accordingly, these developments are the result of 
the law's observation of the new environment and its self-observation, but are never a 
direct application of the economic analysis of the law's efficiency, since the latter 
could  only  be  visible  to  law  indirectly,  by  means  of  structural  couplings.  As  a 
consequence,  the  described  self-evolution  of  law  is  limited  to  the  law's  own 
17 VoIP i.e. Voice over Internet Protocol means transmission of voice by means of Internet Protocol. 
Some types of VoIP now fully resemble in their functionality traditional telephony.
18“Conversely, voice communication services fulfilling the four conditions enshrined in the Directive 
and therefore appearing as  substitutes  for  voice telephony services  provided by traditional  means 
should  be  regarded  as  voice  telephony  and  be  submitted  to  the  relevant  regulatory  regime,  in 
consideration of the principle of technological neutrality”.  Communication from the Commission –  
Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC –  
Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on  
the  status  and  implementation  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the  markets  for  
telecommunications services (2000/C 369/03).
19 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 93.
20 See ibidem, p. 259.
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solutions,  which inevitably places  boundaries for the system's  'adaptation'  and its 
development towards the 'efficient' or another state preferred by other social systems, 
e.g., economy or politics. This is reflected in the developments mentioned above and 
will be corroborated during the course of this thesis.
First, the idea of technology-neutral regulation of VoIP remains limited to the law's 
internal  criteria.  These  criteria  may  have  been  derived  from  economy  (market 
substitution) or politics (public interest) but have at certain point become part of the 
legal  system.  This  is  reflected  in  the  legacy  of  burdensome  voice  telephony 
regulation compared to the light-touch approach to, say newly deployed broadband 
services or internet services  in general,  where no legacy of regulation previously 
existed. As this research will show, the main question for EU communications law in 
respect of end-user services has been if and to what extent should the regulation of 
traditional voice telephony also apply to VoIP services. In the absence of regulatory 
legacy and clear  statutory obligations,  the legal  response to  other  NGN end-user 
issues  such  as  equal  treatment  of  internet  traffic  irrespective  of  origin  (i.e.  net 
neutrality)  has  remained  limited  to  the  insertion  of  a  vague  quality  of  service 
provision into the 2009 reform package.21 Whereas this may be seen as obvious at 
this  stage  of  legal  development,  it  does  in  itself  question  the  law's  flexibility, 
particularly  where  coupling  with  clear  political  legislative  programmes  is  not 
available. Accordingly, it shall be argued that communications law can only achieve 
technological neutrality within the system itself, taking account of the law's existing 
images of the environment, which inevitably limits the law's adaptation to change 
from the perspective of other social systems.
Second,  whereas  the  perception  of  the  evolution  of  applied  technologies  as  the 
'evolution  of  markets'  using  competition  law  concepts  of  'relevant  markets'  and 
'market  power'  has  dramatically  increased  the  flexibility  of  the  post-NRF 
communications law compared to the previous framework, this shift can hardly be 
seen as a universal formula for addressing all NGN-based market failures. Namely, 
21 See Article 22 (3) of the Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7  
March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks  
and  services  (Universal  Service  Directive)  as  amended  by  Directive  2009/136/EC:  “In  order  to 
prevent  the  degradation  of  service  and  the  hindering  or  slowing down of  traffic  over  networks,  
Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities are able to set minimum quality of  
service requirements on an undertaking or undertakings providing public communications networks.”
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due  to  the  idea  of  the  gradual  'shift'  to  general  competition  law,  the  EU 
communications law now lacks a clear formula to deal with permanent bottlenecks22 
such as local access or call termination. From systems theory perspective, this can be 
explained by the law relying on a limited number of internal concepts, which prevent 
it from seeing the full economic picture. Moreover, while competition law addresses 
the defects of such permanent market failures by creating its own images of 'essential 
facilities', communications law lacks an equivalent approach and keeps relying on its 
own mantra of transition to effective competition on every regulated market despite a 
potentially  specific  economic  situation.  Coupling  with  economic  analysis  does 
provide  the  law with  an  array  of  sensors  that  could  address  the  worries  of  the 
economic system, however, the results of this analysis are only applied within the 
legal system for the purpose of choosing one or more of the more or less pre-set 
remedies, which are by definition only temporary and need to be regularly reviewed. 
This  explains  the  difficulties  that  communications  law faces  in  imposing  market 
remedies  as  permanent  regulatory  solutions,  such  as  requirements  for  functional 
separation or 'Bill and Keep'23 settlement systems.
In  fact,  reflexivity  and  'proceduralization'  of  law,24 which  includes  closer  co-
operation among the regulatory authorities in terms of establishing best regulatory 
practices,  facilitate  the  coupling  of  the  legal  system  with  the  environment, 
'connecting the use of administrative power directly with the use of communicative 
power'.25 However, as far as legal solutions are concerned, these processes are unable 
to offer solutions outside the law's own programmes. Notwithstanding the degree of 
the changes in the environment that trigger the changes in legal programmes, both 
case studies will demonstrate that the evolution of communications law in relation to 
NGN is the evolution of the law's own concepts and eventually its internalisation of 
concepts that stem from other social systems, such as economy or science. While this 
may sound  disappointing  to  those  in  favour  of  a  more  flexible,  market-oriented 
22 See Nihoul, P., Rodford, P., 2004, p. 199-200.
23 'Bill and keep' is a wholesale traffic exchange system whereby traffic is exchanged between the 
operators free of charge.
24 Teubner, relying on Ladeur, explains this phenomenon as 'proceduralization', which is based on 
procedural secondary virtues like plurality of options, compatibility of differences, or guarantees of 
social change via resistance against self-reinforcement of the system. See Teubner, G. in: Teubner, G., 
Febbrajo, A.,  State, Law, and Economy as Autopoietic Systems, Regulation and Autonomy in a New  
Perspective,(Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, Milan 1992), p. 611.
25  Black, J., 2000, p. 613.
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regulation,  such  results  are  fully  in  line  with  the  law's  expectation-stabilising 
function  in  society,  providing  'goods  and  services'  that  economy  itself  cannot 
provide.26 Whereas  new  flexible  or  'neutral'  legal  concepts  and  coupling  the 
economic analysis together with 'proceduralization' speed up the creation of norms 
based on the law's observations of the environment, this process inevitably remains 
within the law's own circle of concepts guaranteeing legal certainty of regulation. 
However, the findings as to these limits resulting from autopoietic closure may prove 
to be helpful in identifying the need to introduce new legislative concepts from the 
perspective of the political system.
26 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p.391.
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2 RESEARCH METHODS
It  is  submitted  that  socio-legal  research  would  contribute  to  better  and  broader 
understanding  of  communications  law  and  its  development  by  involving 
interdisciplinary knowledge.27 It  is  further  submitted that  in  order  to  perform the 
analysis  required,  a  powerful  theory  that  is  clearly  able  to  distinguish  between 
technology, law, politics, economy, and identify the interactions among these areas is 
required. In the context of socio-legal research, Ziegert proposes the use of systems 
theory because it is a sociologically thick description that maps society as a whole.28 
This  chapter  will  describe the basic presumptions of this  theory as developed by 
Niklas Luhmanns and Guenther Teubner and will address the strengths and potential 
weaknesses of using it as the central approach for this research.
2.1 Reasons to choose systems theory approach
Communications regulation by means of legal rules is often seen as an instrument of 
economic efficiency29 or,  alternatively,  public  policy30 utilised in order to achieve 
better  use of  network resources,  technological  innovation and consumer benefits. 
This implies that economy or politics can use the law in order to reach certain results 
to  their  own benefit.  According  to  Bach  and Sallet,  for  example,  different  legal 
concepts  such  as  public  telephony  are  linked  to  different  sets  of  rights  and 
obligations,  each  with  their  own distributional  and market  strategic  implications, 
which inevitably forces the regulators to observe the interests of stakeholders and 
enter  the  ‘realm  of  politics’,  particularly  in  case  of  IP-based  services  where 
companies from previously distinct industries, i.e. telephone incumbents and ISPs, 
compete against one another.31 
27 See eg Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. xi.
28 Ziegert, K.A. in: Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. 59.
29 See e.g. Posner, R. A., 2002.
30 For policy reasons behind telecom regulation see e.g. Walden, I. in: Walden, I., 2009, p. 11.
31 Bach, D., Sallet, J., 2005, p. 1-4.
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Although this  view can be used  to  explain  say 'capture'  of  regulators  by certain 
stakeholders, it neglects the law's autonomous stability and developments, including 
its  internal  controls by means of judicial  review.  From the economic or  political 
science point of view, one cannot easily determine the reasons why  legal systems 
might not keep the full track of the new technologies and business models and why 
considerable efforts might be required in order to make it more flexible. Describing 
the law as 'bureaucratic' or 'conservative' tells us little about the law's own operations 
that make it seem that way to other social systems or individuals.
Systems theory  recognises that the legal system performs in the society a distinct 
function from goal-oriented politics and property-oriented economy.  By means of 
stabilising  expectations  despite  disappointments,  the  law provides  for  'goods  and 
services' that cannot be found in the economic system.32 This sheds a different light 
on the law: its failure to 'adapt' to the environment is largely about performing its 
very function.  From the regulatory point  of view, this  is  paradoxical:  on the one 
hand, the law must, as an autonomous system, provide for certainty of the existing 
business  transactions;  on the  other  hand,  it  is  expected  to  be a  progressive,  pro-
competitive instrument of market regulation.
It is submitted that this paradox can best be analysed if one observes the legal system 
as  a  self-referential  social  system  with  rather  strictly  controlled  links  with  the 
environment. Since the law has achieved as an autopoietic system autonomy from its 
environment,  including  politics  and  economy,  its  evolution  is  essentially  the 
evolution  of  its  own  concepts.  Accordingly,  the  paradox  of  'progressive'  yet 
'stabilising' law can best be unveiled if one looks at the evolutionary potential of the 
law's own communications, without a constant reference to their economic efficiency 
or political desirability.
This does not undermine other socio-legal theoretical research approaches. Against 
the background of 'structural' tradition represented by the systems theorists, 'action' 
tradition can provide a valuable insight into the actual functioning of the law.33 For 
32 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p.391.
33 See  Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. 27 and Flood, J. in: Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. 33 et 
seq.
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example, Hall, Scott and Hood have used the “ethnographic” approach in order to 
study “telecoms tribes”.34 However, it is submitted that systems theory is more fitted 
to this research due to its focus on legal communications and structures instead of 
actors involved in the regulatory process.
The relationships between systems theory and other research approaches that will to 
some  extent  be  referred  to  in  this  thesis,  namely  'law  and  economics',  the 
comparative method, legal linguistics and the general theory of regulation, will be 
described later in this chapter.35 
2.2 Qualitative research methods associated with systems 
theory
Systems theory is primarily associated with qualitative research methods although 
one should bear in mind that qualitative research methods are also used by other 
research approaches such as ethnomethodology.36 
As Ziegert points out, qualitative research provides the array of ‘sensors’ which can 
be employed in order to make the boundaries of the operations of law visible.37 By 
contrast he warns against the insensitivity of the quantitative approach to the social 
context.38 It  is  not  the  intention  of  this  thesis  to  criticise  quantitative  research 
methods. Nevertheless, given the rapid changes in technology and even law, it may 
not be possible to involve sufficient quantity of data to conduct this type of research. 
For example,  there may only exist  one or only a few decisions of a regulator or 
legislative change dealing with VoIP even in the most developed countries. On the 
other hand, according to systems theory, qualitative description and comparison of 
events that are available may provide guidance as to how the law develops.39
34 Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. ix.
35 See subchapters 2.9, 2.11 and 2.12.
36 Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. 27.
37 Ziegert, K.A. in: Banakar, R.; Travers, M., 2005, p. 65.
38 Ibidem.
39 See Paterson, J., Teubner, G., 1998.
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Since  systems  theory  does  not  enable  the  finding  of  'facts'  except  for  those 
constructed  by  a  system,  Paterson  and  Teubner  propose  the  idea  of  empirical 
'mapping' whereby different social systems are mapped separately, replacing direct 
chains  of  causality  by  identifying  simultaneous  events  of  structural  coupling.40 
Accordingly, when 'mapping' the law as the focus of this research, one can identify 
those  points  in  the  system where  its  concepts  couple  with  those  of  other  social 
systems,  be  it  economic  analysis,  political  decision-making,  or  processes  within 
regulatory organisations,41 and the evolution of these couplings.
Whereas this does not technically require 'drawing maps', it does require empirical 
observation, both at the level of legislative solutions and at the level of regulatory 
procedures,  in  order  to  establish  which  legal  communications  and  in  what  way 
couple  with  other  social  systems  when  dealing  with  the  developments  in  the 
environment. 
Various sources can and will be employed in order to conduct this type of qualitative 
research:  legal  and  economic  theoretical  works,  legislative  texts,  including 
explanatory memoranda, regulatory decisions and opinions, and articles in the media.
Of  course,  epistemological  questions  relating  to  this  type  of  analysis  should  be 
addressed.  Paterson and Teubner  specifically  deal  with  the  problem of  empirical 
findings  in  the  context  of  understanding society as  systems,  paving the  way for 
qualitative  empirical  systems  theory  research.  First,  an  important  part  of  their 
response is that qualitative empirical findings based on systems theory may not be 
any less reliable than 'classical' quantitative empirical research.42 Second, it should be 
noted  that  language  references  identifying  structural  couplings  with  other  social 
systems (e.g. 'market analysis') are recognizable in a reliable way in different social 
systems involved in coupling. Third, since this thesis focuses on the evolution of law 
and less on its co-evolution with other social systems, there will be no need to test 
second-order effects of legal changes on the part of other social systems. This in 
effect only requires identifying structural couplings as they emerge and evolve on the 
40 Ibidem, p. 457 et seq.
41 Compare ibidem, p. 464-470.
42 Ibidem, p. 455.
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'map' of the legal system, largely avoiding the need for complex multi-dimensional 
mapping.
2.3 Systems theory and social systems
According  to  systems  theory,  the  system  of  society  performs  through 
communications.43 To  be  more  precise,  the  system  of  modern  society  exists  as 
complex differentiated subsystems such as politics, economy, media and law. Law, 
politics and economy are all subsystems of society as a system. On the other hand, 
technology is not part of society and forms part of its environment. Accordingly, the 
existence and use of technical devices must be reflected in society’s communications 
in  order  to  be  reflected  in  law  and  regulation.  In  practice,  technology-related 
communications  are  part  of  the  engineering  social  system,44 whereas  applied 
technology is  also  dealt  with  by  the  economy and,  depending  on  the  degree  of 
'juridification', the law.
In the context of systems theory, the law can be studied as a self-referential social 
subsystem  that  ‘learns’ from  and  responds  to  other  social  subsystems,  such  as 
economy or politics. As implied in the introduction, this process is not necessarily a 
simple and self-evident one. It should further be borne in mind that technological 
issues  are  likely  not  to  ‘enter’ the  law  directly:  they  may  first  be  reflected  in 
economy and politics.  The  legal  communication,  however,  is  always  based on a 
specific code of legal/illegal45. This coding serves as the basis for the legal system’s 
own programmes: the latter are conditional rather than purpose-specific (goal-based) 
compared to, say the  programmes of the political system.46
A further crucial element according to Luhmann’s theory on law is the function of 
law.  According  to  Luhmann,  the  law’s  only  function  that  can  be  established 
empirically is  the  stabilisation  of  expectations  in  time,  despite  disappointments.47 
43 Nobles, R.; Schiff, D. in Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 1.
44 See e.g. Paterson, J., Teubner, G., 1998, p. 471.
45 See e.g. Luhmann, N.,2004, p. 173-4.
46 Nobles, R.; Schiff, D. in Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 21. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 203.
47 Nobles, R.; Schiff, D. in Luhmann, N., p. 14.
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While this function may not be enough to separate the legal system from the rest of 
the society’s subsystems, it can be used as an important criterion for testing how the 
evolution can affect this ability.
Social  systems  are  characterised  by  their  ‘operative  closure’:  to  deal  with  the 
complexity of their environment, they develop a limited range of responses and an 
internal basis for selection.48 These findings are also valid in case of the regulatory 
communications  law.  For  example,  a  regulator  may only address  market  failures 
addressed by economists, as long as a potential remedy for the problem has been 
enabled by the relevant legislation governing the regulatory process. Accordingly, the 
operative  closure  does  not  prevent  the  system  from  communicating  with  its 
environment:  the  system  of  law  is  ‘cognitively  open’49 and  ‘learns’ from  and 
responds  to  other  social  sub-systems  such  as  economy,  politics  or  media. 
Nevertheless, in order for a system to exist as a system, communication with the 
environment must be limited and selective. These limits are of particular importance 
in the context of a regulatory system that claims to be responsive to the ‘actual’ 
market failures.50 Before a response is possible, these ‘actual’ market failures must be 
translated into the code of the system of legal regulation.
Central  to  systems theory as  developed by Luhmann and Teubner  is  the  idea  of 
autopoiesis  of  the  social  system and  its  subsystems,  including  the  law.  It  is  the 
autopoiesis (or ongoing life) of the legal system that guarantees its specific character 
compared  to,  say  politics  or  economy,  and  preserves  law as  a  social  subsystem 
separate from both. Autopoietic social systems, including the legal system, seek fixed 
points  of  their  mode  of  operation  in  themselves  and  not  in  the  environmental 
conditions to which they adapt as best they can.51 They look for these points in self-
description,  which  functions  as  a  programme  of  internal  regulation.52 The  latter 
phenomenon can be referred to as self-reference or autopoiesis.53
48 Ibidem, p. 7.
49 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 69.
50 See e.g. Recital 27 of the Framework Directive.
51 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 15.
52 Ibidem.
53 Ibidem.
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One should note that it is not only the society's function systems such as the law or 
economy  that  are  autopoietic.  In  modern  legal  regulation,  various  formal 
organisations,  such as  regulatory authorities and their  associations,  are  involved. 
Luhmann points out that formal organisations regulate their boundaries by means of 
membership and can regulate which actions are considered actions in the system and 
which  actions  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  environment.54 According  to  Teubner, 
organisations can be identified by the cyclical linkage of identity and action perfected 
in  the  legal  person,  whereas  the  action  system  acquires  a  hitherto  unachieved 
autonomy vis-à-vis its environment, namely both the external environment of say 
market or politics and the internal environment of members and others involved in 
functioning of the organization.55 Of course,  actions of organizations couple with 
other  social  systems,  such as  the law,  which  means that  their  acts,  e.g.  common 
positions or recommendations, can be legally codified and made relevant to the law.
In relation to the entire  society,  social  subsystems such as law,  politics or media 
represent special cycles of communication that have developed out of the general 
cycle of social communication.56 Social systems that have developed a ‘thorough’ 
degree of independence can be referred to  as second-order autopoietic  systems.57 
This is also valid for the legal system in its present form.58 The latter is constituted by 
specific communications about legality and illegality which reproduce themselves as 
legal acts by means of legal acts,59 without a constant reference to an outside source, 
say divinity or nature.
Bearing in mind the political and legal component of regulation, it is important to 
draw a distinction between the legal and the political subsystem in the regulatory 
field. Luhmann draws a distinction based on the coding of both systems: whereas 
54 Luhmann, N., 1995, p. 196-197.
55 Teubner, G., 1987c, p. 20. These characteristics are valid, for example, as regards the ERG, which is 
able to develop its  autonomous positions on regulation of the market,  while consulting their own 
members on the one hand and other stakeholders on the other.
56 Ibidem, p. 69.
57 Ibidem.
58 Ibidem, p. 70.
59 Ibidem.
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politics is characterised by the government/the opposition scheme, the law is based 
on distinguishing between legal and illegal.60 Whereas regulation is not a subsystem 
in its own,61 but rather a description of the influence of one system upon another, 
specific  regulatory  actions  normally  can be  qualified  as  legal  (conditional)  or 
political  (purpose-specific).62 They can  be  either  about  enforcing  the  statute  (say 
requiring  certain  operators  to  provide  emergency  access  based  on  the  statutory 
requirement) or about creating new rules with a specific purpose, normally within the 
powers given to the regulator by the statute (say creating rules for emergency calls 
for  certain  operators).  However,  even  purpose-specific  regulatory  actions  will 
normally belong to the legal system, e.g. as legally-binding decisions.
Accordingly, the limits of the legal system are not established on the basis of certain 
communication  not  being  part  of  other  social  systems  (or,  say,  a  'regulatory 
discourse'),  but rather its  coding that  can be processed by the legal system. This 
reveals not only the penetration of law into the regulatory process (e.g. by means of 
recommendations written in legal form) but also the law's limits when it comes to 
accommodating ideas beyond the grasp of its code.
2.4 Coding and programming of communications law
As already noted above, according to Luhmann, law is characterised by its specific 
binary code of legal and illegal.63 Looking at modern law, one can easily establish 
that  numerous  social  communications  are  given  a  legal  status.  For  example, 
commercial offers often fulfil the requirements for legal offers or at least for stages in 
legally  recognised  negotiations,  even  if  they  are  not  regulated  by  public  law. 
Accordingly, a request to grant access to facilities such as fibre local loops may be 
considered legally relevant even in the absence of a public law obligation mandating 
access to this type of infrastructure.
60 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 378.
61 On the potential of 'regulation' or 'regulatory process' of becoming a social systems on its own, see 
discussion below p. 38 et seq.
62 Ibidem, p. 203-2.
63 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 93.
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Legal  coding  is  therefore  not  enough  to  fully  describe  the  legal  regulation  of 
electronic communications. In order to prescribe legal obligations such as regulatory 
remedies, legal code must be developed into conditional programmes (e.g. by means 
of statutes). These programmes enable legal decision-making on the basis of legally 
relevant  communications.  For  example,  a  request  to  grant  unbundled access  to  a 
copper local loop addressed to a relevant telecommunications operator could trigger 
legal obligations based on the 2000 EC Regulation on unbundled access to the local 
loop64 and the regulatory measures issued based on the 2003 Recommendation on 
relevant  markets.65 On the  other  hand,  a  request  to  unbundle  a  fibre  local  loop, 
despite being seen by the legal system as a valid offer or negotiations, would not 
trigger such an obligation, because, according to the two documents, there was no 
obligation to unbundle an optical fibre loop upon reasonable request. Nevertheless, 
the  request  to  unbundle  a  fibre  local  loop  could  still  be  considered  'legal',  for 
example  as  part  of  'negotiations'  explicitly  recognised  by  both  the  2002  EU 
Framework  Directive and  contract  law,  as  a  commercial  offer  belonging  to  the 
economic system, as the evidence of an abuse of dominant position, or as a political 
proposal to reform legislation.
As  laws  evolve,  not  only  coding,  but  also  programming  changes:  the  same 
communications can gain a different meaning and can trigger different conditional 
obligations. Under the 2007 EC Recommendation on relevant markets,66 whereby the 
local access market is defined in broader terms as a market for ‘wholesale (physical) 
network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed 
location’,67 there is a possibility to create a public-law obligation to unbundle fibre 
64 Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December  
2000 on unbundled access to the local loop.
65 Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC  on relevant product and service markets within the  
electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  in  accordance  with  Directive  
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for  
electronic communications networks and services.
66 Commission  Recommendation  on  relevant  product  and  service  markets  within  the  electronic  
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of  
the  European  Parliament  and of  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  
communications networks and services (Second edition), C(2007) 5406 rev 1.
67 See Annex to the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the  
electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  in  accordance  with  Directive  
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for  
electronic communications networks and services (Second edition).
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local loops. This can be achieved by following a specific market analysis procedure, 
whereby an NRA finds that access to fibre loops forms part of the pre-set local access 
market. According to this scenario, a request to grant unbundled access to a fibre 
local loop could trigger public law obligations of the relevant operator.
To conclude, commercial negotiations in the area of electronic communications are 
unlikely to simply be denied legal status as ‘noise’ not belonging to the legal system. 
It is unlikely, especially in today’s highly ‘juridified’ society,68 that the law would 
simply ignore certain commercial activities and there is likely to be a certain legal 
‘classification’ available to describe them. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the law 
attributes meaning to certain communications does not deem these communications 
regulated  in  the  public  law  sense.  This  is  also  consistent  with  Braithwaite’s 
observation that the law also ‘regulates’ by means of contract  law.69 Like public law, 
private  law  is  self-referential,  regulating  society  by  means  of  regulating  itself; 
however, by means of its coupling with the political system, it can still be seen as an 
instrument by which the state seeks to regulate markets.70 A similar observation is 
made by Maher in respect of competition law in relation to stricter 'command and 
control'  regulatory rules, questioning the traditional distinction between regulation 
and competition.71 It is therefore the programming and not the coding of the legal 
system that makes a difference. Accordingly, it is important to note that modern law 
assigns legal status to numerous communications that do not necessarily correspond 
to  mandatory  public-law  obligations.  Self-regulation  may  serve  as  yet  another 
example.72
A further  difference  in  coding  and  programming  corresponds  to  procedural  and 
substantive law. The fact that a communication can be processed by the legal system 
does  not  in  any way guarantee  that  the  substantive  claim it  expresses  is  legally 
68 For the US example see Kagan, R. A., 2001, p. 182. For European examples see Teubner, G., 1987b, 
p. 6.
69 Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 5.
70 Collins, H., 1999, p. 37-38 and 56.
71 Maher, I. in: Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J. 2004, p. 187-188.
72 According to the general theory of regulation, self-regulation can be seen as taking place when a 
group of firms or individuals exert control over its own membership and their behaviour. Baldwin, R., 
Cave, M., 1999, p. 125. One should bear in mind that, according to systems theory, most forms of self-
regulation will also be legally 'visible', e.g. by means of written codes of conduct.
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justified; in the above case of fibre local loops no mandatory obligation could be 
found under the 2000 and 2003 acts and no mandatory access could be granted.
By means of its reference to coding, systems theory can see  the law as a unified 
system, which is particularly relevant in today’s flexible regulatory system where the 
programmes change easily, making the traditional border between legal frameworks 
and legal decisions increasingly blurred. The latter practice can be seen in action 
through the operation of the 2002 EU regulatory framework. Under this framework 
there are several ways to introduce fibre loops unbundling into the set of mandatory 
obligations. First, an NRA or a national court interpreting obligations could decide 
that the legal system’s consistency and its general principles would require the equal 
treatment of fibre and copper local loops. According to  Luhmann, this would show 
that the law itself has the means of noticing defects and fixing them.73 Such a result 
is, however, unlikely, due to the Commission’s harmonising and supervisory powers. 
Second, the Commission may itself recommend that access market for fibre local 
loops  be  regulated,  which  has  actually  happened  by  means  of  passing  a 
Recommendation  in  2010.74 This  required  not  only  legal  reasoning,  but  also  a 
political decision by the Commission as a policy-making body. Third, the Parliament 
and the Council  could politically mandate the unbundling of fibre local loops by 
means of regulation, as was previously the case with copper loop unbundling. The 
three options show that different programming choices can still result in very similar 
obligations, all of them part of the legal code.
2.5 Structural couplings instead of direct inter-system 
inputs
Self-reference  and  autopoiesis  establish  a  high  degree  of  autonomy of  the  legal 
system in relation to other social subsystems such as economy or politics that form 
its environment.75 In Teubner’s view, the law benefits as a system only if it  frees 
73 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 258.
74 See  Commission Recommendation of  20.9.2010 on regulated access to Next Generation Access  
Networks (NGA), C(2010) 6223 final.
75 See Teubner, G., 1993, p. 15.
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itself from its turbulent environment,76 which is also a pre-condition for its existence 
as  a  social  system.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  law is  isolated  from this 
environment,  but  quite  the  reverse.77 While  autopoiesis  and self-referentiality  are 
crucial in order to establish the law as a stabilized and self-maintaining system,78 
there are constant linkages between the law and other social subsystems by means of 
‘structural couplings’, i.e. regular mutual irritations of the systems that in practice 
enable one system to detect and process the operations of another subsystem. For 
example, the economic transaction of payment is detected and processed by the legal 
system as an act of fulfilling a contract.79 These couplings do not mean, however, that 
one system receives a direct input from the other. Instead, the same transaction can 
be given a different meaning by both systems.
In order to mutually detect each other’s developments, however, the systems must 
irritate each other. In order to make such detection significant, these irritations will 
generally need to  develop into regular,  i.e.  structural  phenomena.  For example,  a 
single observation of an economist  on how competition law should respond to a 
certain issue would leave no trace in the legal system. However, if such observations 
are regularly admitted to legal proceedings by the legal rules, they could become part 
of an individual decision or even established legal practice, e.g. as a regular reference 
in competition law to economic market analysis in order to establish market power. 
Luhmann identifies two crucial structural couplings between law and politics and law 
and economy: constitution and contract.80 Whereas political inputs are admitted to 
law by means of a legislative procedure (as set by the constitution or its equivalent, 
say the EU Treaty81), the concept of contract binds economic and legal transactions. 
Both  of  these  couplings  as  known  today  are  results  of  historic  evolutionary 
developments.82
76 Ibidem, p. 33.
77 Ibidem, p. 26.
78 Ibidem, p. 15.
79 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 395 et seq.
80 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 399, 404.
81 On European constitutionalism see Weiler, J. H. H., 1999.
82 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 385-412.
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However, structural couplings lead us to the crucial question linked to autopoiesis: 
how precisely can outside systems such as economy (and its underlying theory) or 
politics influence law if the latter is caught up in ”its own circle”?83 Similarly, how 
can  law be  used  as  a  means  of  regulating  the  rest  of  society?  One  should  first 
recognize that the legal system cannot be regulated directly from the outside.84 The 
same is  valid  for  other  social  subsystems,  such  as  economy or  politics,  and for 
technology that lies outside of society’s communications. In fact, one can  show that 
the coupling mechanisms are also the key driver of the systems’ (co-)evolution as 
they enable communications from one subsystem to be at the disposal for reception 
of the other subsystem, therefore making its internal changes possible. If coupling is 
regular (i.e. structural), the probability for a change is higher. However, despite this, 
processing information from other subsystems within the legal system remains an 
internal operation of the legal system. Equally,  including legal rules into business 
models and calculations remains an operation of the economic system.
Structural  couplings,  i.e.  couplings  where  the  legal  system  presupposes  certain 
features of its environment on an ongoing basis,85  make the system cognitively open 
and  are  therefore  important  signs  of  the  evolution  of  law  in  relation  to  its 
environment.  In  other  words,  law  may  regularly  run  into  communications  (or 
irritations) from other subsystems, say by political proposals to radically change its 
foundations.  However,  in  certain  cases,  these  communications  (or  irritations)  are 
recognised  by  the  system  and  enable  its  regular  links  with  other  subsystems. 
Accordingly,  structural  couplings  on the  one hand reduce and on the  other  hand 
facilitate the influences of the environment on the system.86 Nevertheless, Luhmann 
warns that, despite structural coupling mechanisms, the communications from other 
subsystems are not direct ‘inputs’ for the system, as they do not use the system’s 
binary code.87 Before they are ‘digitised’ by the system itself, they can in principle 
only trigger “irritations, surprises, and disturbances”.88 
83 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 71.
84 Ibidem, p. 77.
85 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 382.
86 Ibidem, 2004.
87 Ibidem, 2004.
88 Ibidem, 2004.
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This should not be misunderstood, however. Since structural couplings enable certain 
communications from other subsystems to be regularly seen on the law’s own “video 
screen”89 in a specific form written in its own code and vice versa, a notable degree 
of alignment between subsystems is possible provided that “translation” can be made 
by means of (existing or newly emerging) structural couplings.
2.6 Systems theory as a tool of explaining legal evolution
It  is  precisely the idea of autopoiesis  that can explain legal  evolution.  Without a 
relative  closure  of  the  system,  the  system cannot  be  identified  as  a  system and 
therefore cannot perform as such. Similar to organisms, social systems (not groups of 
humans, but rather groups of communications) develop an internal basis for selection 
that allows them to develop more complex internal responses to their environment.90 
Similar  to  evolution  in  biology,  the  mechanisms  of  variation,  selection,  and 
stabilization (retention) play a crucial role in the evolution of social subsystems.91 
Systems theory can be viewed in parallel with the theory of legal memetics.92 The 
latter  sees  the  legal  communications  as  memes  that,  similar  to  genes  of  living 
organisms, possess a 'selfish will' to survive in their form.
The views of systems theorists on the evolution of law are not united93 on the issue of 
how exactly the law can evolve in relation to other social systems and how other 
social  systems can  be  influenced by law.  This  is  linked to  the  question  whether 
autopoiesis is absolute, as Luhmann seems to argue, or are there, as suggested by 
Teubner, varying degrees of it.94 In either case, variation, selection and retention of 
communications as the elements of the law's evolution are internal to the law as an 
autopoietic social system. The law's code and programmes, e.g. case law or statutes, 
89 See ibidem, N., 2004, p. 383.
90 Nobles, R.; Schiff, D. in Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 7.
91 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 232.
92 See Deakin, S., 2002.
93 Whereas Teubner favours a co-evolutionary approach, Luhmann clearly rejects the idea that the 
environment can really 'determine' law. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 258.
94 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 76.
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can only be changed in the legal form. If one explores the evolution of law in relation 
to the environment, however, one can note that these legal changes can take place 
while coupling with other social systems: for example, statutes are changed based on 
political  decisions and judges can 'translate'  economic experts'  opinions into their 
judgements.
Teubner identifies information and interference as the two mechanisms which ensure 
that operatively closed social systems remain cognitively open95 and consequently 
influenced  by  other  systems.  While  an  autopoietic  system  cannot  be  directly 
controlled from the outside, its changes can be ‘triggered off’ from its environment.96 
These outside factors, however,  are according to Teubner never a direct cause of 
change,  as  the  legal  system  has  developed  its  own  mechanisms  of  variation, 
selection,  and retention: only those political,  economical or other social pressures 
that appear on the ‘internal screens’ of the legal system can have an innovative effect 
within the legal system.97 As Teubner further points out, in order to trigger variation, 
outside impetuses must pass through the ‘eye of the needle’ of operations within each 
of  the  subsystems.98 For  example,  an  economic  expert  challenges  economic 
implications of a legal doctrine on market dominance and this view is later presented 
by  a  party  to  competition  law  proceedings.  Selection  means  the  emergence  of 
structures out of the interaction form by exposure to the selection of the different 
autopoietic systems.99 For example, the said opinion is actually admitted by the court 
as  a  valid  defence  in  a  competition  case,  whereas  other  economists  study  its 
economic implications. Retention happens by means of adaptation of these structures 
to the various philosophies and dogmatics of the subsystems.100 For example, the said 
decision is admitted by higher courts and becomes part of case law, while economists 
regularly use it in their analysis for competition proceedings purposes. This process 
can be referred to as co-evolution of the social subsystems.101 It can be used as a tool 
95 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 97.
96 Teubner, G. in: Teubner, G., 1987, p. 233.
97 Ibidem.
98 Ibidem, p. 236.
99 Ibidem.
100 Ibidem.
101 Ibidem.
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to explain mutual influence and development of various social subsystems such as 
law, politics, media, and economy. However, it should be noted that this thesis will 
focus  on  the  evolution  of  law  and  not  on  simultaneous  (co-)evolution  of  other 
mentioned subsystems.
Luhmann seems to reject the idea that some ‘higher meaning’ should be attached to 
the  process  of  evolution,102 and  Teubner  further  stresses  that  one  is  in  principle 
dealing with “blind legal evolution”.103 ‘Blindness’ here does not refer to the absence 
of  specific  intentions  of  legislators and regulators,  but  the double difficulty that 
human consciousness does not directly influence social systems and that different 
social  systems cannot directly influence each other.104 Nevertheless, Teubner does 
mention the cases of ‘regulated co-evolution’ by intentionally established intersystem 
systems  of  negotiation.105 This  pattern  can,  for  example,  be  recognised  in 
consultations of legislative or regulatory public bodies with the industry.
Evolution  is  usually  explained  by  means  of  the  distinction  between  ontogenetic 
learning that takes place in individual proceedings of legislation, administration, and 
adjudication on the one hand, and the phylogenetic  evolution of the system as a 
whole on the other. This difference can be interesting for understanding the evolution 
of communications law: for example, a specific regulatory decision may deal with 
VoIP in a technology-neutral or technology-non-neutral way. However, there must be 
a series of IP/NGN-related regulatory decisions in order to establish whether the law 
is  developing towards  greater  technological  neutrality or not.  It  should be noted, 
however, that the EU regulatory framework, which is subject to reviews every couple 
of  years,  makes  it  difficult  to  distinguish  between  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic 
change.  Hence,  interpretation  will  depend  on  the  viewpoint:  a  single  regulatory 
decision  may be  compared  to  a  change  in  the  legislative  framework,  whereas  a 
change in the framework may be compared to an essential change in the principles of 
the framework.
102 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 267.
103 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 47. On the other hand, Luhmann rejects the idea that the evolution linked to 
the law’s self-promotion would be blind. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 259.
104 See Teubner, G., 1993, p. 59.
105 Teubner, G. in: Teubner, G., 1987, p. 237.
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In  order  to  study  the  phylogenetic  evolution  of  law,  it  is  therefore  useful  to 
distinguish this process from the events that occur in specific regulatory proceedings 
on  a  daily  basis,  i.e.  ontogenetic  learning  in  the  proceedings  forming  the  legal 
system.106 For example, for the purposes of this research, one must avoid placing 
significant importance on the fact that IP technology and IP-based business models 
have been processed by the legal system. At the end of the day, the mere fact that the 
law addresses  these  issues  on  a  daily  basis  would  not  justify  this  research.  The 
general shift to IP technology and NGN in modern communications triggers a more 
important question as to how far this shift  has resulted in important, general and 
permanent changes on the part of the communications law.
One should not argue that there is a mechanism that could empirically and reliably 
distinguish between the ontogenetic  learning and the phylogenetic  evolution.  The 
main  reason  is  the  artificial  nature  of  the  application  of  this  concept  to  social 
systems. Unlike biological organisms that possess their own memory, which ceases 
to exist as a consequence of their death, the results of specific legal proceedings are 
usually recorded and can easily be used in other legal proceedings, either directly as 
precedents (which would also mean phylogenetic change) or indirectly, as a source of 
knowledge  used  to  reach  or  simply  explain  a  result  in  other  proceedings.107 
Accordingly,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  use  the  said  distinction  in  a  metaphorical 
sense, in order to distinguish minor and daily changes in legal communications from 
more fundamental changes in legal rules and principles. There is, however, a reason 
for  trying to  draw a distinction:  while  the first  type of  changes cannot  easily be 
explained  without  detailed  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  of  a  specific  case 
(including  factors  such  as  the  regulator’s  personnel’s  private  views  and  political 
influence), the second type of changes possesses the ability to be more readily linked 
to the events in the environment.
106 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 59-61.
107 Teubner suggests individual proceedings as ontogenetic units, but the difference between selection 
as phylogenetic category and ontogenetic learning of single proceedings as an individual system is not 
entirely clear. Accordingly, it is preferable to argue that this is primarily a metaphorical tool. Teubner,  
G., 1993, p. 60-61.
33
In any case, one should be warned that what appears as ontogenetic learning of the 
social systems may, unlike in the case living organisms, result in memes that can be 
re-used by the legal system and can therefore become part of its autopoietic cycle.108 
This can either be legally institutionalised (e.g. by means of the system of precedent) 
or can simply take an informal form (e.g. as established practice).109 
To conclude, while it should be borne in mind that systems theory may not be able to  
explain  particular  phenomena  such  as  an  individual  regulatory  decision  on  the 
treatment  of  VoIP,110 it  is  a  valuable  tool  for  understanding  the  evolution  of 
telecommunications  law  in  its  entirety111 by  means  of  clearly  identifying  the 
boundaries of the legal system and its  links with the environments with which it 
interacts.
2.7 Synchronisation of communications law with other  
subsystems
If one adopts systems theory approach, one cannot presume the synchronisation of 
the  legal  system  with  its  environment,  namely  the  business  transactions  of  the 
economic system, the power relationships of the political system, or the development 
of technology of the scientific system. However,  the legal system’s perception of 
technology  and  economy  may  be  crucial  in  getting  to  understand  how  the 
developments  in  technology  and  business  models  can  ultimately  affect  the 
developments in law. As already mentioned, these developments must appear on the 
law’s ‘internal screen’, which can happen either by means of direct processing of 
these developments by the regulators and courts, or alternatively by means of these 
developments first being coded in legislation by means of the parliamentary process. 
Despite the finding that the latter process is primarily a political process, drafting 
108 See Deakin, S., 2002.
109 Such a process may be facilitated by means of a regulatory process that enables a more efficient 
flow of information. For example, legal practices of the NRAs may be re-used by means of inclusion 
and reference to ERG principles and best practices. See eg ‘ERG Common Position on Best Practice 
in Bitstream Access Remedies Imposed as a Consequence of a Position of Significant Market Power 
in  the  Market  for  Wholesale  Broadband  Access  ERG(06)69Rev1’  (2006)  Available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_06_69rev1_wba_cp.pdf, 2nd March 2008.
110 See Teubner, G. in: Teubner, G., 1987, p. 226.
111 Ibidem.
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means describing the environment in a legal form and therefore also amounts to an 
operation of the legal system.
Nevertheless, the fact that the law is coding its environment in order to process it 
does not mean that it  is receiving direct ‘inputs’ from the environment.112 Due to 
autopoiesis, there can be no direct inputs. If one looks at operatively closed systems, 
there can be only irritations. Instead of reproducing itself in the same manner as it 
did before, the legal system is confronted with an irritation from the outside. It will  
detect this irritation and may eventually change because of it, but the irritation will 
still be processed by the system itself and not by its environment.  
The concept  of irritation explains why the coupled systems react  to  irritations at 
different  speeds.113 The  speed  of  the  response  depends  on  the  structure  of  the 
system,114 which makes it impossible for, say law and economy to react to a change 
in  technology  at  the  same  time.  As  Deakin  points  out,  the  evolution  of  law  is 
‘asynchronic’, whereby close alignment between the state of the law and that of the 
economy is  the  exception,  not  the  rule.115 Whereas  economy may rather  quickly 
develop a new retail product based on new technology, the law may need to resort to 
lengthy parliamentary procedures or at least complex court proceedings in order to 
find  answers  to  a  technology-related  question.  Even if  the  law can generally  be 
perceived as open to its constant change in relation to technology, as is the case with 
the EU regulatory framework, the change may take a considerable amount of time.116
2.8 Self-promotion, juridification and proceduralization
Possible responses of communications law to changes in the environment by changes 
in its programming vary to a large extent. As it will be shown, law can face certain 
issues in the environment by relaxing its conditional rules and allowing for more 
112 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 382.
113 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 383.
114 Ibidem.
115 Deakin, S., 2002, p. 37.
116 The reform of the NRF was initially presented by the Commission in 2006. However, the proposals 
have only reached the Parliament and the Council in the beginning of 2008.
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discretion. It can further offer its existing concepts from one area of law to deal with 
a  specific  new  issue  in  another  area,  as  is  the  case  with  the  introduction  of 
competition law concepts into sector-specific telecommunications law. However, the 
example that will be studied during the course of this research give us little guidance 
as to why the law would adapt to its environment instead of choosing to become 
obsolete. It is submitted that one part of the answer is given by Luhmann and the 
other part by Deakin.
According to Luhmann, the legal system is no longer waiting in the wings for people 
to engage in a dispute in order that it can find a legal solution.117 Instead, the law 
itself produces situations which trigger off conflicts by regulatory manipulation of 
everyday life.118 Thereby,  the  law promotes  itself.119 Luhmann links  this  with the 
proliferation  of  legislation,  which  is  based  on  the  democratization  and  the 
constitutional  channelling  of  political  influence  through  legislation.120 This 
phenomenon  largely  corresponds  to  'juridification',  i.e.  legal  coding  of  the 
environment not previously regulated by law.121
However, a more specific view on the legal system’s self-promotion can be extracted 
with a reference to legal memetics as provided by Deakin.  The law of economic 
regulation  is  nowadays  increasingly moving  from a  ‘command and  control’ to  a 
‘reflexive’ approach,  whereby the law already ‘thinks about’ the conditions for its 
own application in business practice. This means that the law itself already aims at 
inducing  desired  second-order  effects  on  the  part  of  economic  system.122 For 
example, as ‘law and economics’ theories  become part of the legal doctrine, law is 
117 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 259.
118 Ibidem.
119 Ibidem.
120 Ibidem, p. 259-260.
121 Though one shall understand ‘juridification’ as a neutral term explaining the law's response to the 
environment, it is not an easy word: in his 1987 work, Teubner explicitly refers to it as ‘ugly’. He 
links  it  with  Jacoby’s  concept  of  ‘bureaucratization  of  the  world’  and  Habermas’  theory  on 
‘colonization of the life-world’ and relates it  to the modern ‘regulatory law’, which is structurally 
coupled with politics on one hand and the regulated social field on the other.  Teubner, G., 1987b, p. 3-
5. This very type of law is also subject to Weberian concept of ‘materialization of formal law’, which 
results in a ‘flood’ of (substantive) norms. Ibidem, p. 5,10.
122 Deakin argues that the possibility arises that learning about evolution itself will become a property 
of the legal system. Deakin, S., 2002, p. 39-40.
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pre-programmed to respond to economic events in terms of its own version of what 
constitutes efficiency. Through such developments,  the law increasingly gains the 
capacity to respond to other social systems. This largely corresponds to the concept 
of  “responsive  regulation”.123  This  is,  for  example,  reflected  in  the  finding  that 
various business models have been developed on the basis of regulated products such 
as bitstream or local loop unbundling.
Another  key  evolutionary  development  in  today's  regulatory  law  is  increased 
responsiveness,  which is  closely linked to the phenomenon of 'proceduralization', 
whereby the process of reproduction and justification of substantive legal norms is 
subject to procedural virtues, such as maintenance of plurality of options, which also 
enables  a  higher  degree  of  the  law's  reflexivity  of  the  environment.124 The 
phenomenon  of  'proceduralization'  was  in  practice  observed  by  Born  and 
Goldschmidt,  who  analysed  legal  regulation  of  the  risk  related  to  off-shore 
installations.  They pointed to the openness of regulation in substantial  issues and 
‘proceduralization’ of risk debates.125 
The  concept  of  proceduralization,  like  self-promotion  and  juridification,  can  be 
observed  in  the  specific  context  of  communications  law  and  will  be  helpful  in 
explaining its evolution. This exercise was carried out in 1998 by Scott, who noted 
there  was  a  shift  in  terms  of  replacing  highly technical  rules  with  more  general 
norms, in terms of greater emphasis on the procedures, and in terms of more general 
regulatory institutions.126 With a reference to voice telephony and wholesale access 
and  interconnection  regulation,  these  major  observations  of  his  work  will  be 
compared to recent developments in EU law.
However,  in  this  thesis,  the  emphasis  on  the  degree  of  'thickness'  of  EU 
communications  law's  'proceduralization'  shall  be  avoided:127 for  the  purposes  of 
systems theory analysis of law, proceduralization should be understood as increased 
123 Ayres, I., Braithwaite, J., 1992, p. 4.
124 Teubner, G., Febbrajo, A., 1992, p. 611.
125 Born, A. W., Goldschmidt, L. B., 1997, p. 33.
126 Scott, C., 1998, p. 244.
127 See Black, J., 2001, p. 35 et seq.
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structural coupling of regulatory law with other social systems by means of using 
open-ended legal  procedures,  without  specific  implications  as  to  the evolution of 
deliberative democracy.128
2.9 Systems theory and the theory of regulation
The instrumental mentality associated with the term ‘regulation’ is about influencing 
the behaviour of people to accomplish particular social objectives.129 In this sense, 
communications law is generally seen as a regulatory law.130 Accordingly, reference 
to  regulation  is  not  only  useful,  but  also  necessary  in  order  to  establish  how 
successful the law is in regulating the electronic communications business, and, on 
the  other  hand,  the  primary interest  for  this  research,  how the  law itself  can  be 
influenced by or adapted to the regulated field. Studying these mutual relationships 
among social systems is particularly important if one recognises that other forms of 
social regulation such as self-regulation of the economic system exist in parallel with 
law;131 it  is  therefore worth asking how law itself  is  regulated by other forms of 
ordering, that is, how it is modified when coupled with other social systems so that 
the actual effects of the law might be quite different from those intended.132
In its essence, systems theory can be used to enrich the general theory of regulation, 
with one important difference, namely that it shifts the focus from the network of 
actors (e.g. regulators and stakeholders) to the system of communications. In this 
function, it is often referred to in the modern theory of regulation as a useful concept 
to understand legal regulation.133 For example, systems theory can be used to explain 
128 Ibidem, p. 57.
129 Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 5.
130 As telecommunications or, as lately referred to, (electronic) communications law means a specific 
market activity, the law governing them can easily be associated with a specific regulatory intent, 
compared to traditional legal areas of doctrine, such as contract law. Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N.,  
Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 5.
131 According to the general theory of regulation, self-regulation can be seen as taking place when a 
group of firms or individuals exert control over its own membership and their behaviour. Baldwin, R., 
Cave,  M.,  1999,  p.  125.  This  definition  is  generally  not  inconsistent  with  systems  theory  view. 
However, one should bear in mind that, according to systems theory, most forms of self-regulation  
will also be legally 'visible', e.g. by means of written codes of conduct.
132 Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 7.
133 See Moran, M., 2007, p. 71. Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 7, 10.
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the limits of legal regulation in late modern states and the corresponding resort to 
non-legal forms of regulation.134
One should reject the idea that (tele-) communications regulation as a whole is at this 
stage of development an autonomous autopoietic subsystem. First of all, this is due to 
its constant reliance upon the legal rules, the political decision-making process, and 
the  economic  analysis.  Accordingly,  too  many external  points  of  orientation  are 
sought on an ongoing basis.  Whereas self-regulation may seem like a self-contained 
regulatory system, one should be warned that even self-regulation is likely to consist 
of legal rules set by the parties themselves.135 In addition, it often relies on ‘sunset’, 
‘sunrise’ and similar clauses established by state laws. Moreover, political, legal or 
even self-regulatory communications on regulation are not sufficiently interlinked to 
form a unified system, particularly because it  is  not possible to identify them by 
means  of  a  common  reference  that  would  distinguish  them  from  other 
communications. Therefore there is no reason to treat regulation as an autopoietic 
subsystem with its specific code.
If one should properly define the term ‘regulation’, one can observe that it is used by 
the legal, the political, the economic and the media system, and also in general social 
communications.136 Teubner also does not seem to give ‘regulation’ a specific status, 
but uses the term to describe the influence of one system upon another.137 The term 
regulation will generally be used in the same way as it is used by Teubner. Such use 
is also consistent with the general understanding of scholars of regulation who see 
regulation as the intentional activity of attempting to control, order or influence the 
behaviour of others, 138 in doing which it can describe the mutual relationships of 
human beings, institutions or social systems. Regulation incorporates the setting of 
standards, processes for monitoring compliance with the standards, and mechanisms 
for enforcing the standards.139
134 Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 7.
135 See eg Teubner, G., 1993, p. 93-4.
136 See eg Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., 2004, p. 1.
137 See Teubner, G., 1993, p. 64 et seq.
138 Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 1.
139 Ibidem.
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One should note that the term regulation does not only refer to the influence of one 
system on another, but also to the internal regulatory mechanisms of one system. For 
example, regulation is not seen as limited to state interventions in the economy, but, 
as  already  noted  above,  includes  self-regulation.140 As  there  is  no  way  one 
autopoietic system could directly exercise control over another, regulatory operations 
of one system must be internalised by the other, i.e. must be detected and at least to 
some extent processed by it. For example, legal regulation must be internalised by 
the economic system driving the sale  of  telecommunications  services in  order  to 
produce  the  desired  effect  in  terms  of  consumer  choice  and  price.  If  this 
‘internalisation’ was excluded from the understanding of the regulation, this research 
would only be about the unsuccessful types of legal regulation. However, when one 
deals with self-regulation of the business community, one should note that there is:
• self-regulation that is perceived by the legal system as having legal character; 
and
• self-regulation  that  internally  regulates  the  operations  of  the  economic 
system, but is not juridified i.e. does not take the form of legal code.141
In order to refer to the whole body of ongoing communications connected with the 
passing of regulatory legal acts or introducing self-regulatory practices, for easier 
understanding, the term 'regulatory process' has been introduced. This does not mean 
that these  communications can be identified by a single code and self-reference. For 
example,  there is no common reference between self-regulating good practices of 
UK ISPs and  ex ante regulatory remedies under the US Telecommunications Act 
1996. Though both can be described as ‘regulation’ from the point of view of an 
external observer, the first primarily sees itself as part of business practice, whilst the 
second takes the form of a legal act. Accordingly,, the term 'regulatory process' will  
only be used for the purpose of identifying all potentially relevant communications 
referring  to  telecommunications  regulation  that  may  belong  to  various  social 
subsystems.142
140 Ibidem.
141 Moran, M. 2007, p. 68.
142 See e.g. Born, A. W., Goldschmidt, L. B., 1997.
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2.10 Mapping the regulatory process
Compared to, say discursive analysis, exploring the law or even communications law 
in  regulatory  practice  requires  isolating  legal  communications  from  other 
communications that take place within a certain visible discourse, say public debates 
on future regulation of the internet.143  
This  requires  one to  determine how communications  law fits  into the context  of 
regulatory organisations and procedures and how its concepts connect to those of the 
(regulated) economic system and the political system that tends to regulate economy 
by  means  of  the  law.144 In  this  context,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that 
communications belonging to the legal system may simultaneously also belong to 
other systems such as economy or politics. For example, the statement that certain 
services must be regulated can be perceived as legal, political and economic.
When deciding which communications about regulation belong to the legal system, 
one   should  start  with  the  premise  that  the  law only accepts  arguments  that  are 
perceived by the legal system itself as legal. This may sound tautological, but no 
matter how much academics, interest groups, or lobbyists try to influence law, they 
can only do so in the form understandable to the legal system. Accordingly,  if a 
communication  refers  to  regulation  of  electronic  communications  (and  does  not 
imply  a  purely  economic  self-regulatory  solution  or  regulation  by  means  of 
technology itself145), it must ultimately at least touch upon a legal solution in order to 
143 A degree of cautiousness is required before linking a discourse with the legal outcome of regulatory 
proceedings. Many communications, despite relating to communications law, e.g. casual debates or 
even many academic opinions, are unlikely to have direct access to institutions and procedures being 
able  to  affect  legal  obligations.  For  this  reason,  systems theory approach  produces  more  reliable 
results. Compare Luhmann, N., 1997. This limitations can also be compared to the rules on identifying 
discourses as suggested by Born and Goldschmidt. According to them, when communicative practices 
create patterns that  link them internally,  but separate them from other patterns externally,  one can 
classify them as discourses. These patterns can be identified empirically by their topics, language, 
norms, or participants. Born, A. W., Goldschmidt, L. B.,  1997, p. 27. However, such a discursive 
analysis  may  not  be  sufficiently  precise,  whereas  also  its  empirical  value  to  analyse  legal  
developments is questionable.  Primarily,  it  was not intended to empirically classify the law by its  
topic, language, norms, or participants. Law as a self-referential system does not need to distinguish  
itself from its environment by any of these.
144 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 71.
145 Such as e.g. technical measures to protect copyrighted works.
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have a chance of success. Of course,  this does not render legal mistakes or even 
intentional  breaches  of  law  by  the  regulators  and  their  staff  impossible. 
Notwithstanding such deviations, however, judicial review by the courts that lie in 
the  centre  of  the  legal  system146 ultimately  provides  for  the  system's  internal 
consistency.
In order to make this premise a useful starting point for research, one should look at 
those communications that can be perceived as belonging to a subsystem such as 
economy or politics, but can at the same be made visible to the legal subsystem for 
the purposes of its own processing. For example, stakeholders and their organisations 
may express views on future regulation, say on efficient regulation and balancing 
interests in the communications market.147 Views on (legal) regulation can also take a 
scientific form, say in academic writing on the requirements for regulation in the 
fast-changing technological and business environment. Examples include economic 
studies on wholesale access obligations to provide IP-based services.148 If the array of 
sensors developed by law is broad enough, law can even detect and process certain 
media debates on the role of regulation, say on the consequences of regulation as to 
the openness of the internet.149
The interplay of these communications and their visibility by various social systems 
produces a highly complex picture of regulation. One can identify five theoretical 
options, whereby regulatory process can be interpreted as:
• part of the periphery of the legal subsystem;
• political decision-making of public administration;
• an interface to resolve intersystemic conflicts;
• a co-evolutionary process of various social subsystems;
146 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 293.
147 These views can be expressed in public consultations but also in documents such as ERG reports,  
such as e.g. ERG Report on ‘VoIP and consumer issues’, 2006, ERG (06) 39, or Final Report on IP 
interconnection, 2007, ERG (07) 09, ECTA positions and regulatory Scorecards, such as 'Regulatory' 
and 'Broadband' Scorecards, ETNO Common Positions, and various types of stakeholders’ lobbying 
communications.
148 See e.g. Cave, M., 2004 or a broad Ofcom’s monography Richards, E., Foster, R., Kiedrowski, T.-
ed., 2006.
149 Despite not being part of the UK and the EU regulatory framework,  net neutrality, originally an 
issue in US political and media debates, has been addressed by Ofcom in their communications with  
the media. Ingram, P., 2006.
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• an autonomous autopoietic social subsystem.
Whereas the courts are located in the centre of the legal system,150 the periphery (e.g. 
communications made by legal departments in businesses and public administration 
or legal consultants) makes more readily visible to the law outside elements, such as 
said changes in technology and economy. For example, a factual problem of market 
competition can be presented by the industry to a law firm. Accordingly, Luhmann 
points out that the periphery is particularly suited as a zone of contact with the other 
functioning systems of society.151 There is accordingly an option to fit the regulatory 
process into the law’s periphery as a ‘melting pot’ for economic, political and legal 
statements on regulation.
However, one should be warned from overly simplified conclusions, as the law must 
maintain its autopoiesis both at its centre and its periphery. The mere fact that most 
of regulatory cases handled by the periphery are not brought to the attention of the 
courts does not change the fact that even the periphery of law considers the courts to 
be  the  able  to  always  give  final  answers  as  to  legal  programmes.  Accordingly, 
regulatory  proceedings  that  generally  take  place  with  the  regulators,  i.e.  in  the 
periphery are not able  to  disregard the centre  and dismantle  legal  autopoiesis  by 
introducing the code of another social system. Therefore, legal decisions that take 
part  in  the  periphery,  e.g.  decisions  of  regulatory  authorities,  can  ultimately  be 
challenged in the centre, i.e. at the courts.152 Nevertheless, the periphery must be able 
to filter out communications that do not use the code legal/illegal and it must do so 
more regularly than the centre.153  
150 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 293.
151 Ibidem.
152 This is further corroborated by the EU regulatory framework that explicitly requires the option for  
appeal, which is likely to be addressed to the Member States courts. See Article 4 of the Framework 
Directive, see Appendix. Similarly in the US, there is  judicial review by federal courts of the FCC 
actions. See Lee, K.; Prime, J. in: Walden, I.; Angel, J., 2005, p. 525.
153 For example, ERG Common Positions often use the wording such as ‘may be implemented’ or 
‘should consider’. See e.g. ‘ERG Common Position on Best Practice in Bitstream Access Remedies 
Imposed as a Consequence of a Position of Significant Market Power in the Market for Wholesale 
Broadband Access’, ERG(06)69Rev1 (2006) Available at
     www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_06_69rev1_wba_cp.pdf  , 2nd March 2008. Such language can 
be used to directly support discretionary legal decisions made by the regulators that are ultimately  
programmes based on the code of legal and illegal. At the same time, these documents also involve  
direct descriptions of technical and economic terms.
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However,  the  regulatory  process  does  not  always  focus  on  finding  purely  legal 
solutions.  Quite  often  the  rhetoric  used  in  regulatory  discussions  may  be  very 
different compared to legal rhetoric.154 In this respect, many communications taking 
place in relation to regulation such as reports or academic papers do not even bother 
about specific legal outcomes.155  This leads us to the conclusion that the regulatory 
process is not a purely legal process that would be conducted in the legal periphery 
and would sometimes result in the decisions by the centre. Instead, elements of this 
process can (simultaneously or exclusively) belong to other subsystems.
Furthermore,  Luhmann  classifies  decision-making  by  administrative  bodies  as 
purpose-specific political communications.156 Like the rest of public administration, 
regulatory  authorities  can  be  seen  as  the  agencies  pursuing  certain  goals  set  by 
politics,  i.e.  implementing political  programmes.157 If the political  goal is  say de-
regulation, the administrations will find legal means to pursue this goal, but the legal 
means will be relatively unimportant for their operations. In this context law will be 
perceived as an instrument of political regulation of other social systems or even as 
an obstacle for achieving political goals.158 Similarly, the European Commission also 
154 Compare Born, A. W., Goldschmidt, L. B., 1997, p. 37. The authors argue that, in the case of the  
regulation of risk at off-shore installations, the role of legal language in the discourse is modest.
155 Unlike the  ERG Common Positions mentioned  above,  other  ERG documents  are  not  directly 
concerned with specific legal solutions. Despite being prepared by an organisation with a specific  
status  under  the  EU  law,  ERG  reports  and  responses  to  them  do  not  have  any  direct  legal 
consequences. What is legal about them is the mere fact that they were adopted under the ERG legal 
procedure and are therefore given a certain status in the legal system. However,  their content can 
hardly be described as legal coding of the environment. See e.g. ‘ERG Report Mobile access and 
competition effects, ERG (06) 45’ (2006) Available at
     w  ww.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_06_45_report_on_mobile_access_market_competition.pdf  , 
8th August 2008. Such documents can include simple observations on legal obligations e.g.: “In some 
other member states (Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands and to some extent Norway and Italy) there 
is an obligation for providers of telephony services to terminate emergency calls trough the USO 
provider’s electronic communication network.” ‘ERG Report on ‘VoIP and consumer issues’ ERG 
(06)39’ (2006),  p. 9. In addition, they can also include purely technical observations e.g.: “In most  
NGNs run by incumbents, transport is separated from the control level (signalling etc.) and services 
tend to be provided using centralized platforms (Media Gateway, Softswitch).” ‘Final Report on IP 
interconnection ERG (07) 09’ (2007).  Similarly,  academic writing on regulation, though implying 
legal intervention, may not even address specific legal actions. See e.g. Cave, M., Mason, R. 2001. 
The authors refer to regulation in very vague terms (e.g. access to the local loop) and do not quote any 
specific legal solutions.
156 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 374.
157 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 374.
158 This  understanding  of  public  administration  tasks  most  clearly  corresponds  to  the  classical 
Cartesian-bureaucratic decision-making style that is also the starting point of Hall, Scott and Hood’s 
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performs  its  regulatory  tasks  based  on  political  motives,159 say  by  issuing 
recommendations with clearly political tasks.160
Nevertheless, both the relative independence of regulatory bodies based on economic 
reasoning161 and  the  broad  discretion  granted  to  them  by  modern  regulatory 
frameworks seem to result in a changing pattern of regulation. Furthermore, Hall, 
Scott  and Hood also  identify a  bargaining-diplomatic  regulatory decision-making 
style,162 which  implies  more  interaction  with  the  environment  and  less  direct 
application of political programmes. If the regulators consult the industry and user 
groups163 about what they should do on a regular basis, there is less chance for them 
to directly follow the pre-set political programmes of the law-makers.
In order to reconcile legal, political and economic aspects of the regulatory process, 
Teubner’s theory on intersystemic law of conflict can be used.164 Teubner offers the 
law  as  a  dispute-resolution  mechanism  for  conflicts  between  various  social 
subsystems, including functional subsystems, such as politics, economy, science and 
culture.165 However,  the  problem  with  this  approach  is  put  forward  by  Teubner 
himself: can the law develop conflict rules which counteract juridification through 
the process of juridification itself?166 In other words, if there is a conflict between the 
legal system and the economic theory (say that the first requires unbundling only for 
copper pairs, whereas the latter would support technology-neutral unbundling), can 
the law find a  way to objectively adjudicate between its  own perception and the 
analysis of Ofcom’s performance of its tasks. Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 126 et seq.
159 About the political character of the Commission, see Spence, D., 2006, p. 512.
160 The recommendation on NGA, for example, clearly puts forward political goals as to facilitation of  
investment  and  equivalence  of  access  with  no  prior  economic  or  legal  analysis.  Commission 
Recommendation  of  20.9.2010  on  regulated  access  to  Next  Generation  Access  Networks  (NGA),  
C(2010) 6223 final.
161 Independent  regulation is justified as long as it is about the maximization of aggregate welfare. 
Elected politicians, on the other hand, should deal with the redistribution of resources and should not 
be attempting to regulate directly. Majone, G. in: Hayward, J., Menon, A.-ed., 2003, p. 311.
162 Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 172 et seq.
163 Ofcom’s Consumer Panel Regulatory Toolkit may serve as an example of end-user involvement in 
regulatory decision-making.
164 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 100 et seq.
165 Ibidem, p. 109.
166 Ibidem, p. 109-10.
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perception of another, in this case economic subsystem? The question is far from 
being irrelevant, as it leads us back to the very problem of the operative closure of 
the legal system. The merits of the 'dispute resolution' decision will always be set by 
the legal system and any rule of adjudication between the legal and the economic 
system will  necessarily belong to the legal  system, which prevents the law from 
becoming an ‘almighty’ system for resolving the disputes within the society.
However,  Teubner’s  idea seems worth of further  exploration.  Whereas  the law is 
increasingly  able  to  respond  to  other  social  systems,167 it  may  also  become 
increasingly recognised by these systems as the system for conflict resolution. If the 
economic system invents an image of law as a system of resolving its conflicts with, 
say  politics,  this  would  indicate  intensive  structural  coupling  among  the  three 
systems. For example, businesses may perceive it as part of their strategy to rely on 
the regulators to settle disputes between politically motivated definitions of relevant 
markets by the Commission or the NRAs and the economic analysis of supply and 
demand in actual business transactions, which may result in different relevant market 
definitions.  In  this  case,  it  would  be  an  over-simplified  solution  to  talk  about 
regulation  only  in  legal  terms,  as  economy  and  politics  may  have  a  means  of 
describing  the  same  regulatory  phenomena  from  their  own  perspective.  This, 
however, requires that the same regulatory communications are visible and can be 
simultaneously attributed to various social systems.
Accordingly, while law evolves, other subsystems also evolve. When one studies the 
evolution of law as part of the regulatory process, this implies co-evolution of other 
subsystems. According to Teubner’s understanding of co-evolution of social systems, 
the  regulatory process  could  as  well  be  understood as  a  co-evolutionary process 
involving various social systems, their co-variation, co-selection, and co-retention.168 
In Teubner’s understanding, there are impulses to variation which stem from these 
various  systems.  These must  pass through the 'eye  of the needle'  of  the singular 
interaction, and can then exert pressure on each other for change as parts of systems 
167 Deakin, S., 2002, p. 40.
168 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 62.
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that  reciprocally  influence  each  other.169 The  theory  of  'ladder  of  investment'170 
actually applied in today's  regulatory practice has in practice found its  way from 
economic  theory171 to  business  practice  and,  by  means  of  market  analysis  as 
structural coupling, to the law. By means of co-selection, it can actually be used by a 
company planning market entry or a regulator creating pricing obligations in markets 
for  bitstream and unbundled local  access.  By means of co-retention,  it  may well 
become part of a general legal doctrine of communications regulation.172
An  important  warning  should  therefore  be  given  that  a  large  group  of 
communications  that  appear  during  the  regulatory  process  do  not  necessarily 
constitute  a  unity.  Instead,  these  communications  can  remain  at  the  disposal  of 
various function subsystems, provided these systems are sufficiently open to enable 
the  translation  of  these  communications  into  their  own  code.  In  this  respect, 
regulation  is  essentially  a  series  of  (structural)  couplings  between  various 
subsystems. The acceptance by other subsystems is crucial for regulatory success, as 
Teubner points out that legal acts of regulation must ‘stand up’ to the autopoiesis of 
the regulated subsystem; in the case of telecommunications this is the economy.173 It 
should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  research  will  focus  on  the  evolution  of 
communication  law  in  response  to  developments  in  economy  and  science 
(technology),  and  not  on  the  response  of  these  other  subsystems  to  said  legal 
evolution.
Whereas the regulatory process involves various co-evolving function systems, one 
can once again repeat the question whether this process itself has reached a degree of 
autopoiesis.174 Born and Goldschmidt, for example, find that regulatory discourse can 
169 Ibidem.
170 The concept assumes that a new entrant operator starts using basic, usually active, wholesale 
services provided by the incumbent operators. The new entrant will gradually climb the 'ladder', 
investing more and using less and less of the incumbent operator's infrastructure.
171 See eg Cave, M., 2006, p. 223-37.
172 Such a doctrine can also be recognised by, say the ERG. See e.g. ERG Common Position on Best  
Practice in Bitstream Access Remedies Imposed As A Consequence of a Position of Significant Market  
Power in the Market for Wholesale Broadband Access, ERG(06)69Rev1, p. 10.
173 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 80.
174 See above subchapter on Systems theory and the theory of regulation .
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be characterised as autopoietic, as it produces its own developmental conditions.175 
Specifically, in their area of research, they observe that the discourse has developed 
internal hierarchies of norms, from where new concepts and arguments are being 
developed.  This,  however,  may  not  hold  true  in  the  entire  area  of  electronic 
communications regulation. Despite areas where self-regulation plays an important 
role,176 the regulatory process still  primarily focuses  on the development  of legal 
rules,  i.e.  norms  outside  the  discourse  as  a  potentially  autonomous  subsystem. 
Moreover,  the  process  may  itself  be  driven  by  legal  rules  requiring  public 
consultations.177 This necessarily limits the degree of  autopoiesis of the regulatory 
discourse  itself:  should  certain  legal  concepts  such  as  wholesale  network  access 
obligations  cease  to  exist,  its  scope  would  necessarily  be  limited.  Furthermore, 
despite the existence of areas where there seems to be a universal discourse as to 
certain regulatory issues outside a specified legal framework, the legal component of 
regulation  still  exists  independently  and  is  not  in  any  way  affected  by  such 
developments.178 However,  this  does  not  undermine  the  possibility  of  certain 
175 Born, A. W., Goldschmidt, L. B., 1997, p. 38. In the case of law, developmental conditions are set 
by the constitution and legislation that enables the passing of legally relevant rules and decisions. In  
the case of discursive communications, however, the conditions for the development of new concepts 
may be less visible and will depend on the established practice of certain regulatory forums such as 
the ERG.
176E.g. UK VoIP providers’ code of conduct that will be discussed in the chapter on VoIP.
177See Article 6 of the 2002 Framework Directive: “...Member States shall ensure that where national 
regulatory  authorities  intend  to  take  measures  in  accordance  with  this  Directive  or  the  Specific  
Directives which have a significant impact on the relevant market, they give interested parties the  
opportunity to comment on the draft measure within a reasonable period…”
178 The example of ‘net neutrality’, at first a civil society idea that telecommunications law access-type 
of remedies be used in order to regulate control of traffic exercised by the ISPs, may be used to  
demonstrate a high degree of autonomy of the regulatory discussions outside formal proceedings. In 
terms of media coverage, the US debates on ‘net neutrality’ have converged the elements of both the  
ongoing civil society ‘internet freedom’ movements and the debates on certain access-style remedies 
in  telecommunications  law  that  later  found  place  in  specific  legislative  proposals.  See 
http://savetheinternet.com/ that converges the Internet freedom efforts of Professor Lawrence Lessig 
with legal developments. The debates were broad enough not to limit themselves to political or legal 
solutions. See Ganley, P., Allgrove, B., 2006, p. 459-461. However, one should bear in mind that the  
debates  were  not  focused  only on the  legislative  outcomes.  Instead,  their  focus  was  on  the  idea 
whether to regulate net neutrality or not. There was not necessary a political solution to this, one could 
also invoke self-regulation. See e.g. Silva, P. 2005. Interestingly, net neutrality debates also emerged 
in Europe,  showing how the same regulatory topic  can spread  regardless  of  the  underlying legal 
framework.  See  e.g.  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/speeches/2006/12/net_neutrality_111206.pdf, 
viewed 3rd February 2008. However, though impressive, the net neutrality movement does not in any 
way undermine the legal  component  of  regulation: the proponents  of the movement  were largely 
seeking legal and political solutions for the problem (see e.g. ‘Save the Internet: Take Action! Petition 
on  the  issue  addressed  to  the  Congress  and  the  FCC’  (2009)  Available  at 
https://secure.freepress.net/site/Advocacy?cmd=display&page=UserAction&id=356, viewed 11th
October 2009), whereas the unity of the movement with 'regular' legal regulatory proceedings can 
be questioned.
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comparative  legally  elaborated regulatory concepts  being  'transplanted'  from one 
jurisdiction to another.179 
2.11 Systems theory and the comparative method
In  order  to  reach  legally  relevant  conclusions,  systems  theory  observation  and 
comparison should be used together with the traditional comparative law approach. 
This  may  be  crucial  in  order  to  produce  practical  results  from the  analysis,  as 
Luhmann  himself  notes  that  systems  theory  has  limits  as  to  its  practical 
application.180 
Systems theory meets comparative method when discussing 'legal transplants',  i.e. 
solutions that are 'transplanted' from one legal system to another181 whereby these are 
still recognised by the latter system as 'law'. In addition, it should be borne in mind 
that,  as  systems  theory,  comparative  method  tends  to  study law from a  broader 
perspective,  focusing on the function of legal concepts rather than their  doctrinal 
structure.182 It should further be noted that the traditional comparative method can be 
enriched by the sociological understanding of the legal framework in a broader social 
context.183 Accordingly, the comparative approach can be seen as largely compatible 
with the broader and deeper systems theory.
The comparative analysis will primarily focus on two systems of communications 
regulation: the EU and the US. The EU and the US systems are interesting to observe 
because  the  EU and the  US are  generally  perceived as  leading the  way in  both 
technology and market regulation. Although both systems depend on certain common 
concepts such as ex ante rights of access and independent regulatory authorities, they 
nevertheless have very different historical roots. The EU and the US systems can 
further  be  seen  as  both  representative  and  prototypical  case  studies  for  national 
regulatory systems across the globe: whereas potential EU accession countries like 
179 See below and Watson, A., 1993.
180 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 65.
181 See Watson, A., 1993, p. 95.
182 Zweigert, K., Kötz, H., 1998, p. 45.
183 See ibidem, p. 10.
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Croatia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  or  Montenegro  have  adopted  the  EU-type 
regulation, in Mexico, for example, the idea of the Federal Regulatory Commission 
(Cofetel) resembles that of the US FCC. In addition, one can involve the comparison 
of both systems with the WTO communications liberalisation system as their lowest 
common denominator. 
However, the main reason to compare the EU and the US law is obvious enough 
divergence of their concepts despite similar development of technology and market 
competition on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas both systems created their own 
images  of  phenomena  such  as  telephony,  interconnection  and  unbundling,  these 
images  considerably  differ  in  terms  of  their  scope,  flexibility  and  obligations 
attached,  proving the  law's  autonomy and calling  for  a  critical  assessment  of  its 
flexibility  in  relation  to  outside  developments  such  as  the  transition  to  NGN. 
Although NGN technology, its application in business and the development of the 
markets may be largely comparable in the EU and the US, it will be shown how the 
two legal systems begin their analysis of their environment from two largely different 
legal perspectives
Whereas certain concepts such as local infrastructure unbundling can be seen as legal 
'transplants'184 from  the  US  to  the  EU,185 they  will  inevitably  live  their  own 
autonomous life within the legal system they have been transplanted to. Accordingly, 
system  theory  can  provide  additional  explanation  to  the  comparative  method, 
explaining how imported legal 'best practices' fit into the relevant legal system.
2.12  Systems theory approach and other research methods
In contrast with the ‘law and economics’ approach,  systems theory does not limit 
itself  to  the  image of  law from the  perspective  of  economic  theory or,  to  put  it 
differently,  the  subsystem of  economy.  ‘Law and economics’ looks  for  the  most 
‘efficient’ legal solutions from the economic point of view. Accordingly, one could 
use this approach to identify and advocate those legal solutions that are most efficient 
184 See Watson, A., 1993.
185 'Unbundling' is a term used by US Telecommunications Act 1996 and later by the EU  Regulation 
2887/2000.
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in the light of IP technology. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the relative autonomy of 
the legal subsystem, one can argue that using only ‘law and economics’ may create 
theoretical models of regulation with little chance of successful implementation in 
practice. For example, the links between the regulatory burden in specific cases and 
investment decisions are extremely difficult to prove at the empirical level. Studies 
that have been conducted in this respect usually involve very general observations, 
and  do  not  focus  on  specific  legal  concepts.186 These  limitations  have  exposed 
traditional  ‘law  and  economics’ to  criticism  from  the  ‘path  dependence’ theory, 
which has been offered as an alternative to neo-classical economy by authors such as 
Arthur.187 The key idea of path dependence is the lock-in by certain historical events 
that can explain why,  even when a more efficient solution exists,  systems fail  to 
evolve towards that solution.188 According to ‘path dependence’, the legal system and 
the  telecommunications  industry could  be  deemed locked-in  by certain  historical 
concepts; the tradition of public monopolies resulting in monopolised local access 
copper-based networks may serve as a good example. It is therefore highly unlikely 
that an entirely new and potentially ‘efficient’ system of business models and legal 
concepts would emerge. Instead, one can expect an evolution of the existing legal 
system towards something that is simply more 'adapted' to the complexities of its IP-
shaped environment.
 
Despite criticisms, it is submitted that ‘law and economics’ arguments can be used in 
order to evaluate the legal evolution from the economic perspective. Since regulatory 
laws are generally used to regulate economic transactions, this approach may prove 
to be extremely valuable.  For this  reason, it will  be used occasionally during the 
course of this research in order to evaluate  the intended effects of legal regulation 
from the economic perspective.
Nevertheless, systems theory may be better equipped to explain the evolution as such 
for the following reason: the presumption that the legal systems develop towards the 
most  ‘efficient’ solutions  seems  highly  unpersuasive.  ‘Efficiency’  as  a  term  in 
economic  theory  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  humans  are  rational  utility 
186 See e.g. Li, Wei, 2004.
187 See Liebowitz, S. J., Margolis, S. E., 1995.
188 See Small, R.G., 2001, p. 58.
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maximisers.189 There is, however, no proof that the latter assumption is true and that 
this  maximising  always  takes  place  in  business  transactions,  politics,  and  law. 
Accordingly, there is no proof that systems always tend to move towards the most 
efficient solutions.  Therefore,  ‘efficiency’ can hardly be seen as the driving force 
behind  evolution190 but  rather  primarily as a  criterion used within the economic 
subsystem in order to describe transactions within the economic or other subsystems. 
As Luhmann points out,  it  is  not economic efficiency,  but complexity that is  the 
intervening variable that translates evolutionary structural changes into adjustments 
within the system.191
Contrary to the ‘law and economics’ approach, systems theory does not limit itself to 
the society as a general system for the balance of advantages, but can provide a much 
richer and more concrete description of the society and its subsystems,192 including 
the  law.  This  can  be  of  particular  importance  in  complex  relationships  among 
regulators,  lawmakers, the industry, and end-users. Many of the arguments about the 
efficiency  of  regulations  require  one  to  unbundle  complex  relationships.  For 
example, it is usually argued that laws themselves, without appropriate transparency 
of the actual decision-making, cannot produce a satisfactory regulatory environment 
in developing countries.193 Similarly, understanding how the EU telecommunications 
law  operates  requires  knowledge  of  the  actual  functioning  of  the  European 
Commission and its DG Information Society. Only if one observes the way ‘Article 7 
procedures’194 are conducted in practice, one can truly evaluate the EU regulatory 
model.  As systems theory is  equipped to tackle these complexities by identifying 
separate  social  subsystems  and  interactions  among  them,  it  may  produce  better 
overall results than ‘law and economics’.
One should further bear in mind that legal concepts must be expressed in language in 
order  to  form  part  of  communication  and,  accordingly,  society.  As  language  is 
189 Posner, R A., 2003, p. 4.
190 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 271.
191 Ibidem.
192 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 64-65.
193 See e.g. Petrazzini, B.A. in: Melody W.H., 1997, p. 361.
194 See Article 7 of the Framework Directive, which involves the opinion prepared by the Commission 
Services experts.
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studied by the science of linguistics, the latter can be employed in order to enrich 
systems  theory research.  This  can  be  achieved  by testing  the  capability  of  legal 
language to adapt to new phenomena in its environment. In this respect, the traditions 
of linguistic and jurisprudential analysis should be observed, namely exegesis and 
rhetoric.195 The former is based on the idea of recovering the true meaning and order 
of the text by virtue of an analytic reconstruction of its source,196 whereas the latter 
builds on a more pragmatic idea of law as discourse.197 These approaches to legal 
language can help us understand the possibility of codifying certain technological 
and business situations. Furthermore, legal linguistics may help us determine how the 
‘transformation’ or ‘translation’ of ‘ordinary language’ and ‘ordinary meanings’ into 
the  ‘closed’  code  of  the  legal  system  is  effected  by  means  of  ‘practical 
jurisprudence’.198 It  should be noted,  however,  that  regularly-changing definitions 
introduced by law in order to track technological developments usually leave little 
time for this ‘practical jurisprudence’ of  finding stable meanings by means of a day-
to-day application of laws. This will be demonstrated on the example of VoIP, along 
with other examples of the law's response to NGN that will  be dealt  with in the 
chapter that follows.
2.13  The limits and weaknesses of systems theory
Whereas  systems theory can  be,  based  on the  above,  highly useful  in  providing 
insight into the evolution of law, it is also important to bear in mind its limits in  
terms of research results.
To begin with, systems theory cannot provide for value judgement as to political or 
regulatory decisions. Whereas it can identify the law's autopoietic boundaries that 
limit the systems's internal flexibility and may require coupling with other systems in 
order  to  reach certain  results,  it  cannot  serve  as  means of  establishing  desirable 
results.  For this  reason, whenever  desirable solutions  are  proposed in this  thesis, 
195 Goodrich, P. 1987,,p. 3.
196 Ibidem, p. 3-4.
197 Ibidem, p. 5-6.
198 Ibidem, p. 161.
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they are borrowed from the economic system or say the law's internal autopoietic 
concepts such as the principle of equality.
Moreover,  systems theory usually cannot explain  one off199 political or regulatory 
decisions triggered by powerful figures or groups whose minds or programmes can 
directly couple with the decision-making process. A thick policy theory and analysis 
would be required in order to tackle these issues, which is beyond the reach of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, this limit of the system theory is offset by its ability to provide 
essential warnings to policy-makers regarding the law's (in)ability to adapt to new 
phenomena in communications markets.
This thesis is primarily about the law's reluctance to change on the one hand and its 
flexibility on the other. It cannot provide for an ultimate answer as to what would be 
required  for  'better'  legal  regulation.  However,  as  long  as  'better'  regulation  also 
means more reflexivity, it can provide guidance as to what can and what cannot be 
expected from the current trends in regulatory laws. 
2.14  Normative framework to be addressed
Perhaps the historical Edison ruling whereby voice telephony was held to constitute a 
'form of telegraph'200 can be used as the best starting point for the review of the law's 
response to the challenges of new technologies. Whereas the existence of a legal 
dispute seems to demonstrate the increasing economic importance of voice telephony 
and its competition to the old telegraph business, the dispute itself evolves around a 
legal definition. This implies both the need for the economic system to couple in 
legal  regulatory matters with the legal  system, and the law's  reliance on its  own 
concepts regardless of the changing technological and business environment.
This thesis attempts to follow this dichotomy of the law and its technological and 
business environment by means of linking 'cornerstone'201 legal regulatory concepts 
199 See Teubner, G. in: Teubner, G., 1987, p. 226.
200 AG v Edison Telephone Company of London (1880) 6 QBD 244. For more history, see Walden, I.,  
2009, p. 124.
201 Melody, W.H. in: Melody, W.H., 1997, p. 51 et seq.
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with  the  new  phenomena  in  communications  technology  and  economics.  These 
concepts will be tested for their reluctance to change in relation to the changes in the 
environment.
One should imply that numerous legal concepts might couple with NGN and that a 
selection inevitably has to be made prior to conducting research. Accordingly, the 
initial  legal  market-liberalising  norms  have  mostly  been  left  out  as  increasingly 
irrelevant  in largely licence-free European markets.202 Areas  of law not  primarily 
attempting to affect communications market economics such as privacy, surveillance 
and data protection have also not been addressed, since they would require their own 
highly complex analysis.  Spectrum issues  are  mostly not  addressed  by European 
bodies  in  the context  of  regular  market  analysis  and are less  likely to  be linked 
specifically to IP traffic or even fixed fibre-based NGA roll out. Therefore, the first 
focus of this thesis is on the rules governing public telephony market, largely based 
on the idea that end-users require protection in a freshly liberalised market.203 The 
second  focus  is  on  the  rules  governing  wholesale  access  and  interconnection, 
whereby competitors are allowed to use other operators' facilities in order to develop 
their own networks and services, a common attempt to overcome communications 
market failures.204
The concept of public telephony is associated with VoIP, the NGN all-IP equivalent 
of traditional switched voice services; the concept of interconnection is associated 
with the exchange of IP traffic instead of traditional voice traffic and access; and the 
concept of unbundled local access is associated with the replacement of copper-based 
local  networks  with  'Next  Generation'  fibre-based  infrastructures.  All  of  these 
concepts can be, on the other hand, linked to the EU Treaty rules on the functioning 
of  the  internal  market,  competition,  non-discrimination  of  EU  nationals  e.g.  in 
relation to establishment, and consumer protection.205 This context inevitably makes 
these concepts 'sticky' in relation to their legal foundations and questions their ability 
to freely adapt to the NGN environment.
202 See Flanagan, A. in: Walden, I., 2009, p. 327.
203 See e.g. Walden, I. in: Walden, I., 2009, p. 11.
204 See ibidem, p. 392.
205 See e.g. Articles 4, 26, 50, 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
55
Two additional issues are added to the review and will be addressed in the thesis for 
better understanding of the law's evolution in relation to NGN. 
The first is so-called net neutrality, a legally elaborated concept based on the idea 
that different types of traffic should not be discriminated against in NGNs. Although 
having  been  enacted  in  the  scope  of  end-user  protection  measures  of  the  EU 
communications regulatory framework,206 this concept can be seen as a  sui generis 
legal  innovation relying on the principle  of equality in  both wholesale  and retail 
communications market transactions, demonstrating the evolutionary potential of the 
legal form and concepts.
The second issue is the EU institutional setting and its evolution. There are three 
reasons that call  for a closer look at  the European regulatory bodies,  namely the 
European Commission and the NRAs, with a view to NGN-related evolution of law. 
First, legal developments as to the institutional structure can be seen as the law's own 
attempt to get a better understanding of its rapidly changing environment. Second, 
the  processing  of  new  technological  and  business  phenomena  by  means  of 
institutions  can  spur  the  law's  responsiveness  to  the  environment.  Third,  the 
institutions and the law are both autopoietic, pursuing e.g. the EU Treaty 'internal 
market' agenda, which points at the limits of the institutions as the law's 'sensors' of 
the environment. Accordingly, the analysis that follows begins with the institutional 
context in order to provide a full picture of the law's coupling with the environment 
and its evolution. 
206 See  Articles 8 and 22 (3) of the 2009 Universal Service Directive.
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3 INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF RULES
In order to promote itself in the changing environment, one can expect the law to set 
up institutions  i.e. organizations that can facilitate its co-evolution with market and 
technological developments by means of coupling, on the one hand, with the legal 
framework  and,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  law's  evolving  market  and  applied 
technologies. 
Like  function  systems,  these  organizations  are  autopoietic:  according to  Teubner, 
organizations  can  be  identified  by  the  “cyclical  linkage  of  identity  and  action 
perfected  in  the  legal  person,  whereas  the  action  system  acquires  a  hitherto 
unachieved  autonomy  vis-à-vis  its  environment  and  internal  environment  of 
members and others involved in the organization”.207 Whereas they may contribute to 
the law being more reflexive by means of regular processing of contemporary issues, 
one should be cautious about the ambit of such organizations' activities: an adequate 
institutional design can increase the response but cannot cause the law to get out of 
its  own  concepts  of  seeing  the  environment.  Moreover,  the  autopoiesis  of  these 
organizations as such may cause the law to largely couple with their own agenda 
instead of say economic market failures.
Indeed, a great deal of EU law's reform from the ONP framework to the 2009 review 
was  about  the  institutional  framework.  For  example,  Commissioner  Reding's 
spokesman  Martin  Selmayr  directly  linked  the  need  for  a  European  regulatory 
authority  with  the  urgent  need  for  regulatory  attention  to  VoIP.208 While  this 
statement is political in its context and can be contested on practical grounds, it is at 
the same time an interesting indicator  of the European law's interaction with the 
environment:  the law sees its  institutions as essential  means of addressing NGN-
related issues, regardless of say self-regulatory mechanisms of the market. 
207 Teubner, G., 1987c, p. 20.
208Steitz, C., 2007.
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3.1 The evolving EU institutional framework
Unlike  in  the  US  where  the  regulatory  powers  are  shared  between  the  Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and State Public Utility Commissions with key 
local  access  regulation  powers  conferred  to  the  former,209 the  power  to  issue 
regulatory acts in the EU has been concentrated in the hands of the Member States’ 
bodies  designated  to  act  as  NRAs.210 based  on   EU  directives  and  national 
implementing  measures.211 However,  European  Commission  has  since  the  very 
beginning  of  the  liberalisation  process  played  a  key  role  in  the  EU  regulatory 
process.  Its  first  key initiative and achievement  was the issuing of  liberalisation 
directives  that  dismantled  national  equipment  and  later  service  monopolies  in 
Member States.212 Under the initial regulatory directives as adopted by the European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  Commission  played  its  usual 
Community  ‘watchdog’  function.213 However,  under  the  2002  Framework,  the 
Commission  has  become  actively  involved  in  day-to-day  regulatory  activity, 
proposing relevant markets214 that are to be regulated and evaluating the work of the 
NRAs. This includes commenting on the proposed legal measures and can, in case of 
serious doubts about  the compatibility  of the market  analysis  and market  power 
designation with EC law, include  the suspension of the measure or even a veto 
209 On this topic, see Lee, K., Prime, J. in: Walden, I.,-ed., 2009, p. 227 and 232.
210 On the powers and criteria for the NRAs, see Walden I. in Walden, I.,-ed., 2009, p. 192-197.
211 In exceptional circumstances, direct regulation is possible by means of Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the EU Council. This power has been exercised in respect of local loop unbundling by 
means  of  Regulation  (EC) No 2887/2000 of  the  European Parliament  and of  the  Council  of  18  
December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, and in respect of international roaming price  
regulation,  by  means  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  Regulation  (EC)  No  717/2007  of  the  European  
Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks  
within  the  Community  and amending Directive  2002/21/EC,  as  amended by  Regulation (EC)  No  
544/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009.  
212 On this process, see Walden, I. in: Walden, I.,-ed., 2009, p. 176-185.
213 For example, monitoring and reporting as to interconnection were dealt with by Articles 14(3) and 
22 of the 1997 Interconnection Directive. However, the Commission did have in Article 7(5) explicit  
mandate  to  issue  a  harmonising  Recommendation  as  to  cost  accounting  systems  and  accounting 
separation in relation to interconnection.
214 See Article 15(1) of the 2002  Framework Directive: “After public consultation and consultation 
with  national  regulatory  authorities  the  Commission  shall  adopt  a  recommendation  on  relevant 
product and service markets…”
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decision.215 These powers that are exercised in the so-called 'Article 7 procedures'216 
have been in  the 2009 Framework review partially extended to market remedies, 
such as obligations imposed on operators to grant network access.217   
The powers of the Commission are counterbalanced by the consultative comitology 
proceedings,  whereby  the  Communications  Committee  (Cocom)  representing  the 
Member  States  oversees  the  powers  delegated  to  the  Commission.218 More 
importantly  in  practice,  however,  European  NRAs  have  been  organised  in  the 
European Regulators’ Group (ERG), recently transformed to the Body of European 
Regulators  on  Electronic  Communications  (BEREC),  that  regularly  prepares 
Common Positions and other documents on the harmonised application of regulatory 
powers granted by the NRF. 
During the review of the NRF, the idea about a European regulatory authority has 
emerged.219 Commissioner  Reding  initially  proposed  the  creation  of  a  single 
215 See Article 7(4) of the 2002 Framework Directive: “Where an intended measure […] would affect 
trade between Member States and the Commission has indicated to the national regulatory authority 
that it considers that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single market or if it has serious 
doubts as to its  compatibility with Community law and in particular  the objectives referred to in  
Article 8, then the draft measure shall not be adopted for a further two months. This period may not be 
extended. Within this period the Commission may, in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 22(2), take a decision requiring the national regulatory authority concerned to withdraw the 
draft measure. This decision shall be accompanied by a detailed and objective analysis of why the 
Commission considers that the draft measure should not be adopted together with specific proposals  
for amending the draft measure.” On Commission role, see also Walden, I. in: Walden, I.-ed., 2009, 
p.192.
216 See ibidem.
217 See Article 7a of the 2009 Framework Directive in the Appendix.
218 See  Article 22(1) of the 2002  Framework Directive:  “The Commission shall be assisted by a 
Committee (the Communications Committee).” The same article further refers to comitology system 
established by the Council decision Decision 1999/468/EC.
219 One should, however, bear in mind that the EU system is specific compared to, say the US system.  
The NRAs could not possibly play the role comparable to the FCC on the national level, as they are  
subject to the Commission veto as far as their crucial measures such as market analysis is concerned. 
In  this  respect,  the  Commission is  playing the  role  of  the  quasi-regulator  with a  high  degree  of  
discretion, including the power to set its own criteria to define the markets susceptible for ex ante  
regulation. In addition, it has the crucial power of initiative to recommend the changes in legislation to 
the Parliament and the Council. See e.g. Wallace, H., 2000, p. 15. In this respect, the Commission 
itself should be treated as a regulator with broad discretionary powers.  This should be put in the 
context of the EU institutional design: the Commission generally lacks sufficient staff and is bound to 
co-operate with national institutions, in this case the NRAs. Ibidem. Accordingly, the Commission and 
the NRAs, together with the ERG, form European regulatory bodies. This is quite different from the 
relationship between the US FCC and the State Regulatory Utilities Commissions, where the division 
of powers is based on federal and state competences. In the EU, on the other hand, national SMP 
decisions  may always  be  vetoed  by the  Commission,  implying  EU jurisdiction  over  every SMP 
decision.
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European  regulatory  agency  resembling  the  US  FCC,220 but  this  has  later  been 
watered down by the Commission's idea of a consultative body named the European 
Electronic  Communications  Market  Authority  (EECMA).221 Though  this  may  be 
questionable bearing in mind the very limited  powers of this agency proposed, the 
Commission’s public messages indicated the emergence of EECMA was important 
inter alia in relation to unresolved issues as to the use of VoIP that were supposedly 
insufficiently  dealt  with  by  the  ERG.222 The  initial  proposal  has  been  severely 
modified during the European Parliament and the Council discussions and has finally 
resulted in the idea of Body of European Regulators for European Communications 
(BEREC), a modified ERG supported by an Office as a Community body,223 with 
enhanced powers in 'Article 7 procedures'.224
Organizations such as the ERG, now BEREC, and the European Commission fulfil 
the  Teubner's  criteria  for  autopoiesis225,  as  they  largely  achieve  their  identify 
themselves by means of their  harmonising communications, while also distancing 
themselves from its members, i.e. Member States and their NRAs. Communications 
attributable to the Commission and the ERG, now BEREC, structurally couple with 
the law, either as mandatory decisions or soft law that can be re-used in regulatory 
practice (e.g. Common Positions or Recommendations). As further analysis of the 
220 On EU regulatory agencies, see Tarrant, A., Kelemen, R. D., 2007.
221 See  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and the  Council  establishing  the  
European Electronic Communications Market Authority, COM(2007)699 rev2.
222 See e.g. Steitz, C., 2007.
223 See 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 
European  Electronic  Communications Market  Authority –  Outcome of  the  European  Parliament's 
second  reading  (Strasbourg,  4  to  7  May  2009)’  (2009)  Available  at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09320.en09.pdf, 26th July 2009.
224 See Article 7a and Recital 19 of the  Better Regulation Directive: “...In order to benefit from the 
expertise of national regulatory authorities on the market analysis, the Commission should consult 
BEREC prior  to adoption of its  decisions and/or  opinion.'  See also the Position of  the European 
Parliament adopted at second reading on 6 May 2009 with a view to the adoption of a Directive 
2009/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services: 'The discretion 
of national regulatory authorities needs to be reconciled with the development of consistent regulatory 
practices and the consistent application of the regulatory framework in order to contribute effectively 
to  the development  and completion of  the internal  market.  National  regulatory authorities  should 
therefore support the internal market activities of the Commission and those of BEREC.”
225 Teubner, G., 1987c, p. 20.
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two  organisations  show,  each  of  them  have  processed  NGN-related  phenomena 
according to their own legal tasks and autopoietic organisational agenda.
3.2 European Commission
An increase in the harmonising activity of the Commission services can be observed 
in the passing of the 2002 Framework. Until 2008, Commission intervention in the 
harmonisation of network access measures was limited to the issues of leased lines, 
cost accounting and accounting separation.226 This was despite the general powers 
granted to the Commission under Article 19 of the 2002 Framework Directive227 to 
issue recommendations on the harmonised application of the provisions of the 2002 
Framework in order to further the achievement of the objectives mandates upon the 
NRAs,  such  as  the  prevention  of  distortion,  or  restriction,  or  competition,  or 
encouraging  efficient  investment  in  infrastructure.228 In  2008,  however,  the 
Commission  came  up  with  two  strategic  Recommendations  relating  to  network 
access:  on  fixed  and  mobile  termination  rates,  and  on  Next  Generation  Access 
networks  (NGA).229 The  Commission's  harmonising  powers  have  been  further 
enhanced by means of the 2009 review, whereby the issuing of mandatory decisions 
has been made possible in addition to non-binding recommendations.230
The  creation  of  new abstract  norms  by the  Commission  has  become an  internal 
function  of  the  EU communications  law that  can  regularly  couple  with  external 
influence,  such  as  political  power  and  lobbying.  As  Luhmann  would  argue,  the 
provision of said Article 19 of the 2002 Framework Directive triggers the creation of 
new legal texts with the help of the existing directives texts.231 Any use of these 
226 See  ‘eCommunications:  recommendations  and  guidelines’  (2010)  Available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/recomm_guidelines/index_en.htm,  29th 
December 2008.
227  See Appendix. 
228 The original  full list of objectives for the NRAs was listed in  Article 8 of the 2002  Framework 
Directive, see Appendix.
229 See  Commission Recommendation of 20.9.2010 on regulated access to Next Generation Access  
Networks (NGA), C(2010) 6223 final and Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment  
of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, C(2009) 3359 final. 
230 See the new Article 19 of the 2009 Framework Directive, see Appendix.
231 This is valid for any interpretation but even more so for discretionary decision-making, where more 
room for the development of new texts is created. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 306.
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powers will trigger the development of a new Recommendation. Moreover, as the 
Commission is involved in the so-called ‘Article 7 procedures’, it faces a constant 
requirement to evaluate, at least from the Single Market point of view, regulatory 
measures  presented  to  it.232 If  this  requirement  is  coupled  with  an  ability  to  set 
abstract  rules  in  the  form  of  Recommendations,  using  Recommendations  as  an 
additional steering instrument in ‘Article 7 procedures’ becomes a normal response 
of  any administration that  is  required to  ‘implement’ its  pre-written programmes, 
which may be originally political, but are translated into legal form.233 Of course, a 
pre-condition for such steering is the Commission's largely political perception that 
such action is required.
When the transition from the ONP directives to the NRF was in question, there was a 
broad agreement  at  the  EU level  as  to  the  transfer  of  the  remedies  of  the  1997 
Interconnection Directive into the 2002 legal framework.234 In this case, except as to 
specific accounting issues, no additional harmonisation needs were envisaged by the 
Commission.  This situation seems to have changed with the advent of NGN and 
NGA, whereby the coupling with the new business and technological environment 
has taken place. There was no obvious consent of the NRAs and the Commission on 
how to deal with access to fibre loops or ducts that can be used to roll them out, or on 
how to charge for  termination at  the time of  a  progressive replacement  of  TDM 
network cores with NGN. The opinions of several Member States and the ERG that 
enough room should be  left  to  the  NRAs for  them to be able  to  tackle national 
circumstances could hardly be accommodated, as the Commission is bound to pursue 
the autopoietic legal (and political) programme of harmonisation, legally elaborated 
232 Article  7  of  the  2002  Framework  Directive:  “[The  NRA]  shall  […]  make  the  draft  measure 
accessible to the Commission […] and inform the Commission […] thereof. […] the Commission 
may make comments to the national regulatory authority concerned [...] 4. Where an intended measure 
covered by paragraph 3 aims at: (a) defining a relevant market which differs from those defined in the  
recommendation  […] (b)  deciding whether  or  not  to  designate an undertaking as  having,  either 
individually or jointly with others,  significant  market  power […] and would affect  trade between 
Member States and the Commission has indicated to the national regulatory authority that it considers 
that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single market or if it has serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with Community law and in particular the objectives referred to in Article 8, then the  
draft measure shall not be adopted for a further two months. […] 5. The national regulatory authority 
concerned shall take the utmost account of comments of other national regulatory authorities and the 
Commission and may, except in cases covered by paragraph 4, adopt the resulting draft measure and, 
where it does so, shall communicate it to the Commission.”
233 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 374.
234 See chapter on access and interconnection below.
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in Articles 7 and 19 of the  Framework Directive  and based on the Commission's 
general role under the EU Treaty. Accordingly, it was an understandable action by the 
Commission to propose long-run incremental costs (LRIC)235 based on the costs of 
the NGN core as the ultimate call termination pricing methodology,236 and set rules 
for  costing  and  non-discrimination  as  to  ducts  and  fibre  loops  access.237 These 
developments suggest that coupling of the EU law with the new NGN environment 
should be seen in the context  of the legal  harmonisation formula pursued by the 
Commission as an institution.
It is not of primary interest for this work to discover the influence of lobbying or 
specific hidden political (or even personal) agendas behind them. What matters most 
is that, when producing the rules, the Commission functions as a specific autopoietic 
forum with its own set agenda that is based on its perception of ‘harmonisation’. 
There  are,  of  course,  external  influences  and  legal  safeguards  in  the  form  of 
Communications  Committee  (Cocom)  procedures,238 public  consultations,  ERG 
inputs,  or  simply  lobbying.  However,  the  procedure  whereby  original  rules  are 
actually created is limited to the Commission services, i.e. its internal administration. 
In other words, observations of the environment on the basis of which regulatory 
rules are primarily239 drafted happen within a closed organisational circle. A similar 
type  of  decision-making  can  be  observed  with  the  ERG,  later  transformed  to 
BEREC, introducing checks and balances to harmonising procedures initiated by the 
Commission in accordance with its enhanced powers.240
235 Incremental costing in telecommunications is based on the idea that one additional unit of product 
hardly means any marginal costs, however, multiple units require an increment in terms of network 
investment, enabling the regulators to set, for example, the price per minute of call. See also  Melody, 
W.H., 1997, p. 239 et seq.
236 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU,  
C(2009) 3359 final.
237 Commission  Recommendation  of  20.9.2010  on  regulated  access  to  Next  Generation  Access  
Networks (NGA), C(2010) 6223 final.
238 See Article 22 of the Framework Directive: “1. The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee 
("the Communications Committee") …”
239 Consultancies, such as Analysys Mason, may from time to time be hired by the Commission.
240 See Articles 7 and 19 of the DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND  
OF  THE  COUNCIL  of  7  March  2002  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  
communications networks and services (Framework Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC  
and Regulation 544/2009 (unofficial consolidated version).
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3.3 European Regulators Group (ERG) and the Board of 
European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC)
The ERG, an organisation of European NRAs that has subsequently transformed into 
BEREC and its Office with the status of an EU agency, has also seen tremendous 
increase in its harmonising activities. Though formally, according to the Commission 
Decision241 that established it, its task is to advise and assist the Commission,242 in 
practice the ERG has been characterised by its largely autonomous views.243 
The essential background for its creation was the Commission’s finding that “the 
need  for  the  relevant  rules  to  be  consistently  applied  in  all  Member  States  was 
essential  for  the  successful  development  of  an  internal  market  for  electronic 
communications networks and services.”244 The ERG was supposed to provide “an 
interface between national regulatory authorities and the Commission in such a way 
as to contribute to the development of the EU internal market.”245 It was also to allow 
for  cooperation between national  regulatory authorities  and the  Commission in  a 
transparent manner to ensure the consistent application of the regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services in all Member States. The ERG 
was to “serve as a body for reflection, debate and advice for the Commission in the 
electronic communications field”.246
In parallel, the members of the ERG have also established the IRG as an independent 
organization of European NRAs, which has acted as a pressure group against the 
Commission's policies, and also has, since 2008, had legal personality under Belgian 
241 Commission Decision 2002/627/EC of 29 July 2002.
242 Ibidem. Aims of the ERG are defined in Article 3: “The role of the Group shall be to advise and 
assist the Commission in consolidating the internal market for electronic communications networks 
and services. The Group shall provide an interface between national regulatory authorities and the 
Commission in such a way as to contribute to the development of the internal market  and to the 
consistent  application  in  all  Member  States  of  the  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications networks and services.”
243 Diverging views on future regulation were sometimes even expressed publicly. See e.g. letter of the 
former  ERG  Chairman  Mr  Roberto  Viola  of  6th  November  2007,  available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/viviane_reding_letter.pdf, 27th July 2009.
244 Recital 4 of the Decision 2002/627EC.
245  See Recital 6 of the Commission Decision 2002/627/EC.
246 Recital 6 and 7 of the Decision 2002/627EC.
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private law. In either role, however, the ERG has shown a degree of autonomy in 
relation to  the Commission.247 Moreover,  it  has developed an ongoing process of 
dealing with regulatory issues,  whereby project teams consisting of NRA experts 
have been preparing Common Positions or Reports to be ultimately adopted by the 
Plenary  as  the  body  of  NRA  heads.  The  ERG  has  become  an  organisation 
interpreting legal rules, proposing market remedies and observing technological and 
business phenomena, which has resulted in large amounts of fresh documents.248
The ERG, now BEREC, consults on the documents with the general public,249 but the 
documents themselves are initiated and prepared internally, bearing in mind that the 
work programme for each year is also influenced by the actions and requests of the 
Commission.250 Accordingly,  the  procedure  does  not  guarantee  any  significant 
dependence  on  the  outside  factors,  and  therefore  enables  a  rather  autonomous 
development of norms by the ERG as a forum of regulators. This may be perceived 
as having unwanted consequences. The regulators ‘want to survive’, even if their key 
objectives  have been fulfilled in many markets, a phenomenon also observed by 
Hall, Scott and Hood in Oftel's earlier stages of existence.251 The same point can be 
made  in  respect  of  the  Commission’s  role,  except  for  the  fact  that  the  ERG's 
autopoietic  activities  largely  refer  to  the  national  regulatory  experience  of  its 
members,  whereas  the  Commission's  ideas  primarily  originate  from  the 
Commission's  own  political  agenda  and  the  acquis  communitaire-based 
harmonisation programme.252
247 See 2008 IRG/ERG Work Programme: “In addition, the strategic importance of pointed and well-
prepared  deliveries  is  to  support  and  to  voice  standpoints  of  the  NRAs  as  a  group,  and  show 
consistency to the outside world, including the Commission.”
248 See http://erg.ec.europa.eu/, 29th October 2009. Though established for the purpose of harmonising 
the regulation of electronic communications services (by definition not including content services, see 
Article 2(c) of the  Framework Directive), the ERG has also launched research on convergence by 
means of establishing a Convergence Project Team, touching also upon issues such as the influence of  
copyright for content as bottlenecks in communications value chain.
249 See BEREC ‘Public consultations’, available at www.erg.eu.int/documents/cons/index_en.htm, 30th 
December 2008.
250 For example,  Work Programme for 2009 at several occasions refers to Commission activities or 
requests.  ‘I/ERG  work  programme  2009’  (2008)  Available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/consult_wp_2009/erg_08_48_wp_2009_final_081209.pdf,  30th 
December 2008.
251 Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 209.
252 An interesting phenomenon can further be noted in relation to the regulation by the two closed fora: 
instead  of  producing  binding  legal  documents,  which  generally  requires  stronger  safeguards, 
documents without direct legal binding power are created that can, however, have a huge impact upon 
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The autopoietic existence of the ERG is also reflected in the quantity of its activities, 
irrespective of the NRF idea of the progressive phasing out of  ex ante regulation. 
Looking  at  the  ERG  record,  the  amount  of  documents  produced  per  year  has 
significantly grown since establishing the organisation.253 In this respect, the ERG 
has increasingly focused on specific remedies related to network access. Whereas 
initially  only  general  guidance  as  to  the  choice  of  remedies  under  the  2002 
Framework254 or solutions for specific problems such as cable bitstream255 had been 
given,  it  has  become  common  practice  to  propose  more  detailed  rules  for  non-
competitive markets in specific areas, such as wholesale local and broadband access 
(bitstream)256,  symmetry of termination rates257,  or regulation of leased lines.258 In 
order to properly understand this increased activity, however, one should not only 
point to the autopoietic reference to the ERG's harmonising mission, but also to its 
identity vis-à-vis the Commission.259
3.4 Productive competition
Interestingly, the relationship between the Commission and the ERG has in practice 
amounted to the one of competition rather than to the one of co-operation. In 2007 
actual legally-binding decision-making. For example, invoking Commission’s Recommendations or 
ERG Common Positions may help to fulfil the burden of proof for imposing certain remedies with the 
domestic courts.
253 See http://www.erg.eu.int/documents/docs/index_en.htm, 30th December 2008.
254 The original ‘ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the new 
regulatory framework,ERG (03) 30rev1' (2003) Available at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/whatsnew/erg_0330rev1_remedies_common_position.pdf, 1st January 2009.
255 ‘Bitstream Access,  ERG Common Position of 2nd April 2004 and amended on 25th May 2005 
ERG (03) 33rev2’ (2005) Available at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/whatsnew/erg_03_33rev2_bitstream_access_final_plus_cable_adopted.pdf, 3rd 
May 2008.
256 ‘ERG  Common  Position  on  Best  Practice  in  Bitstream  Access  Remedies  Imposed  as  a 
Consequence  of  a  Position of  Significant  Market  Power  in  the Market  for  Wholesale Broadband 
Access ERG(06)69Rev1’ (2006) Available at
     www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_06_69rev1_wba_cp.pdf  , 2nd March 2008.
257 ‘Common  Position on symmetry of  fixed  call  termination  rates  and  symmetry of  mobile  call  
termination rates, ERG (07) 83’ (2007) Available at
 www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_83_mtr_ftr_cp_12_03_08.pdf, 1st January 2009.
258 ‘Common Position on Best  Practice in  Remedies Imposed as  a  Consequence of  a  Position of  
Significant Market Power in the Relevant Markets for Wholesale Leased Lines, ERG (07) 54’ (2007) 
Available at www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_54_wll_cp_final_080331.pdf, 1st January 2009.
259 See e.g. Teubner, G., 1987c, p. 20.
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the Commission,  holding the legislative initiative in the EU, proposed within the 
scope  of  the  2002  Framework  Review  that  the  ERG  be  replaced  with  a 
Euroregulator:  the  European  Electronic  Communications  Markets  Authority 
(EECMA)  that  would  have  the  status  of  an  EU  agency.260 As  the  reason  the 
Commission quoted the efficiency of ERG work in certain areas.261 However, bearing 
in  mind  the  extremely  limited  powers  of  the  proposed  authority,262 the  lack  of 
political  understanding  between  the  Commission  and  the  ERG  is  a  more  likely 
reason. It should be noted that, in parallel with the proposed institutional reform, the 
Commission also proposed to extend its  veto to the NRA decisions on remedies, 
whereas EECMA would assist the Commission’s services in preparing the desired 
alternative regulatory scenarios.263 With the NRA heads playing a (marginal) role in 
the  so-called  EECMA 'Board  of  Regulators',  the  ERG  and  the  IRG  would  be 
rendered unnecessary, while EECMA powers would be vested in the Director and the 
Administrative Board appointed by the Council of Ministers and the Commission.264 
Although this  can be seen as  an attempt by the  Commission to  seize powers  of 
Member States' NRAs, it is also part of the programme to pursue harmonisation; the 
latter is easier to achieve when less de-centralised players are involved, as is the case 
with the NRAs and their organisation.
In his letter, ERG Chairman Daniel Pataki offered the IRG, the existing ERG acting 
as a civil  law organization with its own resources, as a response to the proposed 
260 See  Proposal for  a  Regulation  of  the  European Parliament  and the  Council  establishing  the  
European Electronic Communications Market Authority, COM(2007)699 rev2.
261 Commissioner Reding's spokesman Martin Selmayr directly linked the need for a Euroregulator 
with  the  urgent  need  for  regulatory attention  as  to  VoIP,  without  explaining how establishing an 
authority, which should be 'three times as well' as the ERG in performing its tasks, will contribute to  
better regulation of VoIP, especially given the fact that no specific powers would be given to it in this  
area.  Steitz,  C.  ‘Planned  EU  telecoms  authority  to  replace  ERG  in  2010’ (2007)  Available  at 
www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/10/31/afx4284234.html, 26th July 2009.
262 See  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and the  Council  establishing  the  
European  Electronic  Communications  Market  Authority,  COM(2007)699  rev2,  whereby  EECMA 
would mainly serve as a consultancy for the Commission services in 'Article 7 proceedings'.
263 At the request of the Commission, 'the Authority shall deliver opinion on all matters regarding 
electronic  communications.'  See  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and the  
Council  establishing the  European Electronic  Communications Market  Authority,  COM(2007)699 
rev2.
264 Each body would appoint 6 of totally 12 members. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European  
Parliament and the Council establishing the European Electronic Communications Market Authority, 
COM(2007)699 rev2.
67
EECMA.265 Stressing past ERG achievements, he proposed to enhance the existing 
model  of  co-operation  between  the  ERG  and  the  Commission  by  means  of 
formalising the ERG's role in Article 7 proceedings and its further involvement in 
other Commission activities, such as the Framework review.266 On the other hand, the 
Commission could get involved at an earlier stage in the ERG annual Work Program 
drafting  process.267 The  letter  did  not  persuade  the  Commission  to  withdraw  or 
modify its EECMA proposal. Nevertheless, following the procedure in the European 
Parliament and the Council  of Ministers, which also meant direct involvement of 
Member States' governments, the EECMA proposal has been gradually modified268 
into  a  proposal  to  establish  the  Body  of  European  Regulators  for  European 
Communications (BEREC)269 that would resemble the old ERG primarily governed 
by the NRA heads. On the other hand, this entity would be assisted by an Office that 
was  to  provide  administrative  and  professional  support.270 In  this  form the  ERG 
essentially survived, while also gaining an additional full-time support system in the 
form of an EU office. In this respect, it is essential that the ERG as an autopoietic 
organization successfully went through the changes of the legal framework, being 
able to identify itself not only internally271 but also externally by means of its actions, 
coupled with the European politics that had granted it a privileged position in 'Article 
7' and 'Article 19' procedures.272
265See  the  ERG’s  letter  to  Commissioner  Vivienne  Redding  (2007)  Available  at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/viviane_reding_letter.pdf, 31st October 2009. 
266 Ibidem.
267 Ibidem.
268 Scaling  down  Commission  powers  is  the  most  common  explanation  of  this  reaction  by  the 
Parliament and the Council. See Peter, H., 2008. The interim version proposed an upgraded ERG 
called the Body of European Regulators of Telecommunications (BERT).
269 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 (BEREC Regulation).
270 See EU Telecom Trackers, Cullen International, June 2009, p. 8.
271 In its 2008 Work Programme the ERG clearly states: 'The WP 2008 intends to make sure that our 
voice is heard regarding every bit of the reform and that the contributions are taking into account at 
the  highest  level.'  ‘IRG/ERG  Work  Programme  2008’  (2007)  Available  at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/work_progr_2008/erg_07_65rev2_work_programme_2008.pdf ,  1st 
November 2009.   Furthermore, reaching the agreement to register as a civil law entity under Belgian 
law does show a high degree of self-identification of the members who are essentially parts of public 
administrations of the Member States. 
272 Similarly, Hall, Scott and Hood describe the UK former sectoral regulator Oftel's 're-invention' as 
competition authority, which prevented its 'self-destruction' implied by the theory of transition to a 
competitive market. Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 209.
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Looking at the activities of both bodies described above, the last highly conflicting 
years have also been the most productive ones in terms of preparing new legally 
relevant  documents.  Whereas  the  technological  developments  in  respect  of  NGN 
provided enough content to deal with, it was nevertheless the competition between 
the two bodies that facilitated the coupling with the changing environment: the 2008 
IRG/ERG Work Programme largely focused on the Commission Framework Review 
proposal273 with a view to preparing an alternative version. The need to compete with 
the  Commission  is  most  clearly  described  by the  following  wording  in  the  said 
document:  “In  addition,  the  strategic  importance  of  pointed  and  well-prepared 
deliveries is to support and to voice standpoints of the NRAs as a group, and show 
consistency to the outside world, including the Commission.”274 Unlike other years' 
Work Programmes, the 2008 programme also contained an implicit worry that the 
ERG would look bad if not performing as  ad hoc requested by the Commission: 
“The  ERG  also  needs  to  reserve  resources  in  order  to  fulfil  requests  of  the 
Commission  of  ERG  opinions  on  specific  topics  articulated  in  high-level  pre-
legislative papers.”275 This can of course be seen as productive competition between 
the  two  organizations  identifying  themselves  vis-à-vis  each  other,  whereby  this 
productivity results  in more text  and more 'juridification'.  As the law attempts  to 
tackle  new  problems  in  the  environment  in  order  to  promote  itself,  it  sets  up 
organisations that produce more legal rules to this end. 
It may be comforting, though, that proliferation of legal regulation or 'juridification' 
says more about the administrative burden for market entities than about the real 
economic burden in terms of, say pricing or network access requirements. As such, 
proliferation of norms merely means that the economic system will have to couple 
with a way more complex body of legal norms (or, alternatively, ignore it as far as 
possible).276
273 See above.
274  ‘ERG Work Programme 2009’ (2008) Available at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/consult_wp_2009/erg_08_48_wp_2009_final_081209.pdf, 30th 
December 2008.
275 Ibidem.
276 The business community seems to be well-prepared to this increased complexity by means of  
forming its  own organizations, such as ECTA (see  www.ectaportal.com, 1st November 2009).  The 
organisation was established in 1998 and has been publishing ‘Regulatory Scorecards’ evaluating the 
work  of  European  NRAs since  2002.  By adding a  special  ‘Broadband Scorecard’ to  the  general 
reports, ECTA activity particularly focused on broadband to provide high-speed IP-based services. 
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Whereas the described institutional setting relies on the EU law's internal programme 
of harmonisation of regulatory measures, it  also facilitates, by means of different 
regulatory bodies and procedures performed by them, the coupling of legal concepts 
with phenomena in the environment. This can be observed in the case of expanding 
wholesale local access regulation to NGA infrastructures and in the case of VoIP, 
both addressed in the next two chapters. This confirms the hypothesis put forward by 
Scott  as  early  as  1998  that  regulatory  institutions  are  becoming  increasingly 
general,277 not in the sense of transferring power to general competition authorities 
but in terms of broadening the scope of their activities to all the areas that can be 
perceived by law as electronic communications networks and services markets.
Nevertheless,  in  their  pursuit  of  their  legally  set  goals,  these  organisations  will 
always have to rely on creating more legally relevant texts278 without any guarantee 
that  these  texts  actually  make  an  impact  on  the  environment.  Paradoxically,  this 
creation of text will even happen in the context of the de-regulatory activities based 
on the NRF programme itself:  the Commission is  obliged to  draw up guidelines 
restraining ex ante regulatory activity,279 whereas the ERG was in 2009 involved in 
the  project  of  preparing  guidance  for  transition  from  ex  ante regulation  to 
competition  law.280 The  proliferation  of  norms  is  therefore  a  result  of  the 
organisations'  (competing) legal competences established by law in pursuit  of the 
(legal)  idea  of  harmonisation,  and  not  a  necessary  need of  the  changing 
communications business. 
Accordingly, the emergence and functioning of ECTA could be linked to the increased complexity of  
both the regulatory process and telecommunications business.
277 Scott, C., 1998, p. 244 and 249.
278 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 306.
279 See Recital 27 of the 2002 Framework Directive: “It is essential that ex ante regulatory obligations 
should only be imposed where there is not effective competition, i.e. in markets where there are one or  
more undertakings with significant market power, and where national and Community competition 
law remedies are not sufficient to address the problem. It is necessary therefore for the Commission to  
draw up guidelines at  Community level in  accordance with the principles  of  competition law for 
national  regulatory authorities  to  follow in assessing whether  competition  is  effective  in  a  given 
market and in assessing significant market power.”
280See ‘IRG/ERG 2009 Work Programme’ (2008) Available at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/work_progr_2009/erg_08_48_wp_2009_final_081209.pdf, 29th October 
2009: “The ERG will investigate the issues arising from the transition from sector specific regulation 
to competition law, particularly in markets removed from the list of relevant markets will be analysed 
in more detail.”
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Moreover, the described relationship between the Commission and the ERG, now 
BEREC, also confirms that no direct links between EU law and its institutions, and 
the  technological  and  commercial  environment  exist.  While  the  initial  political 
impetus  for  the  creation  of  said  institutional  framework  might  have  relied  on 
technology change, as suggested by Martin Selmayr's speech,281 it was primarily the 
autopoietic institutional design and reference to the tasks set by the law that was the 
driving force behind the increased production of norms. While specific responses of 
the  two  organisations  to  changes  in  the  environment,  such  as  the  NGN 
Recommendation or Common Position on VoIP, clearly demonstrate that the intensive 
coupling with the NGN environment has taken place, the intensity of the response 
and  the  quantity  of  documents  produced  remains  an  internal  function  of  the 
autopoietic  institutional  setting,  namely  the  two  organisations  and  the  EU 
communications law: first, the proliferation of norms encompasses not only NGN, 
but also other issues, e.g. leased lines282; second, NGN-related projects dealt with by 
the two organisations are not synchronised in time with the environment,  but are 
processed according to the organisations' own activities plans, such as ERG Annual 
Work Programs and the relevant Commissioner's political agenda,283 providing for 
the selection mechanism that cannot be directly controlled by outside factors such as 
stakeholders or politicians;284 third, the role of both organisations  has been largely 
limited to creating soft law, i.e. recommendations and common positions. Although 
these documents make it easier for the measures of NRAs to pass the 'Article 7' or 
judicial  review  proceedings,  they  all  need  to  be  translated  into  specific  national 
measures  in  order  to  be  able  to  affect  actual  business  transactions.  The  cyclical 
linkage  of  identity  and  action  of  the  two  organisations  is  established  on  the 
harmonisation  of  the  EU  rules  on  regulation,  not  say  on  the  efficiency  of  the 
281 See Steitz, C., 2007.
282 ‘Common Position on Best  Practice in  Remedies Imposed as  a  Consequence of  a  Position of  
Significant Market Power in the Relevant Markets for Wholesale Leased Lines, ERG (07) 54’ (2007) 
Available at www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_54_wll_cp_final_080331.pdf, 1st January 2009.
283 Commissioner Ms Reding, for example,  put  great  emphasis on regulating mobile roaming and 
termination charges, although stakeholders strongly opposed her ideas.
284 The  Roaming Regulation can be seen as an example, whereby Commissioner Reding focused on 
cutting the roaming rates in favour of roaming end-users without a view to specific technological  
changes. See Regulation (EC) No Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of  
the Council of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community  
and amending Directive 2002/21/EC, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 544/2009 of the European  
Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009.
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environment or the effectiveness of regulatory measures in practice. In this respect, 
as also established by the general theory on regulation, regulatory organisations can 
re-invent themselves without a reference to the success of their original goals in the 
market.285   
In the chapters that follow,  it shall be demonstrated that this is not only an issue for 
institutions within this setting, but also for substantive law, no matter how much it 
attempts  to  adapt  to  the  changing  environment.  While  the  above  examples  of 
institutional  activities  largely rely on the  concept  of  pan-European harmonisation 
when developing more regulatory rules, other legal concepts of the EU regulatory 
framework also determine the scope and directions of its future evolution without 
constantly relying on the technological and business environment.
285 See the example of Oftel's re-invention as competition authority described by Hall, C., Scott, C., 
Hood, C., 2000, p. 208-209.
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4 THE EVOLUTION OF END-USER SERVICES 
REGULATION
This  chapter  will  focus  on  one  of  the  two  mentioned  key  elements  that  have 
traditionally been part of (tele) communications law: end-user rights.286 These have 
initially  focused  on  (fixed)  voice  telephony287 and,  despite  the  fact  that  internet 
services have been relevant for a huge body of end-users since the second half of 
1990s, remained the key concept of the EU communications law until 2009, when 
the “connection at a fixed location to the public telephone network and for access to 
publicly available  telephone services  at  a  fixed location” as  the main element  of 
universal  service  was   replaced  by  “connection  at  a  fixed  location  to  a  public 
communications network”.288
This  important  role  of  voice  telephony  in  the  law  has  largely  determined  the 
intensive debates on the regulation of VoIP as a potential replacement for traditional 
circuit-switched telephony. Observations have been made, say by Bach and Sallet, 
suggesting  a  political  preference  for  voice  regulation,289 e.g.  for  the  purpose  of 
making  it  more  difficult  for  new  technologies  to  compete  with  the  established 
telephone  incumbents.  Other  authors  have  put  strong  emphasis  on  the  economic 
determination of VoIP regulatory policies: according to Dick, one will not see VoIP 
services  make  a  full  transition  from  peripheral  to  mainstream  technology  until 
regulators  have  clarified  the  regulatory  position  to  give  operators  and  investors 
greater certainty, and until the technology has improved enough that the quality of 
service and its ability to provide emergency services is clear.290 Whereas it is not the 
intention of this thesis to discredit these views altogether, it is submitted that systems 
theory provides a clearer explanation of the role of voice services in the legal system.
286 See e.g. Walden, I., 2009, p. 11-12.
287 See ibidem, p. 200.
288 The initial Article 4 (1) of the 2002 Universal Service Directive: “Member States shall ensure that 
all reasonable requests for connection at a fixed location to the public telephone network and for  
access to publicly available telephone services at a fixed location are met by at least one undertaking' 
has been  by the 2009 Citizens' Rights Directive replaced by the wording: 'Member States shall ensure 
that all reasonable requests for connection at a fixed location to a public communications network are 
met by at least one undertaking.”
289 Bach, D., Sallet, J., 2007, p. 2.
290 Ibidem.
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This chapter will demonstrate how the legal debates on VoIP have essentially evolved 
around the law's own internal concepts of voice telephony and their transformation, 
and not around political programmes, economy or technological change. With some 
exceptions, where the regulators were able to exercise more (political) discretion, say 
in the case of Ofcom's interim pragmatical views as to emergency calls, or in the case 
of ERG views on the nomadic use of geographic numbering,291 legal responses, even 
when they considered more fundamental changes of the law based on applied IP 
technology,  have  always  been  about  fitting  VoIP  into  the  law,  and  not  about 
questioning the relevance of the legal regulation of voice telephony. While the 2002 
review of the EU regulatory framework has resulted in a more technology-neutral 
definition of public telephony,292 it continued the legacy of detailed regulation for 
voice,293 e.g.  by  mandating  operator  assistance  services  and  directory  enquiry 
services,294 without any specific proof that this required public intervention.295
291 See below.‘ERG Common Position on VoIP ERG (07) 56rev’ (2007) Available at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
292 See Article 2(c) of the 2002  Universal Service Directive: “'publicly available telephone service' 
means a service available to the public for originating and receiving national and international calls  
and  access  to  emergency  services  through  a  number  or  numbers  in  a  national  or  international 
telephone numbering plan, and in addition may, where relevant, include one or more of the following 
services:  the  provision  of  operator  assistance,  directory inquiry services,  directories,  provision  of 
public  pay  phones,  provision  of  service  under  special  terms,  provision  of  special  facilities  for 
customers  with  disabilities  or  with  special  social  needs  and/or  the  provision  of  non-geographic 
services.”
293 A similar legacy issue can be observed in the case of (IP) television. During the Television Without  
Frontiers Directive review process, it was constantly assumed that the new audiovisual media services 
provided over the IP protocol, be it on demand or in linear form, somehow require legal 'coverage' 
resembling that of traditional television, notwithstanding non-legal arguments against it. Barendt, for 
example, observes that television content regulation was traditionally justified by spectrum scarcity, 
which allowed only for a limited number of television channels, and the perception of airwaves as 
public resources. Barendt, E. M., 1995, p. 5-9. See also Van Loon, A., 2004, p. 181-2. Though the 
final version of the  Audiovisual Media Services Directive did not automatically include all internet 
video into the concept of 'television', this does not in any way change the observation as to the law's  
self-evolution: the primary material for change stems from the law's own established concepts. See 
Recital  16 of  the Directive 2007/65/EC:  “For the purposes  of  this  Directive,  the definition of  an 
audiovisual  media  service  should  cover  only  audiovisual  media  services,  whether  television 
broadcasting or on-demand, which are mass media, that is, which are intended for reception by, and  
which could have a clear impact on, a significant proportion of the general public. Its scope should be  
limited to services as defined by the Treaty and therefore should cover any form of economic activity, 
including that of public service enterprises, but should not cover activities which are primarily non-
economic and which are not in competition with television broadcasting, such as private websites and 
services consisting of the provision or distribution of audiovisual content generated by private users 
for the purposes of sharing and exchange within communities of interest.”
294 See Article 25 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
295 Recital 34 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive is exceptionally weak in arguments provided: 
“All end-users should continue to enjoy access to operator assistance services whatever organisation 
provides access to the public telephone network.” The 2009 Citizens' Rights Directive, which finally 
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It is argued that  EU law has in fact developed mechanisms enabling it to respond to 
technology change  faster.  The  regulators  are  able  to  exercise  discretion,  and  the 
definitions  of  public  telephony  are  less  determined  by  specific  circuit-switched 
technology.  However,  both  discretionary  rights  and  technological  neutrality  are 
internal concepts of the law, bound to its own regulatory programmes focusing on 
voice telephony.
This can also explain the fundamental difficulties faced by the proponents of the new 
forms  of  regulation  such  as  net  neutrality.  The  law  is  by  means  of  its  internal 
programmes unable to compare the relevance of voice telephony and net neutrality 
regulation if  the latter  is not part of them, i.e. if it  net neutrality debates are not  
adequately juridified. Accordingly, it shall be argued that getting net neutrality on the 
legal regulatory agenda, as is the case with the 2009 Framework review, is only the 
starting point for the development of the relevant legal discussions, which may later 
rely  on  the  law's  internal  concept  of  proportionality  and  couple  with  economic 
analysis.
4.1 Legal regulation of VoIP
VoIP or IP telephony constitutes a service that uses IP protocol to transmit voice. 
Many forms of VoIP are now used to replace traditional circuit-switched telephony 
(POTS). For this analysis, VoIP represents a crucial issue: while it uses internet (IP) 
technology,  whose  use  has  traditionally  been  almost  unregulated  by  the 
telecommunications law both in Europe and the US, it may also serve as a substitute 
for traditional telephony that has been traditionally the subject of heavy regulation, 
first in the form of state monopoly and later on in the form of universal service. 
Accordingly, the regulation of VoIP, which as a rule functionally replaces POTS in 
removed operator  assistance  obligation  declared  in  Recital  37  that:  “Operator  assistance  services 
cover a range of different services for end-users. The provision of such services should be left  to 
commercial  negotiations  between  providers  of  public  communications  networks  and  operator 
assistance services, as is the case for any other customer support service, and it is not necessary to  
continue to mandate their provision. The corresponding obligation should therefore be repealed.” It is 
far from clear why the situation in 2002 was any different in this  respect  from the one in 2009, 
bearing in mind that interconnection options for this type of service providers already existed at the 
time.
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NGNs, can be seen as a test of the telecommunications law’s ability to adapt to new 
technological and commercial phenomena.
VoIP or  IP telephony  is  commonly  described  as  transport  of  voice  via  Internet 
Protocol, whereas classifications of VoIP as a service have also been made by the 
International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU)  primarily  for  standardisation 
purposes (e.g. ITU-T H.323 protocol), without ambitions to attach to them specific 
legal effects. Legal classifications of VoIP are of course different due to their ability 
to produce effects within the legal system. In addition, as Bach and Sallet warn, they 
always attempt to fit VoIP into existing categories of communications services that 
are already part of the legal system.296 A historical example for this can be found in 
the introduction of voice telephony (POTS), whereby the latter was increasingly seen 
as competition for the existing telegraphy business and was finally held to constitute 
a 'form of telegraph' in the historical Edison case.297 Whereas Bach and Sallet see 
legal classification of VoIP primarily as a matter of political and business interests 
whereby legal  definitions are 'abused'  in order to  achieve a certain goal,  systems 
theory provides for an explanation how the law as a system itself makes such results 
possible:  politicians  and  business  lobbyists  can  only  bet  on  certain  legal 
classification of VoIP if the latter can be constructed as part of the legal system by the 
relevant authorities. In this respect, the evolution of the regulatory classification of 
VoIP in Europe has been largely determined by two essentially legal factors: the lack 
in the relevant legal framework of a specific definition of VoIP as a new service and 
the  division  of  powers  between  the  EU  authorities,  especially  the  European 
Commission  and  the  national  regulatory  authorities  (NRAs)  of   Member  States, 
including the ERG as their body.
EU law image of voice telephony
The regulatory approach to VoIP of the European Commission was for the first time 
generally explained in the Commission Notice Status of voice communications on 
296 Bach, D., Sallet, J., 2005, p. 1.
297 AG v Edison Telephone Company of London (1880) 6 QBD 244. For more history, see Walden, I.,  
2009, p. 124.
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internet  under  Community  law  and,  in  particular,  pursuant  to  Directive  
90/388/EEC.298 The Commission studied VoIP from the end-user experience point of 
view and made a distinction between computer-to-computer, computer-to-phone and 
phone-to-phone types of VoIP. The differences between these types, the Commission 
argued, were based on the fact that, in order to communicate, the users were either 
connected to the internet via public switched (fixed) network termination points or 
dedicated  connections  (or  other  means)  not  employing  such  termination  points. 
These types of VoIP were then considered from the point of view of the European 
regulatory  framework  set  both  in  the  90/3888  competition  directive  and  further 
liberalisation  directives.  In  particular,  it  was  discussed  whether  VoIP  could  be 
considered to be a voice telephony service, which was defined as the 'commercial 
provision for the public of the direct transport and switching of speech in real-time 
between  public  switched  network  termination  points,  enabling  any  user  to  use 
equipment connected to such a network termination point in order to communicate 
with another termination point'.299
The Commission first found that at the time of the notice, voice service was ancillary 
to other elements of an integrated internet service that end-users choose for a number 
of reasons, such as browsing, e-mail, and downloading of files and data. This meant 
that  offering  VoIP was  not  to  be  considered  as  'commercial'.  The  Commission 
pointed out that only where phone-to-phone internet telephony was marketed in the 
European  Union  as  an  alternative  form  of  voice  telephony  service,  would  the 
organisation concerned be considered to be making a commercial offer. Similarly, in 
the case of PC-based voice communications, if the provision of a dial-out facility to 
any  telephone  number  became  a  decisive  element  in  the  service  providers 
commercial strategies, they could be considered commercially to be the transport of 
voice.300
On the  issue  whether  VoIP was  offered  for  the  public,  it  was  the  Commission's 
opinion that in the case of computer-to-computer voice services, although only users 
298 98/C 6/04. See Article 1 of the COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 28 June 1990  on competition in the  
markets for telecommunications services (90/388/EEC). See also e.g. Walden, I., 1996, p.226-31.
299 98/C 6/04.
300 Ibidem.
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who subscribed to an internet service provider (ISP) providing access to the internet 
and who used compatible software would be able to use the internet for calling each 
other, it could be argued that computer-to-computer internet voice was provided 'for 
the public', since the service would be available to all members of the public on the 
same basis. The criterion would, however, definitely be met by both computer-to-
computer  and phone-to-phone services,  whereby any necessary conversion of  the 
signal was taken care of by the organisation offering the service, as these type of 
services were available to all members of the public who wished to enter into the 
commercial arrangement with the provider.301
The Commission went further to explore whether VoIP connected two termination 
points on the public switched network (PSTN) at the same time. These termination 
points  were  those  defined  by  subscriber  numbers  from  the  national  telephone 
numbering plan, based on ITU classification commonly known as E.164 numbers. 
Accordingly, the Commission said, a VoIP call that was originated via leased-circuit-
based internet  access could never qualify as voice telephony.  In addition,  a VoIP 
service used by subscribers whose computers were connected via a modem and who 
were using compatible software was  also not 'voice telephony', because it was not 
'enabling any user to communicate with another termination point' in the sense of 
'any user to any user'. However, in cases of computer-to-phone or phone-to-phone 
internet voice this element would be satisfied.
As to the issue of real-time communication requirement, the Commission stressed 
that internet telephony could not originally be considered to take place in real-time. 
The Commission invoked a technical argument: according to VoIP basic technique, 
the voice is digitally encoded, packed and sent by a user from a termination point to a 
server and on to the reception server, which in turn sends it to the receiver equipment 
that is connected to a termination point, which assembles the packets to be delivered 
as  voice  via  the  loudspeaker.  The  time  period  required  for  processing  and 
transmission from one termination point to the other was generally still such that it 
could not be considered as of the same quality as a standard real-time service.302 The 
301 Ibidem.
302 Ibidem. Compare also the Hungarian position of  the time where acceptable delay was legally 
prescribed (=/>250ms), see ITU IP Telephony Workshop document IPTEL/03, 29 May 2000, p 23.
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Commission further pointed out that at least part of any VoIP transmission was over 
the internet (which at the time had only one class of services), making it subject to an 
unpredictable congestion risk that prevents the provider from guaranteeing the same 
level  of  reliability and speech quality as  in  the  case  of  PSTN. Nevertheless,  the 
Commission noted that in the case of those phone-to-phone services where providers 
guarantee quality by bandwidth reservation and make claims  that the quality of the 
service  is  the  same  as  circuit-switched  PSTN  voice,  this  element  of  the  voice 
telephony definition  would  obviously already have  been  met.303 Accordingly,  the 
Commission anticipated the migration of VoIP to managed IP (NGN) networks.
Looking  at  the  above  Commission  analysis,  one  can  note  that  it  is  not  about 
exploring technical or business potential of VoIP but rather about checking whether it 
fits into a legal definition that existed before its widespread commercial application. 
Contrary to Bach and Sallet suggestion that regulators could be expected to make a 
use  of  old  legal  definitions  in  order  to  place  a  burden  on  VoIP providers,  the 
Commission concluded that VoIP services fell within the liberalised area established 
before  the  deadlines  set  for  the  implementation  of  full  competition.  They 
nevertheless  noted  that  there  were  already  new  voice  communications  services 
offered to the public by means of employing internet technology. Therefore,  they 
believed further review was necessary.
In  2000,  a  supplement  was  added  to  the  original  communication304 as  the 
Commission considered that some further clarification was needed. The Commission 
expressly pointed out that it was not impossible for  certain VoIP services to satisfy 
the criteria for voice telephony service. In addition, as in case of the ITU position, a 
distinction  was  made  between  voice  over  the  internet  and  voice  over  IP.305 
Consequently,  the Commission affirmed the 'real-time transport'  conclusion of the 
1998 notice on voice services over the public internet, but noticed that the 'real-time' 
condition could be satisfied when a voice service was generally regarded and used by 
303 Ibidem.
304 Communication from the Commission - Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and  
in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC - Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to  
the European Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC  
on competition in the markets for telecommunications services (2000/C 369/03).
305 Ibidem.
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a consumer as a substitute for voice services over a circuit-switched PSTN by virtue 
of its characteristics, in particular its level of quality and reliability.306 This condition 
should also be considered as satisfied where the provider of the service guarantees its 
customers  PSTN-like  quality  and  reliability.307 Lastly,  the  Commission  observed 
actual and possible developments in the commercial offering of VoIP and concluded 
that,  when operators  marketed a combination of a voice service and data service 
which,  although  distinct  and  clearly  separable,  were  bundled  within  the  same 
commercial  package, the Commission would consider this package as comprising 
two commercial offers; a voice service could be considered as separable from a data 
service, even though they were usually offered together under commercial usage.308
A major change in the EU regulatory framework in 2003 introduced new definitions 
of services, making the previous discussion on the status of VoIP largely obsolete. In 
addition,  the  2003  “new  regulatory  framework”  (NRF)  itself  highlighted 
technological  neutrality,309 which  is  also  reflected  in  its  definitions  of  electronic 
communications services and publicly available telephone services (PATS). Despite 
coupling with European political legislative processes, however, one could hardly see 
this change as either regulatory forbearance or toughening rules in respect of VoIP. 
Further diverging developments described below suggest that it should primarily be 
attributed to  the promotion of  the EU law's  concept  of  telephony in an evolving 
environment, regardless of specific policy results.
According to the 2002 Framework Directive, an electronic communications service 
means  a  service  normally  provided  for  remuneration,  which   wholly  or  mainly 
consists  of  the  conveyance  of  signals  on  electronic  communications  networks, 
including telecommunications services and transmission services in networks used 
for broadcasting, but excludes services providing or exercising editorial control over 
content transmitted via  electronic communications networks and services; it does not 
include information society services, as defined in Article 1 of  Directive 98/34/EC, 
which do not  wholly or mainly consist of the conveyance of signals on electronic 
306 Ibidem.
307 Ibidem.
308 Ibidem.
309 Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
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communications networks. Electronic communications services can be either private 
or provided to the public, i.e. public electronic communications services.310
The 2002 PATS definition does not address the underlying switching technology of 
the service (i.e. circuit- or packet-switching), but instead focuses on its  functional 
features.  According to the  Universal Service Directive,  PATS are defined by four 
essential  elements  as  services  (1)  available  to  the  public  (2)  for  originating  and 
receiving national and international calls and (3) access to emergency services (4) 
through a number or numbers in  a national or international  telephone numbering 
plan,  and in  addition may,  where relevant,  include one or  more of  the following 
services: the provision of operator assistance, directory enquiry services, directories, 
provision of public pay phones, provision of service under special terms, provision of 
special facilities for customers with disabilities or with special social needs and/or 
the provision of non-geographic services.311 Falling under the definition has three 
important consequences.  First, once a service is recognised by an NRA as PATS, the 
service provider will need to fulfil all the public and consumer interest requirements 
of  the  directives  that  apply  to  PATS,  such  as  transparency  and  publication  of 
information,312 quality of service,313 access  to 112 emergency services,314 operator 
assistance  and  directory  enquiry  services,315 and  network  integrity  in  case  of 
disaster.316 In this respect, the definition is circular: if an operator provides access to 
112 emergency services, they are PATS and have an obligation to do so. Literally, 
this means that one could escape the public interest obligation to provide emergency 
services  simply by not  providing such services.  Second,  the  privilege of  number 
portability and carrier  (pre-)selection only applies to  those services that fulfil  the 
criteria for PATS.317 In addition,  only PATS users have the right to be listed in a 
public telephone directory.318 Third, PATS service may qualify as part of Universal 
310 See Article 2 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
311 See Article 2 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
312 Article 21 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
313 Article 22 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
314 Article 26 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
315 Article 25 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
316 Article 23 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
317 Article 20 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
318 Article 25(1) of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
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Service  that  has  to  be  provided  on  the  territory  of  each  Member  State.319 
Nevertheless,  the  NRF  enables  the  establishing  of  Universal  Service  funding 
mechanisms where all of the providers of electronic communications networks and 
services, and not just providers of PATS, are required to contribute.320 Accordingly, 
non-PATS  VoIP  providers  may  also  qualify  for  mandatory  Universal  Service 
contributions321,  which  makes  the  definition  scope less  relevant  for  direct  policy 
results. 
The Commission initiated a research on the regulatory treatment of VoIP under the 
new framework, which can be seen as another indicator of unclear guidance by the 
policy-makers  despite  largely  predictable  changes  in  voice  telephony  business. 
Analysys, a consultancy, prepared a report on IP Voice and Associated Convergent 
Services.322 The Report considered VoIP in the context of both general  electronic 
communications service definition and PATS definition.  According to the Report, 
there  were  two  ways  VoIP services  could  be  included  in  or  excluded  from the 
definition of PATS, namely by adopting either  a  broad or a  narrow definition of 
PATS. According to the narrow definition, any provider that did not offer access to 
emergency services was not PATS. In this case, however, public safety concerns were 
raised by Analysys, that is that not offering emergency access could be used as an 
arbitrage to avoid the regulation of PATS. According to the broad definition, any 
service provided in competition with PSTN, i.e. as a substitute for PSTN, was PATS. 
This definition, on the other hand, could place unwanted burden upon many VoIP 
providers that indeed did not provide services equivalent to PSTN. Analysys believed 
there was no obvious answer as to which approach should be taken. However, they 
considered pragmatic solutions, such as using similar tolerance regarding emergency 
calls for mobile operators and VoIP service providers, provided the reduced quality 
was made clear to end-users.
319 Article 4 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive.
320 See  Article  14  para.  1  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive.  See  also IP Voice  and Associated  
Convergent Services, Final Report for the European Commission (Analysys, 28 January 2004), p. 92.
321 See also  Commission Staff Working Document  on the Treatment of Voice over Internet Protocol  
(VoIP) under the EU Regulatory Framework – An Information and Consultation Document (Brussels, 
14 June 2004), p. 11.
322 IP  Voice  and  Associated  Convergent  Services,  Final  Report  for  the  European  Commission 
(Analysys, 28 January 2004).
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The Report considered various types of VoIP services: self-provided services based 
on applications  running on the computer  terminal  equipment  of end-users (DIY), 
services  independent  of  internet  access  (e.g.  Vonage),  services  provided  by  the 
broadband access service provider, services for corporate internal use over corporate 
LAN or WAN, and services for carrier  internal use.  According to Analysys,  DIY 
services such as Skype were not a replacement for telephone services, because they 
did  not  enable  calls  to  PSTN,  whereas  both  Vonage-alike  services  and  services 
offered  by  the  broadband  access  provider  enabled  communication  with  PSTN 
subscribers. An important distinction between the two, however, was that broadband 
access  providers'  offers  might  include  end-to-end  quality  guarantees.323 Carrier 
internal use VoIP services, on the other hand, did not represent a fundamental benefit 
on the side of the end-user experience, but were instead motivated by cost-savings on 
the part  of  the fixed operators.324 According to  the Report,  self-provided services 
were unlikely to fall  within the scope of electronic communications services and 
generally would not be subject to the NRF authorisation regime. The reason was that 
these services were not 'provided for remuneration'. The fact that paid-for equipment 
and software was used was deemed irrelevant, because these were goods according 
to the general EC Treaty distinction between goods and services.325 
Later,  in 2004, the Commission launched a public  consultation on the regulatory 
treatment of VoIP under the NRF.326 The consultation document was largely based on 
the  findings  of  the  Analysys  Report,  including its  classification  of  VoIP services. 
According to the Commission document,  VoIP services could have the ‘look and 
feel’ of a publicly available telephone service, but do not offer access to emergency 
calls. In the Commission's view, there were two broad regulatory approaches to such 
problems: one was to impose traditional PSTN obligations upon all new telephone-
like services; the other, which was also generally the Commission's approach, was to 
ensure that consumers were fully informed and could make their own choices, while 
encouraging suppliers to find new technical solutions in respect of emergency calls.
323 Ibidem, p. 20-23.
324 Ibidem, p. 24.
325 Ibidem.
326 Commission Staff  Working Document  on the Treatment of  Voice over  Internet  Protocol (VoIP)  
under the EU Regulatory Framework - An Information and Consultation Document (Brussels, 14 June 
2004).
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This  reluctance by the Commission to put together  clear  policy guidelines in the 
context  of  a  rather  open NRF definition  was reflected in  Member  States'  NRAs' 
policies.  ERG  Common  Statement  for  VoIP  Regulatory  Approaches  revealed  a 
diversity of Member State approaches towards VoIP, despite a uniform regulatory 
framework on the Community level. The Statement concluded that at that point no 
common conclusions on the evolution or revolution of the market by VoIP could be 
drawn, because the market had not yet developed sufficiently.327
Absent detailed harmonised guidance, European NRAs that had to apply the EU law 
at the national level took different approaches that did not seem to follow specific 
national market circumstances but rather their legal tradition and the regulators' own 
autopoietic  attitude:  whereas  some  VoIP  services  such  as  Skype  were  equally 
accessible  across  Europe  and  whereas  broadband  technology  and  services 
development  enabling  managed  VoIP  did  not  fundamentally  differ  across 
jurisdictions, the cases of three regulatory authorities analysed below differ in both 
approach and results.
Applying  the  same  EU  definition,  Ofcom,  the  only  Common  Law  jurisdiction 
regulator in Europe, generally favoured a rather pragmatic, business- and consumer-
oriented approach to VoIP classification, whereby legal definition coupled with end-
user  cost-benefit  analysis.  Accordingly,  a  great  deal  of  Ofcom's  debate  on  VoIP 
classification was and is still linked to the market role of VoIP and consumer aspects. 
Ofcom's handling of the issue simultaneously points at both potential flexibility of 
the EU voice telephony definition provided that it is applied within a rather flexible 
Common Law regulatory model, and its limits that can be seen as an inevitable part 
of the legal form.
Under the old regulatory regime  based on the pre-2002 ONP directives,  Oftel  as 
Ofcom's predecessor considered that a VoIP service should be regulated as public 
voice telephony if any of the following applied:
327 ‘ERG Common Statement for VoIP Regulatory Approaches ERG (05) 12’ (2005) Available at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/erg0512_voip_common_statement.pdf, 15th August 2009, p. 5.
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• the service was marketed as a substitute for traditional PSTN voice services; 
or
• the  service  appeared  to  the  customer  to  be  a  substitute  for  public  voice 
telephony; or
• the service provided the customer’s sole means of access to the traditional 
circuit switched PSTN.
However,  where  a  VoIP  service  was  clearly  being  offered  as  an  adjunct  to  a 
traditional circuit switched PSTN voice telephony service or as a secondary service, 
it was likely not to be considered as public voice telephony.328
In  response  to  further  developments  in  VoIP  services  and  discussions  with 
stakeholders, Ofcom published a consultation document entitled New Voice Services:  
A consultation  and  interim  guidance  on  6  September  2004.  In  the  consultation, 
Ofcom  recognised  that  a  balance  had  to  be  struck  between  creating  the  right 
conditions in which new voice services and new providers could enter the market, 
and  ensuring  that  consumers  would  be  properly  informed  and  protected.  Ofcom 
favoured an approach that allowed new services to enter the market, whilst enabling 
consumers to make informed choices and take advantage of these new services. In 
particular, Ofcom's initial views expressed in the consultation were that it was not 
desirable for all voice services to be required to offer the same features as traditional 
telephone  services,  including  emergency  services.  Instead,  consumers  should  be 
enabled to make informed decisions. This would help new companies create new 
products and offer consumers more choice. In addition, it was not desirable to rely on 
criteria such as the appearance of a service or whether it was used as a second line in 
order to draw a distinction between those services that were regulated in a similar 
way as  traditional  telephone services  and those  that  were  not.  Instead,  providers 
should be allowed to offer a range of differentiated services, and consumers should 
be made able to make informed decisions about the products they were buying and 
using.329
328 See ‘Frequently asked questions on the regulation of Voice over Internet Protocol Services, 
Director General of Telecommunications’ (2002), April, Available at 
www.internetpolicy.net/telco/020402oftelguidelines-voip.pdf, 30th Marc 2011.
329 New Voice Services: A consultation and interim guidance (Ofcom, 6 September 2004).
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Ofcom  proposed  a  slightly  different  classification  of  VoIP  services  than  the 
Commission.  In  the  centre  of  so-called  'New Voice  Services'  were VoB services; 
although  some  of  IP  voice  services  could  be  used  over  a  narrowband  dial-up 
connection, in practice the always-on connection and higher bandwidth offered by 
VoB services made them a much more compelling service . These services could take 
various forms such as PC to PC, PC to phone, and phone-to-phone. Ofcom further 
identified  the  characteristics  of  New  Voice  Services:  location  and  network 
independence  that  enables  nomadicity,  dependence  of  reliability  on  broadband 
connection, potential for new features, and lower costs.330
In 2006, a public consultation on VoIP was re-initiated by Ofcom on the basis of the 
observation that, in the 16 months since 2004 consultation, there had been a number 
of  further  market  and  regulatory  developments  that  required  a  reassessment  of 
Ofcom’s previous proposals to ensure their objectives in relation to VoIP services 
were achieved.331 In particular, Ofcom declared that there was a need to discontinue 
'interim forbearance'332 from regulation in relation to access to emergency services as 
proposed  by  the  2004  document.  In  their  statement  and  further  consultation 
document,  Ofcom observed that  the diversity of  equipment,  feature  and business 
models for VoIP was expected to continue, and that VoIP development was closely 
linked  to  broadband  access  and  NGN  developments.333 Instead  of  'New  Voice 
Services', the 2006 consultation expressly used the term 'VoIP'.334
An important reason for the new consultation was the observation that, in informal 
talks, the European Commission showed no intention for further clarifying the VoIP 
status in relation to the PATS definition.335 Accordingly, Ofcom considered that all 
VoIP services  fulfilling the four  PATS criteria  were automatically PATS, whereas 
other  VoIP services  were  not  PATS.336 There  was  therefore  no  reason  to  further 
330 Ibidem.
331 Regulation of VoIP Services: Statement and further consultation (Ofcom 2006), p. 12 et seq.
332 Ibidem, p. 17.
333 Ibidem, p. 10-11.
334 Ibidem, p. 13.
335 Ibidem, p. 24.
336 Ibidem, p. 24.
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forbear from regulation of certain VoIP services. The end of the forbearance policy 
was also reflected in the full inclusion of VoIP-based PATS providers into the number 
portability system.337
Cases of other European NRAs in Civil Law jurisdictions consistently and by means 
of public procedures addressing VoIP services are limited.338 Based on the availability 
of data and in-depth analysis as to VoIP services, particularly Skype, the examples of 
Finland and Italy have been studied more closely. In both cases, as one could expect 
in  Civil  Law jurisdictions,  the  regulators'  arguments  focused  on  interpreting  the 
statutory  definition  rather  than  creating  their  own  policy  arguments.  However, 
analysis results of the two authorities differ, which should be, absent differences in 
the analysed environment  i.e.  Skype services,  attributed to  divergent  autonomous 
national regulators' attitudes towards new market developments. 
FICORA,  the  Finnish  regulator,  dealt  with  VoIP classification  in  several  cases. 
According  to  their  2006  opinion,  fixed-network  subscriber  numbers  that  are 
nationwide  or  specific  for  a  numbering  area  could  be  used  in  all  VoIP services 
provided  in  telephone  networks.  The  use  of  mobile  numbers,  however,  was  not 
possible  with  VoIP.339 As  to  the  regulatory  status  of  VoIP,  the  2006  FICORA 
document first considered what types of VoIP were relevant for regulatory purposes 
and established that if an operator used IP technology merely to transmit calls in the 
backbone  network,  this  did  not  have  an  impact  on  the  legal  treatment  of  the 
telephone services provided to the customers.340
Unlike the majority of other European regulators,341 FICORA specifically dealt with 
the  regulatory status  of  Skype,  including  Skype  In  and Skype  Out  services  that 
upgraded the peer-to-peer computer-based Skype with the further  functionality of 
making and receiving telephone calls via E.164 numbering. The position of FICORA 
regarding peer-to-peer computer-based IP telephony was that VoIP services that were 
337 Ibidem, p. 33.
338 See e.g. ‘ERG Report on VoIP and Consumer Issues’ (2006).
339FICORA's ‘Opinion on the use of telephone numbers in VoIP services‘ (2006) Available at 
www.ficora.fi/attachments/englanti/5jZV5jrAi/Files/CurrentFile/VoIP_English.pdf, 9th April 2007.
340 Ibidem.
341 See ‘ERG Report on VoIP and Consumer Issues’ (2006).
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based on peer-to-peer network technology and operated distinctly in the internet did 
not  fulfil  the current  definition of a communications service,  because the service 
provider did not participate in the transmission of messages in a way referred to in 
the  Communications  Market  Act.342 Accordingly,  FICORA  reiterated  the 
Commission's  opinion  that  such  services  were  not  part  of  the  EU  regulatory 
framework,  as  there  was  no  ongoing  provision  of  service,  but  rather  just  the 
provision of computer software.343 Therefore, the original peer-to-peer Skype was not 
a communications service, but rather an information society service.344 As its service 
provider was established in Luxembourg, there was no Finnish jurisdiction under the 
country of origin rule of the E-commerce Directive.345
However, if there was access from a VoIP service to a telephone network, this service 
constituted a transmission of messages in a communications network that was in the 
possession of the service provider or hired from a network operator. In such a case 
the  VoIP service  provided  was  a  communications  service.  If  such  a  service  was 
publicly available, it was also a communications service referred to in the  Act on 
Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications.346 Under Finnish legislation, 
certain obligations were imposed on 'telecommunications operators in a telephone 
network'.   A telecommunications operator acted in a telephone network in a way 
referred to in the  Communications Market Act,  if  it  provided network services or 
communications  services  in  a  telephone  network.  To  be  a  telecommunications 
operator  in  a  telephone  network,  the  operator  needed  not  provide  subscriber 
connections to end-users.347 According to FICORA, a telecommunications operator 
providing VoIP services was also operating in a telephone network if  the service 
provided a connection to a telephone network. In a VoIP service this primarily meant 
342 Page 6 of FICORA's ‘Opinion on regulation of Skype services in Finland’ (2005) Available at 
www.ficora.fi/attachments/englanti/1156489126854/Files/CurrentFile/Skype_final_English.pdf, 21st 
April 2007.
343 Ibidem.
344 Ibidem, p. 10.
345 See Article 3 of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June  
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in  
the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive).
346 FICORA's ‘Opinion on regulation of Skype services in Finland’ (2005) Available at 
www.ficora.fi/attachments/englanti/1156489126854/Files/CurrentFile/Skype_final_English.pdf, 21st 
April 2007.
347 Ibidem.
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that phone calls could be originated from the service to a telephone network and/or 
received from a telephone network.348 
The Finnish law further used the definition of 'subscriber connection'. In its previous 
decision issued in 2003 to TeliaSonera Finland Oyj, FICORA had established that a 
subscriber connection to a telephone network in the  Communications Market Act 
meant the same as a publicly available telephone service in the EU Universal Service  
Directive:  such  a  connection  could  be  regarded  as  a  service  for  originating  and 
receiving national  and international  calls  and access  to  emergency services  made 
available to the public. Therefore, in order to conform to the definition of a telephone 
service  available  to  the  public,  and  accordingly,  the  definition  of  a  subscriber 
connection,  the  VoIP  service  in  question  must  enable  both the  originating  and 
receiving  of  national  and  international  calls  through  a  number  in  a  national  or 
international  telephone numbering plan.349 Accordingly,  in  order  to  regard a  VoIP 
service as two separate services, it should also be possible to buy them and use them 
as separate services.350 
This was also the case with Skype In and Skype Out, both of which were separate 
from the  contractual  point  of  view and did  not  even together  form a  subscriber 
connection  to  a  telephone  network,  but  were  by  the  nature  of  communications 
services provided in the telephone network.351 An interesting conclusion was reached 
by FICORA as to its jurisdiction over Skype In and Skype Out services: whereas 
Skype  In  service  used  Finnish  numbering  and  was  therefore  under  FICORA 
jurisdiction, Skype Out has no such connection to Finland: the service neither used 
Finnish numbering, nor was it particularly aimed at Finnish users.352 In particular, 
FICORA noted that the location of the Skype Out user did not affect the way the 
service was provided353 and that, from a technical perspective, calls to Finland by 
348 Ibidem, p. 7.
349 Ibidem, p. 8.
350 Ibidem.
351 Ibidem, p. 10-11.
352 Ibidem, p. 12.
353 In order to call a number in Finland, it still had to be internationally composed.
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Finnish Skype Out users could be compared to international incoming calls.354 As a 
consequence, the obligation of 'telecommunications operators in a telephone network' 
to offer emergency services did not apply to Skype Out.355
A different approach was taken by the Italian regulator AGCOM: if the service can 
be configured as Skype Out (no E.164 numbers right of use required), the subject 
who provides the service to the public requires an electronic communications service 
general authorization.356 In cases where the service can be configured as both Skype 
In  and  Skype  Out,  there  are  two  possibilities:  that  (a)  the  operator  assigns 
geographical numbers to users: a PATS authorization is required to get the rights of 
use of these numbers, or (b) that the operator assigns non-geographical numbers to 
users  (a  specific  code  55  has  been  introduced  for  nomadic  VoIP  services):  an 
electronic communications services general authorization is required to get the right 
of use of these numbers. In both cases the operator has to provide number portability, 
access to emergency services and lawful interception.
Equally based on the 2002 PATS definition but trying to find a way around it is the 
2009  ERG Common Position  on  VoIP,357 a  document  that  finally  provided  for  a 
thorough harmonising 'to do' list for European NRAs when dealing with VoIP. The 
document only uses  service classification in  order  to  put  forward specific  policy 
goals as to emergency services and numbering, while limiting them to those services 
that  functionally resemble traditional  telephony.  The document introduces  the so-
called category 4 VoIP service, which is defined as a service where incoming and 
outgoing access to the PSTN and mobile network and E.164 numbers are provided.358 
According to the document, this category therefore includes traditional PATS, other 
services which can generally be regarded as a substitute for PATS (like most VoB 
354 Page 12 of FICORA's ‘Opinion on regulation of Skype services in Finland’ (2005) Available at 
www.ficora.fi/attachments/englanti/1156489126854/Files/CurrentFile/Skype_final_English.pdf, 21st 
April 2007.
355 Ibidem, p. 16.
356 Page 23 of ‘ERG Report on VoIP and Consumer Issues’ (2006) Available at 
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_06_39_report_voip_cons_aspects.pdf, 30th March 2011.
357 ‘ERG Common Position on VoIP, ERG (07) 56rev2' (2007) Available at 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
358 Ibidem, p. 4.
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offers) and (other) 'electronic communications services' VoIP.359 This concept largely 
bypasses the circular 2002 Framework definition of PATS that literally enables an 
operator  to  avoid  public  interest  obligations  by simply  not  providing  emergency 
access. It is questionable, though, whether this ERG's clearly activist approach could 
pass the test of legal validity if referred to the courts.
This  ERG  idea  has  successfully  coupled  with  the  political  legislative  process, 
however, which rendered such dilemmas unnecessary: in the 2009 NRF legislative 
review, the Citizens' Rights Directive defined PATS as a “service made available to 
the public for originating and receiving, directly or indirectly, national or national 
and international calls through a number or numbers in a national or international 
telephone  numbering  plan”.360 Accordingly,  the  option  for  service  providers  to 
provide or not to provide PATS based on emergency access availability has been 
removed.  In  addition,  to  reflect  potential  complexities  in  relation  to  accurate 
emergency caller location information relating to the use of VoIP services, Article 
26(5)  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive has  been  amended  with  the  following 
wording: “Competent regulatory authorities shall lay down criteria for the accuracy 
and reliability of the caller location information provided.”361 This clear phylogenetic 
change  in  the  legislative  framework  largely  rendered  previous  debates  on  PATS 
definition and VoIP obsolete.
US law - an alternative perception of VoIP
Whereas  the  above  European  examples  reveal  the  relative  'stickiness'  of  the 
autopoietic legal image of voice telephony regardless of technological developments, 
one could still  argue that European law was simply developing towards the most 
efficient  solution  for  regulating  voice  telephony  in  the  changing  market 
circumstances. However, the comparative US case of VoIP regulation that is based on 
entirely different  legal  concepts  demonstrates  how autopoietic  evolution  of  legal 
359 Ibidem, p. 4.
360 See Article 2 of the 2009 Universal Service Directive.
361   See 2009  Universal Service Directive.
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systems has led to diverging solutions despite similar levels of technological and 
market developments on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The US approach to VoIP classification is strongly determined by the historically-
based  division  between  and  ‘telecommunications’  and  ‘information’  services 
contained in the US telecommunications legislation.362 The evolution of the system, 
however, is largely determined by the broad powers of the FCC363 that enable it to 
create adequate policies based on these rather vague statutory definitions.
Whereas the first type of service is subject to stringent regulation, there is virtually 
no  regulation  attached  to  the  second  type  of  services.364 With  this  distinction, 
Congress  sought  to  give  the  internet,  an  unregulated  ‘information  service’,  the 
opportunity to grow and develop in an environment free of regulatory restraints.365 
One should observe, however, that the said distinction has much deeper roots. It is 
based  on  the  Computer  Inquiry  rulings366 that  first  drew  a  distinction  between 
services that formed an integral part of the telecommunications network and upper 
protocol  layers  services  that  could be provided relatively independently from the 
underlying  telecommunications  infrastructure.  Accordingly,  the  US  legislation 
defines telecommunications as ‘the transmission, between or among points specified 
by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or 
content of the information as sent and received', telecommunications service as the 
“offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of 
users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities 
used.”367 Information services, on the other hand, are defined as “the offering of a 
capability  for  generating,  acquiring,  storing,  transforming,  processing,  retrieving, 
utilizing,  or  making  available  information  via  telecommunications,  and  includes 
electronic publishing,  but [do] not include any use of any such capability for the 
362 47 U.S.C. 153.
363 These powers can be compared to the powers of Ofcom.  See Lee, K.; Prime, J. in: Walden, I., 
Angel, J., 2005, p. 517.
364 Leisinger, A. L., 2006, p. 593.
365 Ibidem.
366 See 28 FCC 2d 267 (1971), 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980), 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986).
367 47 U.S.C. 153.
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management,  control,  or  operation  of  a  telecommunications  system  or  the 
management of a telecommunications service.”368
The FCC has dealt with the above division in respect of VoIP on several occasions.369 
In the so-called ‘Stevens Report’ to the Congress from 1998, the FCC in principle 
determined that VoIP constituted an unregulated information service, even if it was 
offered  in  conjunction  with  telecommunications  services.370 However,  phone-to-
phone  VoIP  might  constitute  a  telecommunications  service  in  cases  where  the 
provider satisfies four criteria:
• it  holds  itself  out  as  providing  voice  telephony or  facsimile  transmission 
service;
• it  does  not  require  the  customer  to  use  equipment  different  from  the 
equipment necessary to place an ordinary touch-tone call over the public switched 
telephone network;
• it  allows the  customers  to  call  telephone numbers  in  accordance  with  the 
North American Numbering Plan and associated international arrangements;
• it transmits customer information without net charge in form of content.371
Using  the  above  test,  the  US  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Minnesota  also 
confirmed  the  ‘information  service’-status  of  VoIP  in  their  ruling  on  Vonage’s 
DigitalVoice service.372 The court’s decision was based on the DigitalVoice alteration 
of  communication  by means  of  its  conversion  into  digital  packets.373 A different 
determination, however, was reached by the FCC in the AT&T VoIP service. The 
FCC found that this service did constitute a telecommunications service, because it 
did not provide any enhanced functionality as required for an ‘information service’ 
classification.374 The issue was that the users of the service may not even know that 
they are using this type of service, as it is only using an IP-based backbone instead of 
368 47 U.S.C. 153.
369 'Stevens Report' to the US Congress, 1998.
370 Ibidem, p. 594.
371 Ibidem, p. 595.
372 290 F.Supp. 2d at 999. See also ibidem, p. 596.
373 See e.g. Leisinger, A. L., 2006, p. 597.
374 Ibidem.
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a traditional circuit-switched backbone. The FCC further ruled on the Pulver.com’s 
FWD service that was used to connect one online subscriber with another online 
subscriber using a high-speed internet connection.375 The FCC found that this type of 
service only used the telecommunications service. The service itself, however, did 
not constitute a telecommunications service.376 The jurisdictional division of the 1996 
Act has also been addressed by the FCC. Upon petition by Vonage, the FCC ruled 
that the provider’s DigitalVoice service constituted a jurisdictionally mixed service, 
because regulators could not readily separate intrastate and interstate elements, which 
pre-empted state regulation.377 However, the FCC did not expressly state that Vonage 
was  an  “information  service”.378 A general  proceeding  and  public  debate  on  the 
regulatory status of so-called IP-enabled services has been initiated by the FCC in 
2004. The discussion, however, does not seem to have yielded final results in all the 
areas of regulation.379 There were also attempts in the Congress to regulate VoIP with 
a  separate  piece  of  legislation  and  thereby  limit  the  impact  of  the  1996  Act 
classification scheme on VoIP.380
Analysing the US approach to VoIP, Lee and Prime also point to the question of the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC over IP-enabled services as the fundamental legal 
question.381 They  stress  that  the  FCC  has  expressed  a  desire  to  keep  economic 
regulation  of  IP-enabled  services  to  a  minimum;  nevertheless,  it  recognized  that 
some matters of public policy were of sufficient importance to warrant regulation 
(e.g.  emergency  services  and  Universal  Service  contributions).382 The  authors 
conclude that IP-enabled services highlight the deficiency of the existing legislation 
to deal with them; the problems of jurisdiction, interconnection and universal service 
are highly likely to require further legislative action by the Congress.383 Leisinger 
also strongly criticises the regulation of VoIP under the Telecommunications Act 1996 
375 Ibidem, p. 598.
376 Ibidem, p. 599.
377 WC Docket No. 03-211, 19 FCC Rcd 22404 (2004).
378 Ibidem.
379 The developments can be tracked on http://www.fcc.gov/voip/ , 6th March 2011.
380 See e.g. 2006, p. 601-3.
381 Lee, K.; Prime, J. in: Walden, I.; Angel, J., 2005, p. 584.
382 Ibidem, p. 585.
383 Ibidem, p. 586.
94
scheme:  whereas  the  distinction  between  information  and  telecommunications 
services may have seemed manageable in 1996, at the time the Congress did not 
anticipate VoIP telephony as a technology that would not readily fit into the existing 
classification scheme.384
An analysis of US federal states’ regulatory classification of VoIP reveals three main 
types of approaches: the ‘functional’, the ‘technical’ and the ‘layered’ approach.385 
The functional approach, which classifies the service based on its function according 
to certain ‘salient features’,386 can also be found in the Stevens Report and is closely 
associated with the ‘legal’ approach, i.e. the straightforward application of definitions 
already contained in the statute. The main difference seems to be whether the criteria 
are  set  by the legislator  or a  regulatory body.  The state  of  Florida,  for  example, 
embraced the functional  approach,  but  at  the same time warned that  the Stevens 
Report introduced an artificial distinction between phone-to-phone and computer-to-
computer  VoIP based on the  location  where  packetizing  occurs,  i.e.  computer  or 
phone. Cannon criticises the latter observation: according to him, all approaches are 
artificial, because they are the implementation of policy and not the policy itself,387 
suggesting  that  the  regulators  rely on statutory definitions  instead  of  creating  an 
appropriate  policy  for  VoIP.  The  US  National  Association  of  Regulatory  Utility 
Commissioners  (NARUC) also  generally  adopted  the  functional  approach  and 
rejected  the  ‘technical’  approach  that  would  be  based  on  a  single  technical 
characteristic, such as the use of IP protocol. However, one can note that NARUC 
has  added the  criterion  of  market  power of  the  provider  to  the  ‘salient  features’ 
criteria.388 Florida, on the other hand, is an example of the so-called ‘technical’ or 
‘under-the-hood’ approach: according to the Florida Public Utility Commission, it 
was  in  the  public  interest  to  keep  the  provision  of  VoIP  free  of  unnecessary 
regulation, regardless of the provider.389 A particular approach that is also based on 
the  technical  issues  is  the  ‘layered’ approach.390 This  approach  is  based  on  the 
384 Leisinger, A. L., 2006.
385 See Cannon, R., 2006.
386 Quoting Commissioner Stan Wise. Ibidem, p. 486.
387 Ibidem, p. 488.
388 Ibidem, p. 488-9.
389 Fla. Stat. Ann. §364.01(3) (West Supp. 2005). See also ibidem, p. 498.
390 Ibidem, p. 499.
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layering of  technical  communications  protocols  from the physical  layer,  over  the 
logical or commuter layers and the application layer, to the content layer.391 In this 
respect, the approach that was adopted in the states of Colorado and Guam392 is not 
dissimilar  to  the  initial  idea  of  the  Computer  Inquiry  Rulings and  the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
From  the  market  point  of  view,  one  can  easily  question  the  usefulness  of  the 
approaches based on technological features, and declare the functional approach to 
be superior. However, even Cannon's critique as to the functional approach seems 
legitimate: in the absence of a clear reference to policy objectives, there is no point 
deciding  upon the  superiority  of  the  ‘functional’,  the  ‘technical’ or  the  ‘layered’ 
model,393 as  each  of  them refers  back to  the  (outdated)  statutory definition.  One 
should therefore conclude that, like the EU law, the US law evolves around its own 
distinct concepts, regardless of technological and market developments that have no 
direct access to the legal system. 
4.2 Voice telephony as an internal concept of the law
Regardless  of  greater  or  lesser  flexibility  and  discretion  exercised  by  different 
European regulators, EU regulatory attention as to VoIP kept evolving around the 
legal  definition  of  public  voice  telephony  contained  in  the  legal  framework. 
Moreover, Rawson’s fully valid argument that regulatory approaches vary according 
to the level of development and history of competition for voice service provision in 
a particular country394 does not fully explain the divergence between the EU and the 
US legal image of VoIP described above. The two jurisdictions' approaches confirm 
that autopoietic origins of legal concepts play a vital role in their evolution, calling 
for further systems theory analysis. 
391 Ibidem.
392 Ibidem, p. 500-1.
393 Ibidem, p. 480-2.
394 Rawson, S., 2005, p. 487.
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A reasonable further step in exploring autopoietic legal images of telephony would 
be to look at the classification of services in international law that is generally more 
stable and not subject to day-to-day pressures for re-interpretation or changes from 
industry groups. In such a system, the autopoietic character of law becomes clearer: 
under  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  international  services  liberalisation 
regime,  VoIP is  not  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  'Services  Sectoral  Classification 
List'.395 Under the title 'Telecommunications', the list provides for the definitions of 
'basic'  and  'value-added'  telecommunications.  Basic  telecommunications  among 
others  include  'voice  telephone  services'  and  'packet-switched  data  transmission 
services'.  Despite  seemingly technology-neutral  voice  telephony definition,396 one 
cannot wholly exclude the classification of at least certain types of VoIP as 'packet-
switched data transmission services' or, alternatively, 'code and protocol conversion' 
as a type of value-added telecommunications. It should be borne in mind that VoIP 
means  packet-switched  transmission  and  that  it  includes  code  and  protocol 
conversion when interconnecting to the PSTN. The issue may be important, because 
value-added services were liberalised under the GATS 'Telecommunications Annex', 
whereas basic telecommunications services were only subject to further liberalisation 
commitments under the Fourth Protocol.397 Despite this potential for disputes, the 
regime has remained intact since its adoption and there seem to be no significant 
pressures for its change or a specific interpretation. Accordingly, two observations 
can be made. First, legal regimes have their own autonomous existence and do not 
require day-to-day justification in their economic and technological environments. 
Second,  as  VoIP has  been a  worldwide  success  in  the  recent  years,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  draw  direct  links  between  potential  regulatory  barriers  not  clearly 
dismantled  by  the  international  liberalisation  regime,  and  VoIP  investment 
decisions.398   
Going back to the more dynamic communications law systems of the EU and the US, 
a general observation can be made that, despite similar technological and business 
395 'Services Sectoral Classification List' (1991) Available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mtn_gns_w_120_e.doc, 30th March 2011.
396 Nihoul, P.L.G. in: Geradin, D., Luff, D., 2004, p. 370.
397 See Walden, I. in: Walden, I., 2005, p. 491-3.
398 Fast pace development of VoIP competition in China despite state regulatory limits may serve as an 
example. DeWoskin, K. J., 2001.
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solutions and a similar level of development, there are still important differences in 
the legal perception of VoIP, which can largely be attributed to the relevant legal 
framework influence on the  regulatory debates.  Accordingly,  it  is  not  difficult  to 
agree  with  Michalis’s  warning399 as  to  the  arbitrary  categorisation  of  services 
according  to  the  existing  legal  frameworks.  However,  one  can  observe  that 
regulatory documents on both sides of the Atlantic reflect the major shift from VoIP 
as an ancillary function of the PC, to the full substitute for the traditional fixed line 
telephone. The adoption of the functional approach yielded similar results in both 
regulatory frameworks: the FCC’s position as to AT&T’s backbone use of VoIP can 
be  compared to  FICORA’s opinion on this  type  of  services.  Moreover,  the early 
European Commission position as to VoIP from 1998 takes an approach similar to 
the FCC ‘Stevens Report’ from the same year; both documents are trying to draw a 
line  between  computer-based VoIP services  and  traditional  circuit-switched  fixed 
telephony-like services. Furthermore,  both documents are based on the regulatory 
frameworks governing traditional telephony that include criteria such as the use of 
E.164  numbering  plans.  However,  one  should  not  miss  the  point  by  simply 
concluding  that  the  documents  reflect  a  similar  reaction  to  VoIP due  to  similar 
commercial and social changes brought by VoIP. It may be more accurate to say that 
they  are  both  based  on  relatively  rigid  definitions  of  the  relevant  regulatory 
frameworks together with their specific issues such as federal jurisdiction in the US. 
In  this  respect,  voice  telephony  in  general  can  be  understood  as  being  over-
legalised:400 VoIP has from its very beginning, already as a computer application, 
faced the potential sanctions of the legal regulatory system that was initially referring 
to POTS, whereas the law, due to the existence of its own voice telephony concepts, 
399 Michalis,  M. ‘Regulation of Internet  Telephony in the United States and the European Union’ 
(2004) 6 CTLR p.152.
400 Over-legalization  stands  in  the middle  of  the  Teubner’s  ‘regulatory trilemma’,  which  explains  
regulatory failures as a relationship between the law and the environment. Teubner, G.-ed. Dilemmas 
of Law in the Welfare State (Gruyter New York Berlin 1988), p. 311.According to the trilemma, there 
are three ways legal regulation can fail:
• the  regulated  system reacts  by not  reacting,  i.e.  the  law creates  no change in  behaviour 
outside its own operations.  For example,  market  liberalisation legislation may be enacted, but the 
regulator does not act and the incumbent operator does not respect it;
• over-legalization of society, i.e. the law influences the regulated system so strongly that self-
reproduction of the latter is endangered. Fulfilling too many formalities in order to launch a VoIP 
service may serve as an example.
• over-socialization of law, i.e. the law is captured by politics or the regulated subsystem, say 
economy, and is ‘politicized’ or ‘economized’.  
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required no justification for addressing thoroughly any new type of applied voice 
transmission technology.
In order to properly understand the evolution of telecommunications law, one should 
further  distinguish  between  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic  developments.  An 
additional crucial difference between the EU and the US is that, during the years 
1998 and 2002, the EU regulatory framework had undergone a key change by means 
of  the  introduction  of  a  new  concept  of  ‘publicly  available  telephone  services’ 
(PATS) that  is  based more on a functional than a technical  approach.  No 'higher 
meaning'  should  be  attached  to  this  change,  however:  PATS  concept  does  not 
necessarily guarantee a lighter regulatory touch as suggested by Dick,401 and may in 
fact prevent providers of functionally PSTN-like VoIP services from permanently 
escaping  regulation,  which  has  been  demonstrated  by  the  evolution  of  Ofcom’s 
policy  on  VoIP,  particularly  with  a  view  to  emergency  access  concerns.402 
Accordingly,  compared  to  US  law,  EU  law  has  seen  an  important  phylogenetic 
evolution  in  the  legal  description  of  telephony  that  moves  towards  greater 
technological  neutrality.  In  this  respect,  the  complexity  of  the  environment  (i.e. 
convergent VoIP solutions compared to traditional voice telecommunications)  and 
the relative flexibility of the legal system were the key driving forces behind this 
evolution.
This confirms the autopoietic nature of laws but adds two additional points. First, 
changes in law can be, by means of structural couplings, triggered by changes in its 
environment. Second, these changes can be a response to the increased complexity of 
the environment, which requires further legal observations of the environment and 
the legal system itself. In order to be able to handle these observations, the law must 
become more 'proceduralized'.
401 Dick, K., 2004, p. 160.
402 See above fn. 327.
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4.3 Proceduralization and reflexivity of VoIP regulation
The said phylogenetic change in terms of the voice telephony definition that  the EU 
law had undergone in 2002 has resulted in less interpretative and more discretionary 
regulatory responses, consider, for example, Ofcom's interim policy for emergency 
calls:  because some new services might  not  be able  to offer  the same degree of 
reliability  for  emergency  calls  as  traditional  fixed  voice  services  (authentic  and 
reliable  provision  of  location  information,  high  probability  of  call  set-up,  and 
generally high level of reliability),403 it was better that these services were able to 
provide less reliable access to 999, rather than preventing them from offering any 
access at all.
It is submitted that this change is about the legal system's internal argumentation, as 
the  result  of  regulatory  decision-making  on  legal  concepts  is  ultimately  always 
reduced  to  the  code  legal  /  illegal.  However,  when  it  comes  to  coupling  with 
communications from other social systems, say economic substitution or scientific 
characteristics of voice services as to emergency calls, this change can be described 
as 'proceduralization'.
Indeed, interpretation and discretion can be differentiated from the legal theoretical 
point  of  view,  but  this  differentiation  happens  at  the  level  of  second-order 
observations:404 according to Luhmann, whatever the internal operation of the law to 
justify it, legal decision-making is always the creation of new texts with the help of 
older texts.405  According to systems theory, it is difficult to construct a qualitative 
403 New Voice Services: A consultation and interim guidance (Ofcom, September 2004), p. 26.
404 Goodrich notes the difference in legal discourse between the traditions of exegesis and rhetoric.  
Goodrich, P.,  1987, p.  3.While the former claims to passively and philologically recover the true 
meaning and order of the legal texts, the latter sees the law in a more pragmatic way, as a discourse in 
a certain socio-linguistic dimension. Goodrich, P., 1987, p. 5-6. The interpretation can more easily be 
associated  with  exegesis,  while  it  is  not  incompatible  with  flexible  rhetorical  and  contextualised  
arguments either.
405 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 305 et seq. Of course, the broad discretion of regulators can also be  
viewed as political decision-making, especially if regulators as public bodies have a more obvious 
mandate to act in a purpose-specific manner in order to achieve a certain goal. Despite this political  
dimension, one should bear in mind that discretionary powers are granted by the legal system, are 
perceived by the legal system as its operations, and are communicated in the legal binary code. Every 
discretionary decision must have legal grounds, whereby these grounds vary in different jurisdictions.  
Whereas statutory and common law requirements for passing administrative decisions in the UK are 
very limited, there is a stricter administrative procedure in place in the US, or even more in European  
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difference between interpretation and discretion outside the legal understanding of 
the two. Even if one looks at interpretation from a purely exegetic point of view, it is  
still the creation of a new text with older texts, namely the expansion of the basic 
text, with the original text serving merely as a reference.406
Looking at  practical examples of regulatory decision-making over the legal status of 
VoIP,407 the use of discretion is more likely to correspond to more intensive structural 
couplings.  Namely,  if  the  law  is  to  justify  discretionary  operations  both  for  the 
states with the continental tradition.  Seerden, R., 2002. For an observer, individual communications 
can  have  both  a  legal  and  a  political  meaning.  Luhmann,  N.,  2004,  p.  377.  They  are  also 
manifestations of the political nature of the system of public administration, seeking to fulfill the goals  
set by the political bodies. Luhmann, N., 2004, p, 374.
406 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 306. An interpretation in a specific legal proceeding can be seen as a one-off 
event, but can also be the driving force of the evolution of law. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 260. Important  
changes in the legal understanding of certain situations can be achieved by means of interpretation 
and, as Luhmann argues, these have as a consequence additional interpretative legal texts. Luhmann,  
N.,  2004,  p.  306.  For  example,  the  ERG  interpretation  of  the  Commission-defined  market  for 
wholesale broadband access  with a  view to cable  bitstream can  be  seen  as  a  one-off  event  that,  
however, inevitably influenced the positions of various European NRAs. ‘Bitstream Access,  ERG 
Common Position of 2nd April  2004 and amended on 25th May 2005, ERG (03) 33rev2’ (2005) 
Available at
     www.erg.eu.int/doc/whatsnew/erg_03_33rev2_bitstream_access_final_plus_cable_adopted.pdf  , 3rd 
May 2008. Such interpretations should also be dealt with in the context of the phylogenetic evolution 
of the legal system. On the other hand, less far-reaching interpretations are possible that should not be 
confused with the evolution of the legal system in the strict sense. While some interpretations of  ERG 
common positions may qualitatively affect regulatory practices, this can rarely be said for the results  
of a specific market analysis of an NRA. Normally, the latter will only be quoted again during the time 
of the validity of the measures or for the purposes of conducting a new analysis, but might not at all  
influence the general interpretation of the EU Framework.
407 According  to  the  Hall,  Scott,  and  Hood  classification  of  regulatory  decision-making  styles,  
interpretation primarily correspond to the Cartesian-bureaucratic decision-making pattern where the 
regulator decides in a pre-programmed manner, applying categorization principles to cases in order to 
handle them. Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 109. While the authors quote the examples of 
Ofcom price  controls  and  numbering management,  early responses  to  VoIP on both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic that have been described in the chapter on VoIP, i.e. EU Commission Notice Status of voice  
communications  on  Internet  under  Community  law and,  in  particular,  pursuant  to  Directive  
90/388/EEC and the US ‘Stevens Report’ may also be quoted. The two documents represent classic 
bureaucratic and exegetic responses to a new technology with a view to existing legislation. A similar  
decision-making style can be found in the interpretations of Skype services by the Finnish and the  
Italian NRA who primarily relied on statutory text in order to reach a relevant conclusion. On the 
other hand, discretion mainly corresponds to the ad hoc-chaotic and bargaining-diplomatic decision-
making styles. Unlike in case of Cartesian-bureaucratic style where the objectives of decision-making 
are  pre-set  at  the  outset,  say  by  statutory  wording,  bargaining-diplomatic  style  also  enables  the 
discovery  of  objectives  through  the  process,  whereas  in  adhocratic-chaotic  style  the  latter  is  the 
primary means of setting objectives of regulation. Ibidem, p. 113.  Hall, Scott, and Hood quote the 
inclusion of fair trading condition into the BT licence as the example of initially adhocratic-chaotic 
and later on bargaining-diplomatic decision-making style. Ibidem, p. 153 et seq and 173 et seq.  The 
development of Ofcom policy towards VoIP also reveals a combination of the two styles: whereas the 
balance between end-user safety and incentives for VoIP service development resembles adhocratic-
chaotic style, the work with the business community in order to develop the consumer information 
draft code resembles the bargaining-diplomatic style. In both cases, sufficient discretionary powers of 
the regulator are required in order to reach the desired result.
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purposes of its internal rules on argumentation and for the sake of its self-promotion 
in the society, it must couple with the environment both at the procedural (e.g. by 
means of public consultations) and the substantive levels (e.g. by taking into account 
economic  feasibility of regulation, as was the case with Ofcom's interim forbearance 
policy for emergency calls).408 Whereas the early European Commission approach to 
VoIP from 1998  and  the  FCC ‘Stevens  Report’ primarily  relied  on  the  exegetic 
discovery of the 'true meaning' of voice telephony definitions in the context of VoIP, 
later documents, such as the Analysys Report, the ERG Common Position on VoIP or 
Ofcom  consultations  on  New  Voice  Services,  reveal  an  approach  reflexive  of 
practical commercial implementation issues, such as the practical problems in 112 
service  provision  or   the  end-users'  ability  to  regularly  migrate  their  VoIP lines 
(nomadicity).
The  described  proceduralization  means  that  the  law  is  attempting  to  be  more 
‘socially adequate’,409 promoting itself in the environment by means of transparency 
and participation, which can also be seen as a trend in global administrative law.410 
However, one should be careful with the concept of ‘social adequacy': it should refer 
to nothing more than the ability of the law to regulate its environment by regulating 
itself, i.e. by being ‘reflexive’.411 Within the law's internal processes this corresponds 
not  only  to  discretion,  but  also  to  specific  procedural  elements,  such  as  public 
consultations expressly prescribed by the NRF.412 In the UK, the coupling with the 
economic system and the practical technology-implementation issues went further 
and introduced a co-regulatory solution, whereby a code of practice on consumer 
408 See previous subchapters above.
409 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 67.
410 Kingsbury, B., Krisch, N., Stewart, R. B., Wiener, J. B. 2005, p. 37-39.
411 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 65-66.
412See Article 6 of the Framework Directive ‘Consultation and transparency mechanism': “ ... Member 
States shall ensure that where national regulatory authorities intend to take measures in accordance 
with this Directive or the Specific Directives which have a significant impact on the relevant market,  
they give interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft  measure within a reasonable  
period.  ...”  However,  Luhmann  warns  that  it  may  only  be  on  the  second-order  level  that  such 
consultations contribute to greater transparency of decision-making. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 355. Their 
'actual' or 'social' effect is therefore not easily revealed.
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information relevant for VoIP emergency calls413 has been prepared together with the 
industry.414
The Commission's  approach to  VoIP classification  reveals  a  similar  trend toward 
greater proceduralization. When the law was first confronted with VoIP, its response 
was to seek how it fits into the scheme of the regulation of fixed telephony. However, 
the initial EU Commission Notice that was originally based on an interpretation of 
the  directive  text  has  itself  been  amended,  bearing  in  mind  the  changes  in  the 
technological and commercial use of VoIP. The interpretation of the requirement that 
telephony  takes  place  in  ‘real-time’ has  been  amended  not  only  with  regard  to 
technological limits that are implied in such a definition, but also with regard to end-
user  perception.  The  Commission  noted  that  the  'real-time'  condition  could  be 
satisfied when a voice service was generally regarded and used by a consumer as a 
substitute  for  voice  services  over  a  circuit-switched  PSTN  by  virtue  of  its 
characteristics,  in  particular  its  level  of  quality  and  reliability.415 By  adding  the 
‘perception’ part to the originally technology-based definition, the Commission has 
opened the door to a higher degree of discretion for itself  and the NRAs.  From the 
inter-system interactions  point  of  view,  however,  this  reveals  the  shift  from the 
coupling of the law with scientific descriptions of technologies, to the rather more 
complex coupling with end-user psychology or market substitution.
Following  the  2002  law  reform,  the  proceduralization  trend  can  be  observed 
particularly as to the 112 emergency calls service regulation, whereby open attitude 
by  the  Commission  enabled  pragmatic,  industry-  and  market-oriented  regulatory 
approaches by the Member States, notably the UK. Accordingly, the trend towards 
more general norms as identified by Scott as early as 1998 has continued.416 The 
Commission suggested in its 2004 consultation that it was desirable that access to 
emergency  services  was  made  available  from  as  wide  a  range  of  electronic 
communications services as possible,417 not specifying how this should be achieved 
413 New Voice Services: A consultation and interim guidance (Ofcom, September 2004), p. 46-48.
414 Compare Teubner who identifies self-regulation as one of the aspects of proceduralization. Teubner, 
G., 1993, p. 67.
415 See above ,
416 Scott, C., 1998, p. 244.
417 Commission Staff  Working Document  on the Treatment of  Voice over  Internet  Protocol (VoIP)  
under the EU Regulatory Framework – An Information and Consultation Document (Brussels,  14 
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at  the  national  level.  Absent  such  guidance,  Ofcom  in  its  consultation  of  2004 
exercised  a  high  degree  of  discretion  in  respect  of  this  issue.  In  order  to  avoid 
difficulties  with  the  circular  PATS  definition,  an  interim  PATS  policy  has  been 
proposed: because some new services might not be able to offer the same degree of 
reliability  for  emergency  calls  as  traditional  fixed  voice  services  (authentic  and 
reliable  provision  of  location  information,  high  probability  of  call  set-up,  and 
generally high  level  of  reliability),  it  was  better  that  these  services  were  able  to 
provide less reliable emergency calls, rather than preventing them from offering any 
access at  all,  which was,  reflexive of the anticipated service providers'  economic 
decisions, intended to incentivise the development of reliable VoIP emergency call 
services and disincentivise the provision of VoIP services with no emergency access 
at all due to heavy regulatory burden.418  
No further guidelines on VoIP have been issued at the EU level until the 2009 ERG 
Common Position on VoIP.419 The latter document is, however, no longer concerned 
with the compatibility of VoIP interpretations with the directives, but rather sets clear 
rules  as  to  regulatory  actions  with  regard  to  VoIP:  legal  definitions  increasingly 
couple with ERG's  own policy agenda and the  findings  of  its  expert  teams.  The 
issues  such  as  numbering  and  nomadicity420 are  addressed  without  any  specific 
guidelines in the directives. Unlike in the specific UK case, largely determined by the 
UK de-regulatory legal tradition,  however,  this  'proceduralization'  did not lead to 
pan-European co-regulation or even self-regulation but instead ended up coupling 
with legislative changes to the Framework.421 Whereas the ERG's activism in this 
case is largely linked to its institutional position discussed in the previous chapter, it 
has been both enabled and limited by the 2002 PATS definition that is more service- 
June 2004), p. 13.
418 New Voice Services: A consultation and interim guidance (Ofcom, September 2004), p. 26, 29.
419 ‘ERG  common  position  on  VoIP  ERG  (07)  56rev2’  (2007)  Available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
420 “For non-nomadic VoIP emergency calls,  all  providers  should route the emergency call  to  the 
emergency response centre responsible to serve the area of the VoIP user […] The main issue related 
to location information with VoIP is nomadism. Since address information is the key element for 
rescue, the ERG recommends that all providers guarantee the availability of information that alert the 
PSAP when subscriber’s address is not trustable, as it is in the case of mobile and nomadic service. In  
addition consumers should be properly informed of any limitation in providing accurate caller location 
information.”  ‘ERG  Common  Position  on  VoIP  ERG  (07)  56rev’  (2007)  Available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
421 See Article 26(5) of the 2009  Universal Service Directive.
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and  less  technology-oriented  than  the  definition  of  voice  telephony  under  the 
90/3888 competition422 and further liberalisation directives.
4.4 A 'neutral' attitude towards technology
The principle of technological neutrality in legal regulation as a general legal attitude 
towards  information and communications technologies has been thoroughly studied 
by  Reed,  who  reveals  that  technology  neutrality  is  a  complex  concept  and  that 
different  aspects  of  the  concept  need  to  be  addressed  for  different  legislative 
purposes.423 According  to  him,  three  main  legislative  techniques  of  achieving 
technological neutrality should be distinguished:
• technological indifference: the law is applied in the same way, regardless of 
the technology used to achieve the result, but this is not possible where technology 
fundamentally changes the nature of the behaviour;
• implementation neutrality: the law is specific to a certain technology, but is 
framed in such a way that it does not favour one or more implementations of that 
technology over others; and
• potential neutrality: a particular attribute of a technology or method of its use 
is  essential  to  achieve the desired legal result,  however,  this  legal  requirement  is 
drafted  in  such  a  way  that  non-compliant  implementations  can  be  modified  to 
become compliant.424
Addressing  the  idea  of  technological  neutrality  specifically  in  the  EU regulatory 
framework, Sinclair criticised the regulatory distinction between services associated 
with communications infrastructure to whom the framework applies,  and services 
provided  over  the  internet  (for  example,  in  the  field  of  e-commerce).425 As  the 
internet increasingly becomes the central communications infrastructure, he argues 
422 COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 28 June 1990  on competition in the markets for  
telecommunications services  (90/388/EEC).
423 Reed, C., 2007.
424 Ibidem.
425 Sinclair, M., 2000, p. 12.
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that the regulation of associated services may inevitably have to cover such internet 
services too if one is to achieve a coherent and convergent regulatory framework.426 
Whereas the author fails to provide any specific explanation why such a convergence 
of content and conveyance regulation should take place, his approach could be used 
to raise an important point: one can desire to regulate various related services by 
means of neutral law but the concept of technological neutrality itself being part of 
the legal system offers no guarantees as to its reach in the changing environment. 
Therefore,  Reed's  techniques  described  above  and  the  attempts  of  the  EU  legal 
framework  to  become  more  technology-neutral  should  be  critically  evaluated  by 
means of systems theory.   
The  1998  Commission  Convergence  Green  Paper already mentioned the  idea  of 
making regulation more technology-neutral.427 This idea was substantiated in a vague 
provision  of  the  2002  Framework  Directive stating  that  Member  States  were  to 
ensure that in carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in the relevant directives, 
particularly  those  designed  to  ensure  effective  competition,  NRAs  would  utmost 
account  of  the  desirability  of  making  regulations  technologically  neutral.428 This 
provision is obviously insufficient to generally prevent the mentioning of technology 
in regulatory rules. For example, in 2008 several Member State on the wholesale 
market still distinguished between termination to subscribers of TDM and IP-based 
public telephony, whereby only the first was regulated.429
Furthermore, the 2002 EU Framework does not totally avoid using a more detailed 
description of technologies. Despite abolishing the troublesome430 voice telephony 
definition of the 90/3888 competition directive and further liberalisation directives, 
and replacing it with a PATS definition, which is more service- and less technology-
426 Ibidem.
427 Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology  
sectors, and the implications for regulation,  COM(97)623, IV.2.1.: “Current definitions delimit the 
boundaries between different sectoral regulation and different regulators. Regulation is linked to the 
definitions of activities. Although regulation can be ‘technology neutral’, as in the broadcasting sector  
(and increasingly in the telecoms sector) it may be linked to the technology used to offer services, as  
well as between areas which are regulated and those which are largely free from detailed rules.”
428 Article 8(1) of the  Framework Directive. The provision is further explained in the recitals of the 
same directive.
429 Data gathered by the Slovenian regulator APEK in a survey addressed to ERG members.
430 See above p.  76 et seq.
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oriented,  the  Framework's  starting  point  for  the  legal  description  of  a  regulated 
service is still the traditional circuit-switched telephony and its features, such as the 
national numbering plan. These features are, however, difficult to abolish altogether, 
as it is impossible to clearly distinguish between the technology and its commercial 
application. By being present in the market for decades, circuit-switched telephony 
has largely determined the tastes of consumers. These features are therefore not only 
the technological features of POTS, but also the functional features of 'telephony' in 
the  eyes  of  the consumers  interested  in  the  service.  These  issues  raise  a  general 
question: can the law really decide to allow only technology-neutral operations?
From systems theory perspective, technological neutrality is an internal operation of 
the law: being neutral towards technology means that the law does not take its own 
image of technology, whatever this image may be, as its own distinguishing factor in 
deciding upon legal / illegal. Accordingly, any 'version' of technological neutrality431 
will lead to cyclical linkage within the law and is essentially autopoietic.
The  different  versions  of  neutrality432 are  different  ways  the  law  can  internally 
construct reality in order to satisfy its own criteria of 'being neutral'. However, there 
are no guarantees that other social systems, such as economy, politics or science will 
perceive this construction as 'neutral'. For example, if the law refers to the transport 
of voice in real-time, as did the Directive 90/388/EEC, the regulator is likely to rely 
on  scientific  experts  in  order  to  obtain  a  binary  legal  answer  whether  a  certain 
technology constitutes  a  real-time  communication.  However,  an  economic  expert 
could justifiably doubt the neutrality of such an exercise, because he could claim that 
the market implications of the service, i.e. e. its substitution from the perspective of 
end-users should be tested instead.  The best the law can do is  to use its  internal 
argumentation in order to justify its approach.
This adds to Bach and Sallet's position that any approach, including the 'functional' 
one, implies a political preference: 433 any legislative text is created by the political 
system, but once passed, it becomes part of autopoietic law. Therefore, no hidden 
431 See Reed's definition above.
432 See ibidem.
433 See Bach, D., Sallet, J., 2007, p. 2.
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political agenda needs to be sought: legal descriptions of applied technologies, such 
as telephony, and legal principles, such as technological neutrality, are all autopoietic 
legal structures, giving no guarantees of satisfying external criteria of what should or 
should not be regulated.
This becomes clear when trying to put the 'function'434 of the technology against the 
background of specific technological features, say circuit-switching. Be it a specific 
function declared by the legislation ('direct transport and switching of speech in real-
time”435)  or  interpretation  (“a  voice  service  is  generally  regarded  and  used  by 
consumer as a substitute for voice services over a circuit-switched PSTN, by virtue 
of  its  characteristics,  in  particular  its  level  of  quality and reliability”436),  there  is 
nothing that guarantees the relevance of this 'function' outside the legal system. This 
inevitably leads to frustrations in the environment, making the law look like nothing 
more than a bureaucratic instrument of political interests. As Ofcom's response to 
VoIP and emergency services shows,437 huge self-promotional efforts can be made on 
the  part  of  the  law  to  overcome  such  reactions.  However,  these  efforts  cannot 
overcome the autopoiesis of the legal concepts as such.
Of course, attempts can be made to regulate in a way not compatible with the current 
law in order to address the service's 'function'. This can be done in the form of a 
political  proposal.  For  example,  the  ERG  Common  Position  on  VoIP explicitly 
proposed  the removal of the access to emergency service requirement in the PATS 
definition to eliminate the 'illogical' circularity that enabled regulatory arbitrage by 
service providers and gave end-users unequal rights.438 Another option is to make 
calls to regulation that could be legally challenged in the courts as breaching the 
statutes: the same ERG document states that all providers of fixed telephony services 
434 See the US 'functional approach' above p.  91 et seq,
435   COMMISSION DIRECTIVE of 28 June 1990  on competition in the markets for  
telecommunications services (90/388/EEC).
436 Communication from the Commission - Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and  
in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC - Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to  
the European Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC  
on competition in the markets for telecommunications services (2000/C 369/03).
437 See Ofcom's interim VoIP policy above.
438 ERG  Common  position  on  VoIP  ERG  (07)  56rev2'  (2007)  Available  at 
www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
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should  be  authorised  to  permit  nomadic  use  by  their  subscribers  of  geographic 
numbers,439 even though this may contravene national laws on the use of geographic 
numbers. However, this type of regulatory activism bears the risk of being annulled 
by the courts, which ultimately points to the legal / illegal formula,440 and not to the 
utilitarian or other purpose-specific intentions of the regulators.
A more sophisticated version of the functional approach is the criterion of economic 
substitutability. If the latter is adopted, as is the case with  EU Significant Market 
Power (SMP) operators' obligations,441 the law relies on coupling with the economic 
system in order to find an answer as to legal / illegal. Instead of interpreting the 
'function' described by the law according to their own discretion and imagination, the 
regulators must draw their conclusions from the market analysis they are obliged to 
conduct. To be sure, this approach is still legal and not economic, which is obvious 
from  the  2003  market  definition  by  the  European  Commission  describing  four 
markets as “publicly available […] telephone services provided at a fixed location 
[…]”.442 The Commission essentially took the legal definition of PATS in order to 
describe  a  market  characterised  in  economic  terms  by supply-  and  demand-side 
substitution,  showing that,  no matter  what  the result  of the analysis  may be,  the 
starting point will always be the law.
In this respect, it becomes even more difficult to draw lines between 'technological 
indifference', 'implementation neutrality' and 'potential neutrality' as different types 
of technological neutrality suggested by Reed.443 The idea of certain technology or 
technologies had at a certain point of time been born with the intent of regulating a 
certain  technology-based industry.  Therefore,  legal  texts  will  inevitably carry the 
traces of specific technologies that existed at the time of their drafting.444 While other 
technologies not being part of this idea may stand the chance of obtaining a certain 
439 ‘Conclusions of the Task Force, ERG (07) 56rev2’ (2007) Available at 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009.
440 See Nobles, R., Schiff, D. in: Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 30-31.
441 See the chapter on access and interconnection below.
442  See Markets 3-6 of the 2003 Commission Recommendation on Relevant Markets.
443 Reed, C., 2007.
444 On neutrality of technology and technological determinism in general, see for example Chandler, 
D., 2008..
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legal  status,  this  chance  will  always  depend  on the  legal  image  of  the  previous 
technology. PATS is essentially a legal description of traditional telephony445 without 
a reference to circuit-switching (a feature not obvious to an end-user). One can ask 
whether  this  means  that  the  law  is  indifferent to  switching  technology,  or  that 
operators can implement public telephony by any type of technology (TDM or IP), or 
that VoIP can  potentially be used to replicate traditional telephony. If the law does 
not really mention technology, the description of the latter does not become part of 
the legal code, which makes the law  impervious to outside change. For example, if 
the law refers to the markets for electronic communications networks and services, 
its entire provisions could only become inapplicable to the environment if electronics 
was no longer  used in  commercial  communications.  However,  while  descriptions 
based  on  competition  law and  relying  on  the  markets  could  as  such  amount  to 
technological indifference, they can only remain indifferent as long as they remain 
fully  abstract.  As  soon  as  they  are  used  to  regulate  specific  situations,  a  legal 
description of the relevant market must be created,  pointing at  a specific applied 
technology or technologies. Moreover, if  ex ante regulation is in question, overly 
abstract definitions make no sense, as the law cannot rely on controlling behaviour in 
advance,  i.e.  coupling  with  the  commercial  transactions,  without  even  properly 
defining it.
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  use  the  above  debate  in  order  to  discredit  the 
relevance of the principle of technological neutrality. The debate merely points at the 
internal legal, i.e. autopoietic nature of this principle. There are two key implications 
of the principle of technological neutrality in the law that make it relevant for the 
law's evolution.
445 See Article 2(c) of the 2002  Universal Service Directive:  “publicly available telephone service' 
means a service available to the public for originating and receiving national and international calls  
and  access  to  emergency  services  through  a  number  or  numbers  in  a  national  or  international 
telephone numbering plan, and in addition may, where relevant, include one or more of the following 
services:  the provision of  operator  assistance,  directory enquiry services,  directories,  provision of 
public  pay  phones,  provision  of  service  under  special  terms,  provision  of  special  facilities  for 
customers  with  disabilities  or  with  special  social  needs  and/or  the  provision  of  non-geographic 
services”. The preference for E.164 numbers or public payphones clearly stem from the PSTN / TDM 
environment.
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First, the principle of technological neutrality is another form of the general legal 
principles  of  equality  and  non-discrimination:446 the  postulate  of  technological 
neutrality  requires  the  equal  treatment  of  various  networks  and  services  (and 
consequently their owners), where the underlying technology cannot be treated as a 
legitimate  discriminating  factor.  Luhmann  sees  'equality'  as  the  most  abstract 
preference  of  the  legal  system,  the  final  criterion  for  deciding  upon  legal  and 
illegal,447 essential for 'justice', the law's formula for contingency, which  generally 
serves as a correction to the use of past legal practice.448 This can be observed on the 
example of UK post-privatization public service law that has largely evolved around 
the concept of equal citizens' rights.449 Whereas equality is accepted by lawyers as 
self-evident,  that is  as autopoietic,  unequal  treatment  requires  justification,  which 
creates  a  rule  /  exception  scheme,450 grouping  together  phenomena  based  on 
argumentation, as was the case with the Italian and Finnish decisions on the status of 
Skype.451 In this sense, it is submitted that technological neutrality is primarily the re-
writing of the autopoietic 'equality', and therefore a genuine invention of the legal 
system that  cannot  be  constructed  on  the  basis  of  other  social  systems.  Namely, 
politics cannot guarantee the specific application of its ideas to future technologies 
without  being  ready  to  change  legislation.  While  economy  could  theoretically 
exercise complex welfare measurements based on different scenarios of the treatment 
of VoIP, it would sooner or later run into the question of weighing individual and 
general social welfare, requiring a legal answer. The legal requirement that particular 
technologies  must  not  be  discriminated  against  is  therefore  the  starting  point  in 
reducing the complexity the regulators are facing when dealing with new applied 
technologies.  Based on the  formula  equal  /  unequal,  new technologies  are  being 
legally  classified,  and  new  criteria  are  being  developed  around  the  evolving 
definitions  of  telephony.  Accordingly,  communications  law  could  build  on 
established legal principles of equality and non-discrimination in order to tackle new 
technologies. The use by communications law of general competition law principles 
446 Some commentators  have seen technological  neutrality as  a  non-discriminatory rule protecting 
technologies instead of legal subjects. Thompson, M., 2009.
447 Luhmann, N, 2004, p. 131-132.
448  Ibidem, 2004, p. 228.
449  Prosser, T., 2000, p. 63-64.
450  Luhmann, N, 2004, p. 132-133.
451 See above 4.1.
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in  order  to  address  new technology-related  market  competition  problems will  be 
addressed in the next chapter.452
Second, as Luhmann points out, the scheme equal / unequal creates a demand for 
criteria, without determining which criteria to use.453 In EU law, the gap created by 
the request not to discriminate between technologies has largely been filled by means 
of coupling with the economic market analysis. Whereas the Commission in its 2000 
Supplement to its VoIP Communication was still somewhat unclear if a substitute “by 
virtue of its characteristics, in particular its level of quality and reliability”454 is really 
an economic substitute, the 2003 Recommendation on Relevant Markets had clearly 
constructed “publicly available […] telephone services provided at a fixed location 
[…]” as a market-related concept.455  Accordingly, the law has created its internal 
image of equality among voice technologies on the basis of its perception of their 
economic substitution.
However,  while  the  principle  of  technological  neutrality  acts  as  a  driver  for  the 
evolution of the law based on the inclusion or exclusion of new technologies into the 
equal  /  unequal  scheme,  one  should  again  be  reminded  that  it  is  an  autopoietic 
principle that only relates to the existing legal concepts describing the environment. 
Against this background, the example of net neutrality shows how difficult it may be 
for  brand-new  issues  raised  by  technology  to  enter  the  law,  despite  its  internal 
striving for openness towards new technological and business environment.
4.5 Net neutrality as juridification of internet freedoms
Whereas the rules on end-user telephony services and wholesale network access have 
initially  developed  before  the  overall  migration  of  telecommunications  to  IP 
452 For a historical perspective on the latter issue, see discussion by Larouche in Larouche, P., 2000, p. 
321 et seq.
453  Luhmann, N, 2004, p. 133.
454 Communication from the Commission – Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and  
in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC – Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to  
the European Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC  
on competition in the markets for telecommunications services (2000/C 369/03).
455  See Markets 3-6 of the 2003 Commission Recommendation on Relevant Markets.
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technologies,  the  concept  of  net  neutrality  is  specifically  tailored  to  an  NGN 
environment  where  independent  third-party  IP-based  applications,  often 
incorporating voice and video, play a vital role in end-user demand. 
Net  neutrality  is  a  policy principle  regarding access  for  content  providers  to  the 
internet end-user, and potential discrimination in that access where the end-user’s ISP 
or another ISP blocks that access in part or whole, often subject to special fees.456 
Discrimination  can  take  form  of  charging  more  for  better  QoS  or,  adversely, 
degrading the service for those end-users who attempt to make the use of certain 
applications.457 The  idea  of  ‘net  neutrality’ is  seen  as  means  of  avoiding  these 
practices,  regulating equal  access by applications and services at  the level of the 
internet service provision. This means that, essentially, the law attempts to regulate 
access to broadband networks and services provided by broadband internet service 
providers, which has previously been agreed upon in the open market. 
This idea has been incorporated into the US Internet Freedom Preservation Bill  of 
2008  proposed  inter  alia  to  “preserve  and  promote  the  open and  interconnected 
nature of broadband networks that enable consumers to reach and service providers 
to  offer  lawful  content,  applications  and  services  of  their  choosing,  using  their 
selection  of  devices,  as  long  as  such  devices  do  not  harm the  network;  and  to 
safeguard the open marketplace of ideas on the internet by adopting and enforcing 
baseline  protections  to  guard  against  unreasonable  discriminatory  favouritism  or 
degradation of content by network operators based upon its  source,  ownership or 
destination on the Internet.”458 The Bill also provided for broad assessment powers of 
the FCC as to the market situation and the benefits of users in relation to access to an 
application.
The FCC has initially indicated that open internet is an issue and, simultaneously 
with  announcing the  phasing  out  of  wholesale  DSL obligation,  adopted  a  policy 
statement that outlined four principles of encouraging broadband deployment and 
456 See Marsden, C. T., 2010, p. 29.
457 See ibidem.
458 See Sec. 12 of the proposed US ‘Internet Freedom Preservation Bill’ (2008) Available at 
www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h5353/text, 2nd January 2009.
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preserving and promoting the open and interconnected nature of public internet.459 
According  to  the  statement,  consumers  are  entitled  to  access  the  lawful  internet 
content of their choice; they are further entitled to run applications and services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; and to connect their choice of 
legal  devices  that  do  not  harm  the  network.  In  addition,  they  are  entitled  to 
competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content 
providers.460 Although the FCC for a long time did not adopt rules in this regard, it  
announced  it  would  incorporate  these  principles  into  its  ongoing  policy-making 
activities.461 However,  FCC policy has  become more  explicit  following President 
Obama's  election:  in  October  2009 the  FCC issued the  Notice  of  proposed rule-
making identifying the need to transfer the principles of the policy statement into  
binding 'net neutrality' rules.462  The US Court of Appeals has, nevertheless, recently 
ruled that  the FCC has  no authority to  enact  the said net  neutrality principles,463 
significantly curtailing FCC discretionary powers.
In the EU net neutrality has in 2009 found its way into legislation as a rule protecting 
end-users and their right to choose content and to enjoy appropriate QoS and not, as 
one might expect, a rule regulating wholesale access rights to broadband networks.464 
The provisions that have been added are vague, however, and left to the discretion of 
459 FCC Policy Statement (FCC, August 2005).
460 Ibidem.
461 Ibidem.
462 The Commission determined that consumers are entitled to: “access the lawful Internet content of 
their   choice [;]… run applications and use services  of  their  choice,  subject  to  the needs of  law 
enforcement  [;]… connect  their  choice  of  legal  devices  that  do not  harm the  network  [;  and]…. 
competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. All of 
these  principles  are  subject  to  providers’ need  to  reasonably manage  their  networks”.  ‘Notice  of 
proposed rulemaking’ (2009) Available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-09- 
30 th93A1.pdf, 30th March 2011
463 “It is true that 'Congress gave the [Commission] broad and adaptable jurisdiction so that it can keep 
pace with rapidly evolving communications technologies.' Resp’t’s Br. 19. It  is also true that '[t]he 
Internet is such a technology,' id., indeed, 'arguably the most important innovation in communications 
in a generation,' id. at 30. Yet notwithstanding the 'difficult regulatory problem of rapid technological 
change'  posed by the communications industry,  'the allowance of wide latitude in the exercise of  
delegated powers is not the equivalent of untrammeled freedom to regulate activities over which the 
statute fails to confer… Commission authority.' NARUC II, 533 F.2d at 618 (internal quotation marks 
and footnote omitted). Because the Commission has failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority 
over Comcast’s Internet service to any 'statutorily mandated responsibility,' Am. Library, 406 F.3d at 
692, we grant the petition for review and vacate the Order.” Comcast Corporation v. FCC, US Court  
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, No. 08-129, 6th April 2010.
464 Wholesale access remedies in the EU Framework are explained in the next chapter.
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NRAs. Article 8 of the 2009 Universal Service Directive gives NRAs an additional 
task of “promoting the ability of end-users to access and distribute information or run 
applications and services of their choice.” Furthermore, according to Article 22 (3) of 
the same Directive, “in order to prevent the degradation of service and the hindering 
or slowing down of traffic over networks, Member States shall ensure that national 
regulatory authorities are able to set minimum quality of service requirements on an 
undertaking or undertakings providing public  communications networks.”465 Some 
NRAs, namely Swedish, French and UK, have already launched public inquiries into 
this matter,466 and the Netherlands passed a law to this end.467
For the purposes of this research, net neutrality is seen as legal intervention intended 
to prevent or limit different treatment of IP traffic based on its type or origin.468 Like 
technological neutrality, net neutrality is about equality and non-discrimination, i.e. 
about the equal/unequal scheme.469 There is an important difference though: while 
the technological  neutrality primarily sought  to adapt  the existing regulation to a 
changing technological landscape, net neutrality seeks to introduce legal regulation 
in order to  require 'equality' on previously unregulated markets. While net neutrality 
originally stems from the early perception of the internet as a 'free' parallel zone,470 
whereby anything can be transmitted to anyone, it has become part of the public 
debate  and  the  political  agenda  in  a  juridified  form,  as  an  idea  of  preventing 
discrimination among internet communications by means of legal intervention.471
From the evolution of law point of view, net neutrality is interesting for two reasons 
that shall be explored in this chapter. First, it shows how the equal/unequal scheme 
can be used in order to tackle new problems society is facing, demonstrating the 
465 See Articles 8 and 22 (3) of the  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the  
Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications  
networks and services (Universal Service Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC (unofficial 
consolidated version).
466 See Ofcom’s ‘Traffic Management and ‘net neutrality’, A Discussion Document’ (2010) Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/net-neutrality/su  mmary/netneutrality.pdf  ,  30th 
March 2011.
467 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-13886440, viewed 22 October 2011.
468 Compare less legal attempts to define it in Marsden, C. T., 2010, p. 1.
469 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 132.
470 A phenomena that Reed identifies as  the 'Cyberspace fallacy'. Reed, C., 2000, p. 1.
471 See e.g. Marsden, C. T., 2010, p. 11.
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law's ability to promote itself. Second, it also indicates how the existing autopoietic 
patterns of legal regulation can be deemed self-sufficient based on their supposedly 
flexible, overarching nature.
In the net neutrality context, based on the changes of the economic and technological 
environment  resulting in incentives for service providers to  differentiate  traffic,472 
juridification  has  emerged  as  a  solution  to  legally  regulate  for  more  freedom of 
certain providers to communicate with their intended users. Accordingly, contrary to 
general belief, juridification may not necessarily be linked to the 'bureaucratization' 
and curtailing of freedoms;473 it is simply about dealing with an issue in the form of 
legal code.474 This can be compared to Lessig's view that architecture (code) of the 
environment, like the law, may be seen as a regulator:475 for example, natural scarcity 
of  traditional  (E.164)  telephone numbers  directly affects  new entrants  wishing to 
provide  POTS-compatible  VoIP services.  Similarly,  as  technology is  increasingly 
used to discriminate among sources or types of communications (packets),476 the law 
may  be  required  to  enter  as  a  countervailing  regulating  power.  While  this  may 
challenge the traditional perception that public law intervention creates the risk for 
freedoms  in  the  IP-based  world,477 it  merely  means  that  the  proponents  of  net 
neutrality  have  used  legal  code  to  promote  their  views,  whereas  the  law  has 
472 See Marsden quoting Riley and Scott: “In the early days of the Internet, non-discrimination was  
easy to uphold because it was not technologically feasible for service providers to inspect messages 
and evaluate their  content in real time. But recently, electronics manufacturers have developed so-
called  DPI  technology capable  of  tracking  Internet  communications  in  real  time,  monitoring  the 
content, and deciding which messages or applications will get through the fastest.” Marsden, C. T.,  
2010, p. 11.
473 In his 1987 work, Teubner explicitly refers to juridification as ‘ugly’. He links it with Jacoby’s  
concept of ‘bureaucratization of the world’ and Habermas’ theory on ‘colonization of the life-world’ 
and relates it to the modern ‘regulatory law’, which is structurally coupled with politics on one hand  
and the regulated social field on the other.  Teubner, G., 1987b, p. 3-5.
474 Seeing in juridification a political or ideological issue therefore misses the point. As Teubner points  
out, social autonomy is first and foremost a cognitive problem for the law. Teubner, G. in Teubner, G.,  
Febbrajo, A., 1992, p. 612: “Irrespective of whether one wishes to liberate market forces through legal 
policy or prefers to tie them up in legal policy fetters, irrespective of whether one wishes to safeguard 
the autonomy of alternative movements by legal guarantees or else legally discipline them, social 
autonomy faces the lawyers with the cognitive problem of their regulatory object.”
475 Lessig, L., 1999, p. 86-88.
476 Examples of today's prioritisation include Google’s AdWords, Ebay on O2, Microsoft Windows & 
MSN.  See  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/speeches/2006/12/net_neutrality_111206.pdf,  3rd May 
2009.
477 The  most  extreme view about  a  parallel  jurisdiction is  identified  by Reed as  the  'Cyberspace 
fallacy'. Reed, C., 2000, p. 1.
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promoted itself as a conflict-resolving mechanism by means of its 'self-evident' non-
discrimination  postulate.478 Bearing  in  mind  the  US  origin  of  the  net  neutrality 
concept,  this  should  not  come  as  a  surprise:  American  forms  of  regulatory  law, 
regulatory policy-making processes, and methods of enforcing regulatory rules are 
highly legalistic.479
In order to understand the shift towards the 'juridification of internet freedoms', one 
should recognise that, initially, the law was indeed more reluctant to regulate the IP 
world.  In  the  EU, the ONP framework left  IP-interconnection  unregulated  at  the 
Community level and left the decision on potential regulation to the Member States. 
Annex II of the 1997 Interconnection Directive, which listed the types of operators 
subject to interconnection rights and obligations, did not expressly mention  ISPs and 
IBPs operators, but allowed Member States to include them into this category by 
means of domestic law.480 In the UK, for example, many ISPs obtained the right to 
interconnect to the fixed-line SMP operators by means of the Telecommunications 
Services Licence.481 However, there was no general duty on ISPs to interconnect. At 
times, leaving the internet unregulated amounted to a clearer policy decision. For 
example,  the  2002  Framework  Directive expressly excluded internet  naming and 
addressing (i.e. domain names and IP numbers) from the Community harmonising 
scope,482 which left  the  existing  regulation  of  this  area  by the sui  generis quasi-
international body ICANN intact.483
In  the  US  there  has  been  a  traditional  division  between  ‘basic’ and  ‘enhanced’ 
services,  which  has  left  the  latter  largely  unregulated.484 This  division  is  still 
embedded  in  the  Telecommunications  Act of  1996  as  the  division  between 
478 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 132.
479 Kagan, R. A., 2001, p. 182.
480 See Directive 97/33/EC, Annex II, in the Appendix.
481 See Walden, I., 2009, p. 406.
482 Recital 20: “The provisions of this Directive do not establish any new areas of responsibility for the 
national regulatory authorities in the field of Internet naming and addressing.”
483 See the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers available at http://www.icann.org, 
14th June 2009.
484 Huber, P. W., Kellogg, M. K., Thorne, J., 1999, p. 1006-1008. 
117
‘telecommunications’ and ‘information’ services.485 The main provisions of the Act 
do not address the internet, which gives the latter the potential to remain outside of 
its scope.486 In addition, the Act clearly states that its primary purpose is to reduce 
regulation  and  encourage  “the  rapid  deployment  of  new  telecommunications 
technologies.”487 Despite the absence of a general rule,  internet services are most 
likely to be classified as (generally unregulated) ‘enhanced / information’ services.488
This  forbearance  from  legal  regulation  has  coupled  with  the  views  of  both  the 
internet users community and academics. For example, it was commonly thought that 
online operations need only concern themselves with complying with domestic laws 
in places where their business had a significant presence, for example by means of an 
office  or  other  assets.489 This  phenomenon  has  been  identified  by  Reed  as  the 
‘cyberspace fallacy’,490 suggesting that there is a delusion about a parallel free virtual 
world. Bearing in mind the development of the internet, this should not come as a 
surprise. Bowrey suggests that there are many internet cultures, made up from many 
different kinds of storytellers, all trying to maintain their own voice and identity.491 
Furthermore,  as  Lessig  would  put  it,  the  Internet  is  already  regulated  by  its 
architecture or code, i.e. software and hardware, the norms and the market.  492 In the 
same context, Teubner argues that the architecture of cyberspace would require new 
types of 'societal'  constitutions, separated from state politics-centred constitutional 
systems.493
However, notwithstanding these views, the exchange of copyrighted works over the 
internet has never been subject to the regulatory forbearance principles. Already in 
1996, some years before the exchange of files over the internet had taken off on a 
485 Ibidem.
486 Even in 2005, broadband transmission services were, as lower protocol services, given the status by 
the FCC of 'information services'. See Wireline Broadband Internet Access Order, FCC, August 2005.
487Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
488 Ibidem, p. 1007.
489 Bowrey, K., 2005, p. 9.
490 Reed, C., 2000, p. 1.
491 Bowrey, K., 2005, p. 15.
492 Lessig, L., 1999, p. 87-89. See also Schiff Berman, P.-ed., 2007, p. 143 et seq.
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mass  scale,494 based  on  international  political  consensus,  the  WIPO  Copyrights 
Treaties specifically addressed interactive communication of copyrighted works to 
the public.495 It should not come as a surprise that these specific tailor-made legal 
measures for the internet in the form of new treaties and implementing legislation496 
faced fierce opposition from advocates of internet freedoms. Braithwaite and Drahos, 
for  example,  have  argued  that  the  internet  has  evolved  as  a  part  of  intellectual 
common and compare the use of ‘gatekeeping’ software with feudalism.497
When faced with the problem of internet traffic discrimination, the proponents of net 
neutrality have quickly recognised that legal code should be seen not only as a threat 
to liberty, but also as a tool to regulate for freedom of access to internet resources and 
services. This is the case when, as Lessig would put it, technology has been used as 
the key regulator,498 controlling access to internet content and applications. With the 
ability of broadband service providers to discriminate  against  certain content  and 
applications on a technological basis,  the law can step in to  prevent such use of 
technology. Of course, this requires the ambitions to regulate to be expressed in legal 
code. This has been largely done by the ‘Save the Internet’ movement. 499
Intensive self-promotion of the law by means of juridification of ideas500 is related to 
the  US  culture  in  which  lawyers  are  normally  hired  even  for  tasks  of  political 
lobbying.501 Consequently, ideas of mandated ‘net-neutrality’ were easily translated 
into the legal language of legislative bills. drafted in order to address this specific 
494 Napster, the revolutionary peer-to-peer music files exchange service that paved the way for massive 
peer-to-peer file sharing, was only launched in 1999.
495WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996, Article 8: “[...] authors 
of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the 
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time  
individually  chosen  by  them.”  See  also  WIPO  Performances  and  Phonograms  Treaty (WPPT), 
adopted in Geneva on December 20, 1996, Articles 10 and 14, establishing an equivalent right for  
performers and producers of phonograms.
496 See e.g. US Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.
497 Drahos, P., Braithwaite, J., 2002, p. 198.
498Lessig, L., 1999, p. 87-89.
499www.savetheinternet.com  , 27th April 2009.
500 See e.g. Lessig's criticism in Lessig, L., 2001, p. 3-5.
501 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 376.
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area of electronic communications activities.502 Moreover, looking at Wu's arguments 
in favour of net neutrality, the idea can be easily linked to the main traditional tasks 
of  telecommunications  law:  allocating  rights  and  managing  problems  of 
discrimination.503 While the first should eventually go away (due to technological 
developments undermining the problem of scarcity), the second seems unlikely to 
ever  go away.504 In  this  context,  the requirement  for a  central  anti-discrimination 
(legal) rule (encompassing its various aspects) could be a solution.505
US proponents of net neutrality have faced opposition in the form of de-regulatory 
ideas that oppose further juridification of wholesale DSL or cable access agreements. 
Their arguments are primarily economic: mandated access could deprive providers of 
alternative  broadband  platforms  from  their  natural  strategic  partners  and,  by 
depriving them of the necessary resources, prevent them from building their own 
networks.506 Moreover, there are more general arguments, such as the potential for 
'network diversity' and 'product variety', that non-neutral IP networks could bring.507 
In  addition,  non-discrimination  rules  such  as  net-neutrality  may  entail  costs  for 
consumers,  for  producers  and  for  the  regulatory  process.508 No  matter  how 
hypothetical these arguments may be, they are part of the general political agenda 
opposing  state  interventions  in  the  private  sector.  This  is  as  also  clear  from the 
'Hands off the Internet' blog that has been built to oppose net neutrality legislation.509 
Paradoxically,  at  'savetheinternet.com'  the  interventionist  and  'juridificational' 
502 US legislative techniques  focusing in detail on the specific area to be regulated are analysed by 
Kagan, R. A., 2001, p. 187-188 
503 Wu, T. 2004, p. 46.
504 Ibidem.
505 Ibidem.
506 Yoo, C. S., 2004-2005, p. 65.
507 Yoo, C. S., 2005, p. 77.
508 See Shelanski, H. A., 2007, p. 102.
509 “Hands Off The Internet is a nationwide coalition of Internet users, manufacturers and network 
operators united in the belief that the Net’s phenomenal growth over the past decade will continue if 
government does not attempt an unwise effort to regulate a market that is otherwise working to give 
consumers the choices, freedom, prices and diverse experiences they desire in the new age of the 
Internet.  To that end, Hands Off The Internet supports state and federal public policies that ensure the  
broadest possible range of choices for consumers and businesses using the Internet. [...] Hands Off 
The Internet believes that the best way to avoid burdensome and unnecessary regulation and mandates 
is  by ensuring that  market  forces  deliver  the benefits  that  only fair  competition can bring to  the  
American consumer - maximum choice in supplier, content and technology.” ‘Hands off the Internet’, 
available at www.handsoff.org/blog/about-us, 3rd  May 2009.
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approach has been used to defend the originally liberal architecture of the internet.510 
In  this  respect,  a  warning  should  be  made  as  to  the  missing  criteria  for  the 
equal/unequal scheme, as the latter could also be filled with the need to discriminate 
between those who provide connections and those who merely free ride with their 
content,  simply in order  to treat the equally in an equal and the unequally in  an 
unequal way.511
In the EU the situation is rather different from that in the US, as during the relevant 
period  the  EU  already  possessed  a  universal  system  for  imposing  rights  and 
obligations on operators in cases of anti-competitive behaviour.512 According to the 
EU 2002 Regulatory Framework, net neutrality regulation could potentially be based 
on the Framework's technological neutrality and the ability of the Commission and 
NRAs to define product markets susceptible to ex ante regulation. The definition of 
single  network  markets  for  broadband  data  termination,  for  example,  could 
potentially yield similar results. As in the case of voice termination on individual 
fixed or mobile networks,513 each broadband ISP could be designated as dominant i.e. 
holding  SMP and  could  be  mandated  to  grant  non-discriminatory  access  to  its 
network for the purpose of access of certain applications or services. This option was 
expressly noted in a proposal for the review of the Universal Service Directive that 
referred to enabling users to have reasonable access to particular types of content or 
applications, and have access to information on their providers' traffic management 
policies that could eventually prevent such access.514
510 Compare e.g. Downes, L., 2009.
511 See Luhmann relying on the famous Aristotelian rule. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 132.
512 See Article  16(2)  of the 2002  Framework Directive:  “Where a national  regulatory authority is 
required under Articles 16, 17, 18 or 19 of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), or  
Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) to determine whether to impose, maintain,  
amend or withdraw obligations on undertakings, it shall determine on the basis of its market analysis  
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article whether a relevant market is effectively competitive.”
513 See Markets 3 and 7 of the 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets.
514 See Recital 14 of the  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  
amending  Directive  2002/22/EC  on  universal  service  and  users'  rights  relating  to  electronic  
communications networks, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the  
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on  
consumer  protection  cooperation  –  Political  agreement: “…Given  the  increasing  importance  of 
electronic communications for consumers and businesses, users should be fully informed of […] the 
traffic management policies […] of the service and/or network provider with which they conclude the  
contract. […]. Where there is a lack of effective competition, the relevant national […] authorities 
should use the remedies available to them in Directive 2002/19/EC to ensure that users' access to 
particular types of content or applications is not unreasonably restricted”.
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Based on this supposed self-sufficiency of the EU regulatory system, the initial NRA 
response  to  net  neutrality  measures  in  Europe  was  not  overly  enthusiastic.  Ed 
Richards  of  Ofcom,  for  example,  stressed  that  activities  of  an  operator  without 
relevant market power should not be automatically construed as anti-competitive or 
necessarily regulated,515 which is consistent with the EU 2002 Framework approach 
to  regulating  communications  markets.  Looking at  the  latter,  a  general  European 
response could be that attempts of ISPs to give preference to certain types of content 
should  be  sufficiently  controlled  by  the  high  degree  of  competition  in  the  ISP 
market.516
When it ultimately came to the juridification of net neutrality in the EU, separate 
measures  were  proposed in  the  context  of  end-user  rights  instead  of  the  market 
analysis scheme. The initial proposal of the French Council Presidency mixed the 
provision on net neutrality with copyright protection measures,517 again suggesting 
that the juridification of the internet can in fact integrate liberal and non-liberal ideas 
about  its  development.  According  to  the  proposal,  end-users  should  decide  what 
lawful  content they wanted  to  be  able  to  send  and receive,  and  which  services, 
applications, hardware and software they wanted to use for such purposes.518 The 
Council  and  the  Parliament  later  agreed  on  a  version  that  only  enabled  ad  hoc 
intervention  by NRAs in cases  where  the  non-neutrality of  transmission  actually 
caused a degradation of service or caused traffic to slow down across networks.519
515 Crawford, S., 2007.
516 See Muys, S., 2006, p. 4.
517See  Compromise  proposal  for  the  consolidated  version  of  the  Proposal  amending  Directive  
2002/22/EC,  Brussels,  10  October  2008,  Working  Party  on  Telecommunications  and Information  
Society,  Room Document  71/08,  Article  20:  “...-  information  on  any restrictions  imposed  by the 
provider  regarding a  subscriber’s  ability to  access,  use or  distribute lawful  content  or  run lawful 
applications and services ...”
518 ‘Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks, 
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic  communications  sector  and  Regulation  (EC)  No  2006/2004  on  consumer  protection 
cooperation  -  Political  agreement,  Report  to  Coreper  of  7  November  2008'  (2008)  Available  at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st15/st15093.en08.pdf, 3rd January 2009.
519See European Parliament lead Industry committee adopts second reading reports on EU Telecoms  
Package, EU Telecom Flash Message 50/2009, Cullen International, 24 April 2009.
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Interestingly, whereas EU law allows for a careful market analysis before any net 
neutrality rules are imposed by the NRAs,520 economic criticisms of net neutrality 
mainly evolve around the simple assumption that neutrality can be either regulated or 
not,  claiming  they  want  to  protect  the  autonomy  of  the  emerging  economic 
transactions  from  legal  irritations.521 According  to  them,  content  providers 
traditionally benefited from the positive externalities of consumers paying for the 
networks, while they could raise their own service and advertising revenues. It is the 
market forces linked to large traffic flow over broadband that started to challenge this 
traditional business model, placing a higher burden on last-mile broadband service 
providers and giving them incentives to charge content providers for the extra effort 
they are making.522 Hemphill  argues  that,  while  concerns  of  exclusion of  content 
providers by broadband providers can be addressed with antitrust law, the extraction 
of content providers' profits by broadband providers could also have positive effects, 
such as access providers' subsidies for consumer broadband take up.523 Of course, 
these assumptions seem like serious arguments and could be coupled with the legal 
proceedings  to  be  conducted  by  the  European  NRAs  according  to  the  2009 
Directives. Bearing in mind the complex body of rules that has traditionally placed a 
heavy  burden  on  voice  telephony  providers,  however,  they  seem  like  poor 
generalised justification against attempts to give regulators a statutory right to tackle 
the discrimination of IP traffic under certain circumstances.
If legal provisions on net neutrality are drafted in a sufficiently open manner that 
allows for regulatory reference to economic arguments (say on reduced utility due to 
quality of service degradation or limited choice), economy can 'enter' legal reasoning 
by means of similar structural couplings, as it does when an analysis of a relevant 
market is performed according to the EU  Framework Directive.  In this respect, a 
comparison  between  the  EU  and  the  US  laws  reveals  the  limits  of  the  law's 
intervention, even if the need to regulate is established by economic reasoning. As to 
the potential exclusion of content providers, Hemphill himself identifies gaps in US 
520  In  this  sense, the 2009 changes may be less ‘radical’ than suggested by Dods, D.,  Brisby,  P., 
Hubbard, R., Ollerenshaw, K., Ingram, B., 2010.
521 See Yoo, C. S., 2004-2005, p. 188.
522 For an overview of the issues, see ibidem.
523 Hemphill, C. S., 2008, p. 172 and 179.
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competition law:524 according to the Trinko ruling, a refusal to supply that breaches 
sector-specific  access  rules  does  not  substantiate  a  claim  under  the  anti-
monopolization  rule  of  the  Sherman  Act.525 Furthermore,  in  the  EU,  access 
obligations  currently only affect  broadband network operators526 and  not  Layer  3 
retail broadband providers, who may also act as bottlenecks against individual users. 
The latter are unlikely to be dominant in the relevant market i.e. hold SMP, as they 
compete in the retail market with several other ISPs. Accordingly, instead of 'one size 
fits all' political legislative solutions, a tailor-made approach based on economic and 
public policy arguments can be used.527 EU communications law has already made a 
general phylogenetic step in terms of reflexivity by means of regular market analysis 
procedures,  showing that regulatory solutions required by modern technology are 
overly complex to be fully decided in advance by parliaments.
However, looking at the EU Framework, the net neutrality intervention of politicians 
also exposes the limits of the regulatory model based on SMP analysis and associated 
remedies that will be analysed in the next chapter. While this model creates a legal 
image  of  the  economic  environment  by  means  of  structural  coupling  with  the 
economic analysis of the relevant markets, it may not be able to detect and process 
specific problems,  such as two-sided platforms resulting from two-sided markets, 
where an intermediary, in this case an ISP, can differentiate pricing and service to 
each side of the market, suppliers and consumers, i.e. content providers and end-
users.528 Bottleneck problems resulting from these structures,  i.e.  subscribers of a 
particular ISP not willing to switch provider simply for the reason of not being able 
to access a certain internet service,529 cannot be deemed non-existent simply because 
524 Ibidem, p. 155.
525 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2.
526 See ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Explanatory Note,  Accompanying document to the 
Commission  Recommendation  on  Relevant  Product  and  Service  Markets  within  the  electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  a  common regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications  networks and  services  (Second  edition)’  (2007),  Available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enforcement/article_7/sec
_2007_1483_2.pdf , 20th June 2009, p. 34
527 Marsden, for example, proposes a co-regulatory approach to net neutrality. Marsden, C. T., 2010, p. 
221 et seq.
528 See e.g. ibidem,,p. 52.
529 On the contentious issue how end-users may actually 'benefit' from using 'walled gardens' instead 
of a variety of applications available on the open internet, see Zittrain, J., 2008.
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the law finds it difficult to tackle them. An interesting proof that there is more to 
bottleneck problems than the Commission and the NRA-defined markets susceptible 
for  ex ante  regulation can be found in the Framework itself: the  Universal Service  
Directive enables the imposition of 'must carry' obligations for certain broadcasts in 
the general interest530 in addition to market-analysis based SMP obligations. In this 
respect,  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  even  a  'flexible'  legal  model  remains 
autopoietic, which may ultimately prevent it from detecting and dealing with certain 
market failures or public interest issues. In such cases, political intervention may be 
required, which will be further demonstrated in the next chapter.
The nascent autopoietic legal regulation of net neutrality in the EU may result in a 
large new body of regulatory rules that are likely to justify its placing in a separate 
chapter. Currently, however, the EU law sees net neutrality as yet another provision 
protecting end-users, whereas its links with the market analysis-based approach to 
setting regulatory remedies, dealt with in the next chapter, are far from obvious.
530 See Article 31(1) of the 2002 Universal Service Directive: “Member States may impose reasonable 
‘must carry’ obligations, for the transmission of specified radio and television broadcast channels and 
services, on  undertakings under their jurisdiction providing electronic communications networks used 
for the distribution of radio or television broadcasts to the public where a significant number of end-
users of such networks use them as their principal means to receive radio and television broadcasts.  
Such obligations shall  only be imposed where they are necessary to meet clearly defined general  
interest  objectives  and shall  be  proportionate and  transparent.  The obligations shall  be subject  to 
periodical review.”
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5 ACCESS AND INTERCONNECTION – A 
REFLEXIVE  CLOSURE
Interconnection  obligations  regulating  wholesale  i.e.  inter-operator  exchange  of 
telephone traffic have traditionally been the cornerstone of regulation for competition 
on telecommunications markets,531 enabling new competitors' end-users to call those 
of the incumbent. However, with the advent of IP technology and its introduction to 
what used to be the domain of traditional telecommunications networks, certain new 
phenomena  as  to  exchange  of  communications  traffic  can  be  observed.  First, 
previously  unregulated  exchange  of  traffic  on  IP  networks  that  was  based  on 
settlement-free peering arrangements is increasingly becoming a commercial issue 
that  may be perceived as  calling  for  regulatory attention.532 Second,  voice  traffic 
interconnection  arrangements  with  the  incumbents  that  were  previously provided 
under strictly regulated terms may be again placed under regulatory scrutiny due to 
the migration of the incumbents’ own networks to IP technology, i.e. NGN.533
Furthermore, the shift to NGN often implies the wholesale use of specific network 
infrastructure that is inherently not linked to IP, but is regularly used for all-IP-based 
services  in  commercial  practice,  Fibre  to  the  Home/Premises  (FTTH/FTTP)  or 
Cabinet/Node (FTTC/FTTN) local loops that are replacing traditionally used copper 
loops being the key examples.534 This type of infrastructure that is generally referred 
to as Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs) is becoming increasingly important 
for  the  development  of  services  that  require  high-bandwidth,  such  as  the 
simultaneous transmission of multiple high-definition IPTV channels. Access to this 
infrastructure  triggers  new  regulatory  issues,  such  as  potential  forbearance  from 
regulation versus additional forms of mandated access.535 The Australian example of 
Telstra’s plans for FTTN deployment is quoted as an example where the decision 
531 Melody, W.H. in: Melody, W.H., 1997, p. 51 et seq.
532 McCormack, E. in: Walden, I., Angel, J., 2005, p. 221. See also Kariyawasam, R. in Walden, I.,  
Angel, J., 2001, p. 190.
533 The first European telecom incumbent to announce the full migration to IP backbone for voice was 
Telecom  Italia.  See  e.g.  http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=22380,  viewed  23rd 
October 2011.
534 This approach to IP-based network analysis is also adopted by Cave. Cave. M., 2007.
535 Ibidem.
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whether  or  not  to  regulate  access  seemed  to  have  directly  affected  Telstra’s 
investment decisions.536
This chapter will demonstrate how the EU communications law has, despite building 
on its own persistent autopoietic concepts of network interconnection and access, 
resorted to increased flexibility in order to be able to tackle new types of network 
access and interconnection described above. This has primarily been achieved by 
means of re-using technology-neutral competition law concepts and coupling with 
the economic analysis. However, this reflexive coupling with the economic system is 
limited to certain specific aspects of autopoietic legal regulation. Whereas the 2002 
Framework requires  market  analysis  to  be performed at  the stage of determining 
SMP,  a  similar  in-depth  economic  justification  is  not  required  when  imposing 
individual  access  and  interconnection  remedies.  The  latter  process  is  largely 
discretionary though, which enables coupling not only with market findings but also 
with  political  preferences  of  the  regulatory  bodies.  This  sometimes  resulted  in 
politically-motivated  interference  with regulatory principles  while  failing  to  offer 
certain potentially desirable long-term market solutions.  
This will add a further point to the 'stickiness' of the legal system in relation to the 
communications  market:  increased flexibility can only be reached within the law 
itself, by means of more open legal definitions, more general i.e. EU Treaty-based 
competition  law image  of  network  access,  and  increased  coupling  with  purpose-
specific regulatory discretion. Despite its intensive self-promotion, the law inevitably 
still lacks direct access to economic transactions in the wholesale communications 
business.
5.1 Regulatory approach to wholesale services regulation
Like legal  concept  of  voice  telephony,  European model  of  wholesale  access  and 
interconnection  model  saw a major  change in  2002.  Based on the Commission’s 
understanding of the convergence trend,537 a new general concept of wholesale, i.e. 
536 Ibidem.
537 See Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology  
sectors, and the implications for regulation, COM(97)623.
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inter-operator ‘access’ has been introduced to the legal framework, which includes 
both  'interconnection'  of  independent  networks  and  'access'  to  certain  network 
elements  or  services.538 Although  still  largely  relying  on the  pre-2002 regulatory 
solutions, both concepts have been linked to a more flexible market analysis-based 
approach to setting regulatory measures. 
As in the case of VoIP, the US regulatory model will be offered as an alternative 
scenario  attempting  to  regulate  a  similarly  developed  market  yet  living  a  rather 
different legal life. In particular, whereas the European concept of local infrastructure 
unbundling can be seen as a legal transplant from the US system, the EU Framework 
managed to use it in a more reflexive (yet still self-referential) way when the NGA 
networks were seen emerging in the environment. In addition to a high degree of 
regulatory  discretion  also  known  in  the  US,  the  EU  legal  system  introduced 
competition law analysis and required direct coupling with the economic analysis. 
Regardless  of  these  developments,  however,  European  law  remained  'sticky'  in 
different ways. In addition to the actual continuity of the ONP remedies into the NRF 
regulatory practice,  parts  of  the EU law's  own Treaty-based competition doctrine 
have  been  offered  as  a  universal  remedy  to  cure  new  communications  market 
problems. 
European concepts of access and interconnection
The concept of access to specific network elements was not unknown to the EU legal 
regulatory framework before 2002.  In 2000,  Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled 
access to the local loop expressly mandated access to metallic loops of the European 
telecom incumbents  inter alia for the purposes of providing broadband services, at 
the time primarily used for the provision of (IP-based) high-speed access to the open 
internet.539  However, it was only in 2002 that a general concept of wholesale access 
had been introduced to the EU directives.
538 See Article 2 of the 2002 Access Directive.
539 See recital 13 of the Regulation 2887/2000.
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The 2002  Access Directive defined ‘access’ as “the making available of facilities 
and/or  services,  to  another  undertaking,  under  defined  conditions,  on  either  an 
exclusive  or  non-exclusive  basis,  for  the  purpose  of  providing  electronic 
communications services.” This is deemed to cover “inter alia:  access to network 
elements and associated facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, 
by fixed or non-fixed means (in particular this includes access to the local loop and 
to facilities and services necessary to provide services over the local loop), access to 
physical  infrastructure  including  buildings,  ducts  and  masts;  access  to  relevant 
software systems including operational support systems, access to number translation 
or systems offering equivalent functionality, access to fixed and mobile networks, in 
particular  for  roaming,  access  to  conditional  access  systems for  digital  television 
services;  access  to  virtual  network services.”540 According to  this  definition,  it  is 
obvious that the European legislator intended to encompass a wide range of inter-
operator and service provider agreements, including the previously narrower concept 
of interconnection. The latter has been defined by the  Interconnection Directive of 
1997 as “the physical and logical linking of telecommunications networks used by 
the same or a different organization in order to allow the users of one organization to 
communicate with users of the same or another organization, or to access services 
provided by another organization. Services may be provided by the parties involved 
or other parties who have access to the network.”541 Almost the same definition can 
be found in the Access Directive542 with the express addition that “interconnection is 
a  specific type of access implemented between public network operators”,  which 
shows  the  continuity  of  European  legal  concepts,  even  following  the  2002  law 
reform.
Despite some specific examples that have been included in the definition of access, it 
should be borne in mind that both the ‘access’ and the ‘interconnection’ definitions 
are sufficiently neutral to cover IP-related types of access and interconnection. These 
include  both  the  exchange of  IP traffic  over  different  networks,  and the  making 
540 See Article 2 (a) of the 2002 Access Directive.
541 See Article 2 (1) (a) of the 1997 Interconnection Directive.
542 'Interconnection “means the physical and logical linking of public communications networks used 
by the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the users of one undertaking to communicate 
with users of the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking.  
Services may be provided by the parties involved or other parties who have access to the network.“  
Article 2 (b) of the 2002 Access Directive.
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available  of  elements  required  to  provide  internet  access  and  managed  IP-based 
services (e.  g.  VoIP or IPTV), such as bitstream services or shared access to  the 
metallic  local  loops.  This  seems  to  be  an  important  shift  from  the  previous 
framework, where Annexes I and II of the 1997 Interconnection Directive limited the 
scope of interconnection obligations to specific categories of regulated entities and 
beneficiaries that did not explicitly include. say internet backbone providers or ISPs. 
The  new  definitions  can  potentially  be  applied  to  all  types  of  electronic 
communications  network  operators  and  service  providers.  However,  in  order  to 
properly understand the actual legal consequences of the new definitions, one should 
examine the broader perspective of the actual practical application of the European 
access and interconnection system.
Despite  continuity  from  the  more  rigid  ONP  regime,  the  2002  access  and 
interconnection  definitions  first  of  all  serve  merely as  means of  ‘classifying’ the 
types  of  behaviour  that  can  potentially be  regulated  by law if  an  operator  holds 
Significant Market Power (SMP).543 The concept of SMP kept the name previously 
used  by the  ONP directives,  but  changed  under  the  2002 Framework to  a  near-
equivalent of the concept of dominance under general competition law.544 Compared 
to the 40-50% market share threshold used in competition law, the initial SMP used 
the 25% market share.545 Moreover, the ONP directives did not clearly define the 
markets based on substitutability criteria used in general competition law, but rather 
relied  on  somewhat  broad  market  'segments',  namely  fixed  telephony,  mobile 
telephony and leased lines services.546 All these changes were in line with the general 
idea  of  the  shift  from  ex  ante  regulation  to  general  competition  law,  wherever 
possible, that accompanied the passing of the 2002 NRF.547
543 See Article 8 of the 2002 Access Directive.
544 See Article 14(2) of the Framework Directive: “An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant 
market  power  if,  either  individually  or  jointly  with  others,  it  enjoys  a  position  equivalent  to 
dominance, that  is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.”
545 “...an  organization  shall  be  presumed to have  significant  market  power  when its  share  of  the 
relevant leased-lines market in a Member State is 25 % or more.” See Directive 97/51/EC. See also 
Walden, I., 2009, p. 188-189.
546 See ibidem.
547 The idea of this shift is explained in Walden, I., 2009, p. 170.
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In order to be regulated, a certain type of access to the SMP operator's facilities must 
also fall within the scope of one of the regulated markets that have been defined by 
the NRAs as appropriate to national circumstances in accordance with the principles 
of  competition  law,  taking,  nevertheless,  the  utmost  account  of  the  Commission 
current Recommendation on relevant markets.548 In case the Commission disagreed 
with  an  NRA market  definition  that  departs  from the  Recommendation,  it  could 
ultimately  veto  such  a  definition,  observing  the  commitology  procedure.549 
Accordingly,  despite the increased technological neutrality of the new framework 
compared to  the  old  one,  there  was  still  room to  pursue  non-technology neutral 
policy by means of relevant market definitions. This could include forbearance from 
regulating IP-based networks, including their underlying infrastructure.550 Under the 
initial  Commission Recommendation,  full  and shared access to the  metallic local 
loops  and  bitstream access  were  regulated,ensuring  continuity  from the  previous 
ONP regime.551 In 2007, using a new technology-neutral definition of 'physical access 
infrastructure', the Commission explicitly extended regulation potential from metallic 
local loops to other infrastructures such as ducts, poles, and fibre.552
It should be noted, though, that the 2002 Framework enabled additional mandating 
'access' in a symmetric way, i.e. for all, including non-SMP operators. Article 12 of 
the 2002 Framework Directive included very limited obligations of Member States in 
respect of facility sharing: where an operator had the right under national legislation 
to  install  facilities  on,  over  or  under  public  or  private  property,  or  could  take 
advantage of a procedure for the expropriation or use of property, national regulatory 
authorities were to encourage the sharing of such facilities or property.  However, 
particularly where operators were deprived of access to viable alternatives because of 
the need to protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town 
and  country  planning  objectives,  Member  States  could  impose  the  sharing  of 
548 See Article 15 of the Framework Directive and Article 8 of the Access Directive.
549 See Articles 7 and 22 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
550 Cave, for example,  automatically associates  fibre deployment  further to the customer with the 
development of IP-based networks. Cave. M., 2007.
551 See Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC and Regulation 2887/2000.
552 See  Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic  
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of  
the  European  Parliament  and of  the  Council  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  
communications networks and services (Second edition), C(2007) 5406 rev 1.
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facilities  or property (including physical  co-location)  on another  operator  or take 
measures to facilitate the coordination of public works. Such sharing or coordination 
arrangements  could  even  include  rules  for  apportioning  the  costs  of  facility  or 
property sharing.553 The 2009 review of the 2002 Framework provided for a change: 
instead of having to prove one of the obstacles affecting network duplication listed 
above, the NRAs could exercise discretion when opting in for mandatory facility 
sharing.554
The EU rules on access and interconnection have been dealt with in NGN-related 
practice not only by the Commission and the NRAs, but also by the ERG. The latter 
carried  out  a  thorough  analysis  of  regulatory  implications  of  IP-based 
interconnection. In its Final Report on IP-Interconnection555 they observed that, with 
the  migration  to  an  IP-based  environment,  interconnect  pricing  regimes  may 
eventually change from per-minute charging (calling party network pays) to ‘Bill and 
Keep’ models556, whereby traffic is exchanged between the operators free of charge. 
The  Report  did  not  provide  comprehensive  guidance  for  future  regulation  of  IP 
interconnection  though,  leaving the door  largely open to  new solutions  that  may 
evolve  in  commercial  practice.  However,  it  did  recommend  that  NRAs  address 
certain  new  issues,  such  as  the  change  in  number  of  access  point  and  network 
hierarchy levels, the presence of ‘control points’ in the network hierarchy that might 
result  in  market  power,  or  the  need  to  ensure  end-to-end  connectivity, 
interoperability, and QoS.557 Later, based on further data and, e.g. the experience from 
the US where 'Bill and Keep' was agreed contractually, BEREC took a more clear 
view in favour of 'Bill and Keep', stating that 'weighing the usage per capita, price 
and ownership effects together, the higher usage and lower price per minute clearly 
553 See Article 12 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
554 Article  12  (1)  of  the  2009  Framework  Directive:  “Where  an undertaking providing electronic 
communications networks has the right under national legislation to install facilities on, over or under 
public  or  private property,  or may take advantage  of  a  procedure for  the expropriation or  use of  
property, national regulatory authorities shall, taking full account of the principle of proportionality, be 
able to impose the sharing of such facilities or property,  including buildings,  entries to buildings,  
building  wiring,  masts,  antennae,  towers  and  other  supporting  constructions,  ducts,  conduits, 
manholes, cabinets.”
555 ‘Final report on IP interconnection ERG(07)09’ (2007) Available at 
http://erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_09_rept_on_ip_interconn.pdf, 30th March 2011.
556 Ibidem, p. 28-31.
557 Ibidem, p. 35.
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indicate BaK results in a higher consumer and higher total welfare.'558 The Report, 
however, did not make a clear preference for either contractual (self-regulatory) or 
legally mandated 'Bill and Keep'.559
The issue of Next Generation Access networks used to provide high-speed IP-based 
services has also been addressed within the ERG, and has been submitted to its NGN 
Project  Team,  which  resulted  in  the  ERG  Opinion  on  Regulatory  Principles  of  
NGA560. The document is a thorough study of possible regulatory solutions from the 
perspective of the legal framework and business models for NGA deployment. The 
document, however, includes no specific recommendations for NRAs. This seems 
logical in the sense that huge differences in terms of NGA technology, development 
and strategy exist among Member States.561 These differences were, however, not an 
obstacle for the Commission who, driven by its harmonisation agenda based on the 
EU Treaty and coupled with political and commercial pressures for legal certainty 
and desired revenues,562 proposed a Recommendation on detailed access and costing 
rules for the NGAs, a document that combines rather pro-competitive and largely 
investor-protecting elements.563
Again, a relatively open framework enabled creativity by the NRAs. For example, 
NGAs have been the subject of analysis by Ofcom in its public discussion document 
Regulatory challenges posed by Next Generation Access networks.564 The document 
deals with various aspects of regulating NGN access technologies, including fibre 
unbundling  at  the  exchange,  sub-loop  unbundling  in  order  to  enable  FTTC 
deployment, and the future of bitstream products.565 As to the potential phasing out of 
certain technology solutions (e. g. local exchange access), Ofcom believed that its 
558 BEREC Common Statement on Next Generation Networks Future Charging Mechanisms / Long  
Term Termination Issues, June 2010, BoR (10) 24 Rev 1, p. 4 and 19.
559 See e.g. ibidem, p. 15.
560 ’ERG  Opinion  on  Regulatory  Principles  of  NGA  ERG  (07)  16rev2’  (2007)  Available  at 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg07_16rev2_opinion_on_nga.pdf, 31st May 2009.
561 See ibidem, p. VI.
562 See below fn. 720.
563 Commission  Recommendation  of  20.9.2010  on  regulated  access  to  Next  Generation  Access  
Networks (NGA), C(2010) 6223 final.
564 Public discussion document (Ofcom, 23 November 2006).
565 Ibidem, p. 34-35.
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role was not to protect present alternative operators' investments against market risks 
that may arise, for example from the emergence of new technology developments 
that  supersede  some  operators’  current  market  propositions.  However,  Ofcom 
considered it appropriate to take into account the operators’ interests in terms of the 
availability of wholesale inputs throughout the life of the assets in which they have 
invested,  as  competitive  operators  were  making  significant  investment  in 
communications infrastructure on the expectation that currently available regulated 
wholesale products (e.g. unbundled local loops) would be available for a reasonable 
period of time.566  In May 2009, Ofcom went further by issuing New Build Investment  
Guidance on Telecoms Regulation567,  a  document that  combines  the principles  of 
equivalence of access for third parties with the principles of reward for investment 
risk and legal certainty for investors.568  Ofcom did not approach the subject in the 
context of regular market analyses mandated by EU law, but rather in a horizontal 
way, encompassing various regulated markets and even symmetric regulation (e.g. 
building ducts with extra capacity and sharing them).569  Similarly,  Ofcom's  2010 
consultation document on regulatory issues as to super-fast broadband integrates a 
series of issues regarding access to- and investments in NGA, such as evaluating the 
need  for  pricing  regulation,  virtual  unbundled  local  access  (VULA)  to  fibre 
networks,   and  incentives  by  different  operators  to  roll  out  their  own  NGA 
networks.570
In general,  the 2002 EU legal regulatory system reveals a potential  for evolution 
based on structural  coupling  with  the  NGN-related  developments.  The  system is 
based  on relatively open  legal  concepts,  and seems  to  be  relatively open  to  the 
environment  by  means  of  regular  market  analyses  by  the  NRAs  and  associated 
566 Ibidem, p. 37.
567 Ofcom’s ‘Guidance Note’ (2009) Available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/ioi/orp/newbuild/NewBuildGuidance.pdf, 31st May 2009.
568 Ibidem, p. 2-3.
569 “We would expect new build developers to install spare duct capacity and use sub-ducting, the 
adoption of which should ensure that the capacity of the installed duct would be sufficient to support  
duct sharing in the future, should that prove necessary for effective competition.” Ibidem, p. 5.
570 ‘Super-fast broadband - Context and summary for Ofcom’s consultations on the wholesale local 
access and wholesale broadband access markets’ (2010) Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/wla/annexes/context.pdf, 7th November 2010.
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mandatory  public  consultations.571 In  addition,  the  principle  of  technological 
neutrality is meant to prevent both discrimination of new technologies, as well as 
regulatory  measures  becoming  obsolete  simply  due  to  change  in  technologies.572 
Nevertheless, one should not overstate this openness. The starting point for NRAs is 
always  the  Commission  Recommendation  on  Relevant  Markets,  whereas  the 
Commission  may  ultimately  veto  the  NRA analysis.573 When  performing  these 
activities,  the  Commission  is  bound  to  pursue  harmonisation,  which  is  again  an 
internal standard of the EU legal system. In this respect, strategic plans of the NRAs, 
such as that of Ofcom, to tackle NGA-related issues must ultimately fit into the legal 
scheme prescribed by the NRF, regardless of their creativity and broadness. Before 
looking at specific aspects of this simultaneous openness and closure, the comparison 
with the US system shall be given, whereby largely similar concepts or even legal 
'transplants'574 primarily  achieve  flexibility  by  means  of  coupling  with  purpose-
specific (political) discretion.
US concepts of unbundled network elements and 
interconnection
Some years  before  the  introduction  of  local  loop unbundling  in  the  EU, the  US 
Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  provided  for  unbundling  of  local  loops  and 
associated unbundled elements.  According to the initial  position of the FCC, this 
included not only access to raw copper loops, but also to ADSL-capable local loops 
in a manner similar to the European concept of mandated bitstream offer.575 In order 
to unbundle specific elements, the FCC must weigh the need for access with the need 
to  facilitate  investment  by using  standards  of  ‘necessity’ and ‘impairment  of  the 
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it 
seeks to offer'.576 The FCC’s understanding of unbundling standards has not only 
571 Article 6 of the Framework Directive.
572 See Article 8(1) of the Framework Directive.
573 See Article 7 of the Framework Directive.
574 See Watson, A., 1993.
575 See above.
576 Sec. 101 of the Telecommunications Act 1996.
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been subject to judicial review577 but has also undergone several changes based on 
the administration's contemporary political goals. Most notably, in 2005, the FCC 
declared  that  wholesale  DSL was  an  ‘information  service’ not  subject  to  access 
obligations.578
The  1996  Act  imposes  a  general  duty  on  all  telecommunications  carriers  to 
interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities of other carriers,579 whereas rates 
have historically been heavily regulated.580 However, based on the FCC opinion, calls 
to ISPs were traditionally excluded from the compensation mechanism as ‘interstate 
calls’.581 Nevertheless,  the  FCC has  indicated  that  in  cases  where  an  IP-enabled 
service  sends  traffic  to  the  PSTN,  its  provider  should  pay for  that  access.582 In 
addition,  the  FCC  also  ruled  that,  as  an  immediate  interim  measure,  (PSTN-) 
interconnected VoIP providers should contribute to the Universal Service fund.583 The 
quoted reasons were of practical nature: declining revenues of stand-alone interstate 
long-distance  traffic  in  comparison  with  the  dramatic  growth  in  interconnected 
VoIP.584 Accordingly, the inclusion of VoIP providers was not based on specific legal 
construction of statutes, but rather on general powers of the FCC to put down rules 
on the Universal Services fund and contributions.
US  developments  on  access  and  interconnection  reveal  an  interesting  paradigm 
whereby  regulation  is  subject  to  regular  change  based  either  on  both  broad 
discretionary powers given to the FCC and vague statutory definitions that may be 
tailored to daily policy needs. However, pointing at the co-evolutionary relationship 
of law, technology, sector organisation and performance, Bauer and Wildman argue 
that the FCC unbundling policy was constantly based on incomplete information and 
577 The US Supreme Court has set the limits of unbundled access in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Board, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999). See also Huber, P. W., Kellogg, M. K., Thorne, J., 1999, p. 1017-18.
578 See Wireline Broadband Internet Access Order (FCC, August 2005).
579 Sec. 251 Telecommunications Act 1996.
580 Lee, K.; Prime, J. in: Walden, I.; Angel, J., 2005, p. 540.
581 Ibidem.
582 Ibidem, p. 585.
583 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (WC Docket No. 04-36, released June 27, 
2006).
584 Ibidem, p. 3, 11.
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partial  models,  and  this  policy  was  only  corrected  when  feedback  on  its  effect 
became available.585 Whereas this is a demonstration of autopoietic nature of both the 
law and  the  FCC as  an  institution,  and  their  lack  of  synchronisation  with  other 
subsystems,  it  also shows how, the US regulatory legal  system primarily couples 
with purpose-specific political decision-making instead of economic analysis as the 
EU Framework does. The latter finding should not be overstated though: it shall be 
further argued that politics still manages to find its way into the  EU system not only 
at the legislative but also at the regulatory level by means of coupling due to both 
European Commission's hybrid role586 and the NRAs' national character.
5.2 The evolution of the regime
Compared  to  the  1997  EU  interconnection  regime,  the  2002  procedural  rules 
contained in the directives are more complex, whereas the details of the SMP status 
and  obligations  are  only  set  out  in  the  NRA decisions.  Various  procedural  and 
substantive elements of the evolving regime can be analysed. In particular, one can 
look at the following legally defined elements of the regulatory process:
• the NRA status;
• consultations at the EU level;
• national consultations; and
• judicial review.
As to substantive rules, the following elements can be analysed:
• the operator with obligations;
• the operator with corresponding rights;
• the networks and technologies to whom the obligations refer; and
• the scope of rights and obligations.
The ONP Framework Directive 90/387/EEC contained no specific provisions as to 
NRA status. However, the 95/62/EC Voice Telephony Directive expressly demanded 
in  Article  2  that  NRAs  be  “legally  distinct  and  functionally  independent  of  the 
telecommunications organizations, entrusted by that Member State, inter alia, with 
585 Bauer, J. M., Wildman, S. S., 2006, p. 418, 427, 438.
586 See e.g. Wallace, H., Wallace, W., 2000, p. 15.
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the  regulatory  functions’”  that  are  addressed  in  the  same  directive.  The  latter 
included the intervention in interconnection matters described in Article 11 of the 
same directive.  Looking at the 2007 review proposals, further attempts were made 
by the  Commission  to  increase  NRA independence  from the  political  bodies  of 
Member States,587 and these attempts were partially successful in the final version of 
the 2009 directives.588 Due to the direct role of the Commission in the regulatory 
proceedings, such independence generally means the strengthening of the autonomy 
of harmonised EU legal regulatory principles against the specific national political 
programmes.
As  to  the  rights  and  obligations  of  network  access,  the  1997  Interconnection 
Directive included the lists of specific entities that were obliged or had the right to 
request interconnection. These lists, which are included in Annexes I and II of the 
Directive,  associate relevant entities with the relevant networks and services they 
provide, and their market power. There are two layers of obligations to which the 
Annexes refer:
• the obligation to negotiate interconnection; and
• the obligation to  grant  access,  which includes  accepting all  reasonable 
requests  for  network  access,  and  specific  obligations  as  to  non-
discrimination, transparency, charging and cost-accounting.589
587 Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament  and of  the Council  amending Directives  
2002/21/EC  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  
services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and  
services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services,  
COM(2007) 697 final: “Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities exercise their 
powers independently, impartially and transparently. National regulatory authorities shall not seek or 
take instructions from any other body in relation to the day-to-day performance of the tasks assigned 
to them under national law implementing Community law. Only appeal bodies set up in accordance  
with [this directive] or national courts shall have the power to suspend or overturn decisions by the 
national regulatory authorities.”
588 See Recital 13 of the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive): “The independence of 
the  national  regulatory  authorities  should  be  strengthened  in  order  to  ensure  a  more  effective 
application of the regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the predictability of their 
decisions. To this end, express provision should be made in national law to ensure that, in the exercise  
of its tasks, a national regulatory authority responsible for ex-ante market regulation or for resolution  
of disputes between undertakings is protected against external intervention or political pressure liable 
to jeopardise its independent assessment of matters coming before it. Such outside influence makes a  
national  legislative  body unsuited  to  act  as  a  national  regulatory  authority  under  the  regulatory 
framework.”
589 See Articles 4 (1) and (2), 6 and 7 of the 1997 Interconnection Directive.
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The difference between the entities to whom the layers are applicable stems from the 
types  of  networks  they  provide,  but,  even  more  importantly,  from  their  market 
position.  The obligation to  negotiate  interconnection refers  to  a  broader  circle  of 
operators,  including inter  alia international  operators,  but  specifically  excluding 
ISPs, unless they also appear in another role.590 However, with some exceptions, the 
main difference between the two layers refers to market power: only those operators 
from Annex I that hold SMP are obliged to follow the more specific rules of the 
Interconnection Directive described above.591
These specific obligations were all transferred to the 2002 Access Directive. There is 
a general obligation to negotiate interconnection for all network operators,592 whereas 
NRAs may, subject to their discretion,593 impose on SMP operators all the obligations 
previously specified in the 1997 Interconnection Directive, i.e. obligations as to the 
granting of access, non-discrimination, transparency of offer, price controls and cost-
accounting.594 However, looking at  the traditional fixed termination market,595 one 
590 1997 Interconnection Directive, Annex I, see Appendix. According to this definition,  national laws 
could also grant specific interconnection rights to ISPs.
591 Ibidem.
592 Article 4 of the Access Directive: ‘Operators of public communications networks shall have a right 
and, when requested by other undertakings so authorised, an obligation to negotiate interconnection 
with each other for the purpose of providing publicly available electronic communications services 
…” One can observe that this obligation is not limited to specific networks or operators.
593 At least formally, the NRAs have since the introduction of the 2002 NRF been much more free in  
terms of being able to choose the remedies they impose on SMP operators. Compare the US system 
that  is  unlikely to  evolve  towards  much stronger discretionary powers  for  the FCC, as  the  latter  
already possesses close to legislative powers and such a move would not be necessary. Similarly,  
Ofcom is unlikely to possess more formal discretionary powers in the future than it did under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1994, as this might contravene the EU law. Both the US and the UK are 
based on a legal tradition that grants more powers to administrative bodies. Whereas the US federal 
agencies are restrained by the federal administrative procedure, the UK has a tradition of extremely 
limited ground for appeal against an administrative decision. See Craig, P. P., 2003, p. 5 et seq. On the 
other hand, discretionary powers do not only mean legal conditional programming but can also be 
perceived as political decision-making based on certain political option being in power. For example,  
in the case of the FCC, the role of the commissioners is to a large extent political. The commissioners 
are chosen with a view to their political party affiliation. Lee, K.; Prime, J. Walden, I. in: Walden, I., 
Angel,  J.,  2005,  p.  518.  Equally,  the  European  Commission,  which  plays  a  crucial  role  in  EU 
regulation, is perceived as a political body. Spence, D., 2006, p. 512. Of course, in strict terms, even  
wholly political  discretionary decisions will  still  maintain their  legal  character,  as  will  politically 
enacted laws.
594 See  Article 8  of  the  Access  Directive:  “Member  States  shall  ensure  that  national  regulatory 
authorities are empowered to impose the obligations [of transparency, non-discrimination, accounting 
separation, access to, and use of, specific network facilities, and price control and cost accounting].”
595 Market 9 under the 2003 Commission Recommendation on Relevant Markets and Market 3 under 
the 2007 version of the same Recommendation.
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can observe that  all  these obligations  were  imposed by European NRAs in their 
respective Member States, mostly with only minor differences, e.g. as to the type of 
price controls.596 Moreover,  remedies do not vary significantly in most individual 
Member States from the first  to the second round of market  analysis.  In France, 
Ireland,  Greece  or  Lithuania,  for  example,  the  remedies  remained essentially  the 
same in  both rounds,  whereas  a  more significant  change can be observed in  the 
Netherlands with the removal of the non-discrimination and accounting separation 
obligations and mandatory interconnection at the regional level.597
Continuous,  almost  mechanical  imposition  of  the  series  of  remedies  that  were 
already  contained  in  the  1997  Interconnection  Directive is  an  indicator  of  the 
autopoiesis of the measures  contained in EU communications law. This autopoietic 
harmonisation only reaches its  limits  when it  comes to the operational  details  of 
remedies left to the NRAs, which have according to the 2002 rules not been subject 
to the Commission veto and therefore Community law's strong harmonising powers. 
For example, price control and cost accounting remedies in different Member States 
include different methodologies (long-run incremental costs - LRIC, fully distributed 
costs or benchmarking)598,  and may yield different costing results,599 whereas it is 
questionable whether different prices can be linked to objectively different national 
market  conditions.600 This  suggests  that  harmonisation  by  means  of  a  common 
reference to autopoietic legal remedies of the NRF only applies to concepts as far as 
they can be elaborated and prescribed at the EU level. The details and enforcement of 
remedies will  therefore inevitably be part  of the autopoietic laws of the Member 
States. As the findings on the institutional framework suggest, this has proven to be 
the utmost political problem for the Commission.601 This should be attributed to the 
596 See  ‘Cullen  International  EU Market  Analysis  Database’  available  at  http://www.cullen-
international.com/documents/cullen/prindex.cfm, 29th December 2009.
597 Ibidem.
598 Ibidem.
599 In September 2008, local call termination in the UK costed just below EUR 0.0030 and in the 
Netherlands  just  below  EUR  0.0080,  which  indicates  a  huge  pricing  gap  despite  using  similar  
methodologies.  ‘See  Cullen  International  Cross-country  Analysis’ available  at  http://www.cullen-
international.com/documents/cullen/prindex.cfm, 29th  December 2008.
600 The issue was addressed by the European Commission in their Recommendation on the Regulatory  
Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU, C(2009) 3359 final.
601 See above at p. 61.
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limits  of  the  Commission  legal  harmonising  powers  that,  according  to  the  2002 
Framework,  have  not  applied  to  the  remedies,  leaving  more  room  for  purpose-
specific activities of the NRAs.
Autopoiesis of regulatory legal obligations has other practical consequences for legal 
evolution. Namely, the principle of cost-based access pricing acted as an obstacle 
against the imposition of settlement-free exchange of traffic traditionally known in 
IP-based networks as 'peering',602 despite the findings that the transition to such a 
system  would  be  beneficial  for  total  and  consumer  welfare.603 For  example, 
according to the majority of experts participating in the 2008 ERG legal research on 
the  possible  imposition  of  the  ‘Bill  and  Keep’  system  as  a  remedy,  such  a 
discretionary option did not exist in the 2002 Framework. It is argued that ‘Bill and 
Keep’,  an  alternative  mechanism  which  enables  the  parties  to  keep  their  retail 
revenues and send the traffic to another party’s network free of charge, cannot be 
interpreted as a pricing and costing remedy under Article  13 of the 2002  Access 
Directive. The latter provisions inter alia require the operators to be able to recover 
costs, which casted doubt upon the compatibility of ‘Bill and Keep’ with the 2002 
regime.  As  a  response  to  these  limits,  some  Member  States  launched  political 
proposals  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  amend the  Access  Directive in  order  to 
specifically provide for such a discretionary option.604 Despite this, the Commission's 
relatively recent actions have reinforced the idea of cost-based call termination by 
means of issuing a Recommendation on fixed and mobile termination charges based 
on efficient costs.605 As a compromise, a modified paragraph has been added to the 
general powers of the NRAs in respect of interconnection, which potentially enables 
602 See Kariyawasam, R. in Walden, I., Angel, J., 2001, p. 187 et seq.
603 “The most important  level  effect  is  the expected significant  higher usage and lower price per 
minute that,  although with possibly slightly higher prices  of  low usage  offers  and slightly lower 
mobile  ownership,  overall  will  lead  to  higher  consumer  and  total  welfare.”  BEREC  Common 
Statement  on  Next  Generation  Networks  Future  Charging  Mechanisms  /  Long Term Termination  
Issues  June 2010, BoR (10) 24 Rev 1.
604 A compromise  can  be  found  in  the  document  ‘Review  of  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for 
electronic  communications  networks  and  services:  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to and interconnection of 
electronic communications networks and services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic 
communications  networks  and  services  -  Political  agreement’  (2008)  Available  at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17006.en08.pdf, 29th December 2008.
605 Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU,  
C(2009) 3359 final.
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an NRA to impose 'Bill and Keep' on operators, provided that the proposal passes the 
'Article 7 procedure'.606
Whereas one can always argue for the superiority of cost-based pricing against 'Bill 
and  Keep',607 the  legal  preference  for  cost-based  pricing  no longer  needs  such a 
justification, as the costing principle is already part of the law. One only needs to rely 
on  the  2002  regime  that  obviously  did  not  foresee  an  alternative  option,  which 
confirms the autopoietic nature of the law's image of interconnection pricing.608 The 
relatively closed nature of this image stems from the fact that the law has in the past 
decided to look at interconnection issues from the perspective of the 'calling party 
pays'  economic regime traditionally used among the operators of circuit-switched 
networks.
From the procedural  point  of view,  in  parallel  with the introduction of increased 
discretionary powers of the NRAs in the 2002 regime, consultations at the national 
and the EU level have been introduced, which confirms the trend towards increasing 
reliance on procedures that has been identified by Scott.609 Before passing a measure 
on  access  or  interconnection,  the  NRA  must  generally  conduct  a  public 
consultation.610  The  NRAs  must  publish  their  national  consultation  procedures, 
whereas Member States are to ensure the establishment of a single information point 
through  which  all  current  consultations  can  be  accessed.  The  results  of  the 
606 “With regard to access and interconnection referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure 
that the national regulatory authority is empowered to intervene at its own initiative where justified in  
order to secure the policy objectives of Article 8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), in 
accordance with the provisions of this Directive and the procedures referred to in Articles 6 and 7, 20 
and  21  of  Directive  2002/21/EC  (Framework  Directive).”  See  Article  5(3)  of  the  2009  Access 
Directive.
607 On internet ‘peering’ and ‘sender keeps’ regimes see e.g. Kariyawasam, R. in Walden, I., Angel, J., 
2001, p. 187 et seq.
608 See Article 13(1) of the Access Directive: “National regulatory authorities shall take into account 
the investment made by the operator and allow him a reasonable rate of return on adequate capital  
employed, taking into account the risks involved.” These factors are generally not considered in 'Bill 
and Keep' arrangements, because all revenue is collected on the retail side.
609 Scott, C.,1998, p. 244 and 248.
610 See in particular Article 6 of the Framework Directive: “…Member States shall ensure that where 
national  regulatory  authorities  intend  to  take  measures  in  accordance  with  this  Directive  or  the 
Specific Directives which have a significant impact on the relevant market, they give interested parties 
the opportunity to comment on the draft measure within a reasonable period.”
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consultation  procedure  are  made  publicly  available  by  the  relevant  NRA.611 In 
addition, there is an express requirement for a judicial review of NRA decisions.612 
These  requirements  serve  as  additional  procedural  safeguards  against  the  NRAs 
acting  arbitrarily.  Of  course,  one  should  bear  in  mind that  it  is  Article  6  of  the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Basic Liberties that already requires the 
right  to  judicial  review  whenever  civil  rights  and  obligations  are  in  question. 
Accordingly,  one  should  primarily  see  the  judicial  review obligation  of  Member 
States under the directive as re-iteration of the established principle in order to avoid 
doubt. Similarly, the requirement for public consultations is the manifestation of the 
general principle of transparency included in the  Treaty on the Functioning of the  
European Union.613 Therefore, while it has been important from the law's internal 
point  of  view  to  stress  said  principles  in  relation  to  more  flexible  regulatory 
provisions, the effect of their explicit enactment is obviously limited when it comes 
to actual external control over regulation.
Of course, arguments can be put forward as to the influence of public consultations 
on  the  actual  quality  of  regulation.  According  to  Baldwin  and  Cave,  public 
consultations are an important part of due process, ensuring equality, fairness and 
consistency  of  treatment  and,  accordingly,  'good'  regulation.614 One  should  note, 
though, that any inputs received during the public consultation procedures do not 
need to be taken account of in the final measure: there is simply a duty of the NRA to 
publish the results  of the consultation.615 Accordingly,  public consultations do not 
turn the law into an instrument of corporatist governance by various interest groups, 
but instead serve the law’s internal consistency function and attempt to legitimise the 
law’s  perception by other systems.  In this  respect,  it  should be noted that public 
consultation mechanisms also have a broader tradition in legal regulation, and have 
also for some time been part of the US administrative law rule-making,616 Therefore, 
611 Except in the case of confidential information in accordance with Community and national law on 
business confidentiality. Article 6 of the Framework Directive.
612  See Article 4 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
613 Article 15 (3): “… Each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are 
transparent ...”
614 Baldwin, R., Cave, M., 1999, p. 77-79.
615 Article 6 of the Framework Directive.
616 Harter, P. in: Seerden, R., 2002, p. 324.
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they should be viewed as the law's internal attempt of coupling with the environment. 
They are neither the ability of other social systems to directly influence the content 
of legal obligations, nor the only means of the law's coupling with the environment. 
For example, in Portugal the position as to mandating access to fibre has not changed 
from the phase of public consultation to the measure notified to the Commission.617 
Moreover, in its proposed Recommendation on NGA, the Commission came up with 
a  detailed  access  and  pricing  regulation  for  the  NGA618 at  the  EU  level  before 
receiving  any formal  inputs  from the  relevant  stakeholders.619 Based  on  specific 
details  in  the  latter  document,  such as  the  rules  for  pricing  of  ducts  or  the  risk 
premium for investment in infrastructure,620 one can assume that intensive couplings 
with the opinions of interest groups existed before the phase of public consultation. 
This can be explained both by the political role of the Commission and the fact that 
the latter is subject to constant and intensive lobbying, and by the multi-disciplinary 
knowledge  and  approach  of  the  people  involved  in  the  drafting  process.  In  this 
respect,  the  2002 Framework's  introduction  of  mandatory coupling  with  publicly 
expressed  opinions  of  interested  parties  is  only  one  of  the  means  of  the  law's 
coupling  with  the  environment.  Public  consultations  do,  however,  hold  a  special 
617 ANACOM  has  not  come  up  with  any  particular  plans  to  grant  access  to  dark  fibre  despite 
substitution  in  the  access  network.  See  documents  available  at  http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?
contentId=611898, 19th January 2009. Similarly, in the case of Ofcom consultations on VoIP (see the 
chapter on VoIP) the outcome of the proceedings was far from dependant on specific evidence sought, 
but rather on finding pragmatic solutions that could overcome the lack of detailed interpretation by the 
European Commission. The same is true for the FCC’s changing position on wholesale DSL (see the  
access and interconnection chapter).
618 See the first autumn 2008 draft of the ‘Commission Recommendation of on regulated access to 
Next Generation Access Networks (NGA)’ (2008) Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/nga/dr_recomm_ng
a.pdf , 25th June 2009, see Appendix. In addition, Annex II sets detailed rules on application of the 
principle of 'equivalence', i.e. that wholesale inputs including ordering procedures for self-supply must 
fully correspond to those intended for external supply: “In order to create a level playing field among 
entrants and the incumbent for the provision of NGA-based services, regulation should require the 
incumbent to provide access to its passive infrastructure under the same conditions, be it internally or 
externally. [...]”
619 ‘Commission launches public consultation on Next Generation Acccess Networks (NGA)’ (2008) 
Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/public_consult/nga/index_en.htm, 18th 
January 2009.
620 See ‘Draft Commission Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA)’ (2008) Available at
     
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/nga/dr_recomm_ng
a.pdf, 18th January 2009.
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position  within  the  law's  self-observation,  as  they  give  stakeholders  formally 
recognised equal rights of access to the decision-making mechanism.
The essentially internal development of EU law becomes even clearer if one views it 
from a longer time perspective. Whereas the shift from less to more legal discretion 
is obvious when comparing the 1997 and the 2002 regimes, one could easily claim 
that a reverse trend is present between the years 1995 and 1997. Indeed, the 1997 
Interconnection Directive specified detailed conditions as to interconnection at the 
EC level, whereas the 1995 directive only dealt with interconnection in one article, 
specifying  general  rules  for  interconnection  of  fixed  and  mobile  operators.621 
Nevertheless, the development between 1995 and 1997 must be viewed as an internal 
function of the legal (and political) programme already in place. The  90/387/EEC 
Directive already specified a  framework for  further  setting the rules  for  network 
access by declaring that “open network provision conditions [was to be] be defined 
in stages under the procedure set out hereafter”, whereby “the Council [was to] adopt 
specific Directives establishing open network provision conditions including a time 
schedule for implementing them”.622 Accordingly, the shift from the 1995 to the 1997 
regime was not a result of a specific technology or business change, but rather the 
fulfilment  of  a  legal  programme  (corresponding  to  political  decisions)  on 
liberalisation. Equally,  as demonstrated by the mechanical imposition of the same 
remedies  and  their  limits  described  above,  the  shift  in  2002  was  about  the  law 
creating its own internal image of increased flexibility in relation to the environment, 
rather than a flexible environment exercising its direct influence upon the law.
However, by means of the 2002 review, the law has also resorted to a highly complex 
internal mechanism for structural couplings with the economic system: competition 
law. Unlike the changes described above that dealt with partial aspects of the law's 
approach to  regulation,  the latter  provides  the law with a  thorough image of  the 
environment in the form of 'the markets'. It shall be submitted that, while this seems 
like a good recipe for the law to keep track of communications technologies applied 
in commercial practice, it is still the law's internal exercise with a chance of cyclical 
lock-in when, say efficiency would require a change in the regulatory approach.
621 Article 11 of the 95/62/EC Voice Telephony Directive, see Appendix.
622 See Article 4 (1) and 6 of Directive 90/387/EEC.
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5.3 Competition law as the law's immediate response
The  competition  law-based  approach  has  obviously  yielded  results  in  terms  of 
increased flexibility in response to the communications market developments. For 
example, unlike the 2000 EC Regulation on unbundling of the local loop, the 2002 
Framework no longer refers to legacy monopoly infrastructures, but instead instructs 
the NRAs to see applied technologies as 'markets'. This confirms Scott's finding that 
there is a shift towards more general norms in communications law.623 
Indeed,  one can  identify examples  where the  Commission,  acting under  the new 
Framework,  has  dealt  with  technological  developments  bearing  in  mind  the 
requirement  for  technological  neutrality,  resorting  to  the  principle  of  economic 
substitution in order to avoid the 'technological bias'. Following the 2007 revision, 
the market for 'metallic local loops' has been replaced with the market for 'physical 
access  infrastructure'.  In  the  Explanatory  Note  to  the  2007 Recommendation,  the 
Commission noted that metallic (copper) loops were increasingly being wholly or 
partly  substituted  by  fibre,624 indicating  that  substitution  should  be  reflected  in 
market definition 'irrespective of technology'. An explicit addition 'irrespective of the 
technology' has also been added in order to newly define the wholesale leased lines 
market,625 which  has,  beside  leased  lines  with  traditional  interfaces,  enabled  the 
inclusion of Ethernet lines as the core building blocks of IP-based NGN networks.
623 Scott, C., 1998, p. 244 et seq.
624 “Deployment  of  NGA access  networks raises  complex challenges on how to maintain a  'level 
playing field' for all competitors. Many incumbents are rolling out fibre to the street cabinet (FTTC)  
and  then  using  VDSL technology  over  the  copper  sub-loop  between  the  street  cabinet  and  the 
customer's premises. Other operators, where the network architecture does not support this model, are  
planning for fibre to the home (FTTH). Some NG access models will result in a completely different 
local network architecture, where the intermediate node at the level of the 'central office' or 'main 
distribution frame' will eventually cease to exist.” Commission Staff Working Document, Explanatory  
Note, Accompanying document to the Commission Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service  
Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance  
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory  
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Second edition), SEC(2007) 1483/2,  
p. 16.
625 See Annex to the 2007 Recommendation on Relevant Markets.
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A move from ex ante regulation towards general competition law in connection with 
new technologies has been on the agenda since the start of the reform of the old ONP 
framework.626 Moreover, the principle of the subsidiarity of  ex ante regulation has 
been included in the 2002 Framework itself.627 The criterion of the insufficiency of 
competition law is also one of the three criteria the Commission uses to define the 
markets  susceptible  to  ex  ante regulation.628 In  addition,  as  far  as  market  and 
competition  analysis  is  concerned,  the  2002 Framework  is  based  on Community 
competition law criteria.629 As Jones and Carlin point out, there is now a clear scope 
for overlap and many points of interaction between the two bodies of law.630 In the 
US, de-regulatory debates have also focused on the move from ex ante sectoral rules 
towards  ex post  antitrust regulation: Shelanski argues that such a shift is necessary, 
but should not necessarily make obsolete specific rules on non-economic objectives 
such as  emergency calls,  or  specific  interconnection  rules  as  to  the  exchange of 
traffic.631 The shift is not supposed to be linked only to the emergence of effective 
competition,632 but  also to  the dynamics  of  internet-related markets that  could be 
constrained by inappropriate regulation.633
It is argued that in the co-evolutionary process social systems can only come up with 
communications  (statements)  in  their  own  code.  Therefore,  as  a  response  to 
competition  problems in the society, the legal system is likely to offer competition 
626 See Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology  
sectors, and the implications for regulation,  COM(97)623, IV.1: “A further key issue is the balance 
between competition rules and sector-specific regulation, with many arguing for a preference to be 
given to the application of competition rules to individual cases within a converged environment, 
rather than the further development of extensive regulation.”
627 See Recital  27 of the  Framework Directive:  “It  is  essential  that  ex ante regulatory obligations 
should only be imposed where there is not effective competition, i.e. in markets where there are one or  
more undertakings with significant market power, and where national and Community competition 
law remedies are not sufficient to address the problem.”
628 See Recital 9 of the initial Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product  
and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in  
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common  
regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services 2003/11/EC: “…The third 
criterion  is  that  application  of  competition  law  alone  would  not  adequately  address  the  market 
failure(s) concerned.”
629 See Recital 27 of the Framework Directive.
630 Jones, K., Carlin, F. in: Scherer, J., 2005, p. 100.
631 Shelanski, H. A., 2007, p. 99.
632 Kahn, A. E., 2006-2007, p. 160-161.
633 Shelanski, H. A., 2007, p. 103.
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law, and such a shift should not come as a surprise. One can therefore agree with 
Kahn, who analyses the US de-regulatory debates: according to him, the idea of the 
'shift'  is  a  truism, as competition law is  the regulating law that  remains  if  direct 
economic regulation is removed.634 This is also consistent with Maher's finding that 
competition law should be seen as another form of regulating law.635
However, one should first verify empirically whether there actually is a shift. Based 
on the proliferation of ex ante rules discussed in the institutional context above, it is 
argued that there it is unlikely that there will be a shift whereby all ex ante regulation 
would be progressively removed and replaced with competition law. In this respect, 
the shift looks more like a political programme that cannot directly affect the law.
The relationship between competition law and ex ante regulation is generally not an 
exclusionary one. As European practice in competition law shows, the Commission 
is  allowed to use competition law remedies despite  regulatory remedies  being in 
place, whereas in such cases competition law remedies finally prevail over NRA-set 
remedies.636 However,  this  does  not  entirely  explain  why,  according  to  the 
Framework Directive, ex ante remedies “should only be imposed where […] national 
and  Community  competition  law  remedies  are  not  sufficient  to  address  the 
problem.”637 In this respect, one should bear in mind that the temporary character of 
regulation has been programmed within the legal system itself. Notwithstanding part 
of  the economic theory supporting such an approach to  regulation,638 EU law on 
634 Kahn, A. E., 2006-2007, p. 165.
635 Maher, I. in: Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., 2004, p. 187-188.
636 See Deutsche Telekom v. the Commission, T-271/03, 10 April 2008: “In that respect, it must be 
borne in mind at the outset that the fact that the applicant’s charges had to be approved by RegTP does 
not absolve it from responsibility under Article 82 EC […] The fact remains that RegTP’s decisions do 
not include any reference to Article 82 EC (see paragraph 114 above). In addition, RegTP’s statement 
that ‘[c]ompetitors are not so prejudiced with regard to their competitive opportunities in the local 
network by the slight  difference  between retail  and  wholesale  prices  as  to  make it  economically 
impossible for them to enter the market successfully or even to remain in the market’ […] does not  
imply that the applicant’s pricing practices do not distort competition within the meaning of Article  
82 EC.  On  the  contrary,  it  follows  implicitly  but  necessarily  from  RegTP’s  decisions  that  the 
applicant’s pricing practices have an anti-competitive effect, since the applicant’s competitors have to 
resort to cross-subsidisation in order to be able to remain competitive on the market in access services 
[…] In those circumstances, RegTP’s decisions could not have created for the applicant a legitimate 
expectation that its pricing practices were compatible with Article 82 EC.”
637 Recital 27 of the Framework Directive.
638 See  e.g.  ‘Regulation of  British Telecommunications'  Profitability’ (1983)  Report  by Professor 
Stephen C Littlechild to the Secretary of State for Industry, London, HMSO, para. 4.11.
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electronic  communications  regulation  has  as  such  been  programmed  for  regular 
reviews in the light of technological and market developments,  including its own 
potential 'sunset' in practice.639
But  what  arsenal  does  autopoietic  law  possess  to  address  competition  problems 
otherwise  addressed  by  sectoral  regulation?  European  competition  law  has  been 
present for decades,640 so it is the most natural solution to resort to its general rules 
should ex ante controls be removed. Accordingly, due to the autopoiesis of law, the 
political decision to remove ex ante regulation and the corresponding legal decision 
that there is no ground to apply it in itself means that the law will be able to continue 
looking at a certain problem through the sensors of general competition law. In order 
to achieve this goal, it is not even necessary to choose competition law as the ‘light  
intervention’ approach.641
Evolution  in  the  sense  of  the  removal  of  ex  ante regulation  would  therefore 
automatically result in the law responding to competition problems only by means of 
general  competition  law.  An  explicit  political  decision  on  that  is  therefore 
unnecessary; autopoietic law will continue to apply general competition rules in the 
area of electronic communications. However, absent the ex ante remedies available, 
the law may realise by means of a mechanism of self-observation that it does not 
possess other means to address the detected competition problems. This may finally 
result in a more systematic application of general competition rules to the electronic 
communications sector. To put it differently, competition authorities may realise that 
there are no  ex ante  regulators who would be more efficient in (or more keen on) 
addressing  competition  issues  they  run  into.  So  far,  competition  litigation  in 
telecommunications has not proven to be sufficient to generally change the behaviour 
of telecommunication incumbent operators.642
639 See Article 22 of the 1997 Interconnection Directive and Recital 39 of the Framework Directive.
640 Competition law provisions have already been part of the original 1957 EEC Treaty.
641 See e.g. Nihoul, P., Rodford, P., 2004, p. 273.
642 In New Zealand, the liberalisation in the absence of ex ante remedies resulted in lengthy court  
litigation. See  Walden, I. in: Walden, I., Angel, J., 2001, p. 11-12. See also Telecom Corporation of 
New Zealand Ltd v. Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385.
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Moreover,  general  competition  law interventions  in  Europe are still  an exception 
when  compared  to  the  number  of  regular  ex  ante decisions  on  remedies  on  the 
markets susceptible to ex ante regulation.643 One should therefore primarily recognise 
that a real ‘shift’ from ex ante regulation to competition law cannot be decided solely 
at  the  political  level,644 as  the  political  system  cannot  directly  control  the  legal 
system. Legally binding rules for regulators would need to be in place in order to 
actually make it happen in the legal proceedings, and these provisions would require 
an explicit lifting of ex ante regulation in the desired areas, for example by means of 
the  Commission  Recommendation  on  relevant  markets  susceptible  for  ex  ante  
regulation. Except  in  some  specific  markets645 where  the  Commission  actually 
prevented the NRAs from regulating ex  ante by means of  its  veto powers,  there 
remains a huge amount of ex ante remedies still existing in Europe today. This shows 
that the law does not reflect the political agenda of de-regulation by means of a shift 
towards competition law.  There is hardly evidence of a real shift in terms of general 
competition law application in communications markets.
Notwithstanding the stability of these internal legal developments, one can observe 
an increased degree of complexity in the environment the law seeks to regulate. For 
example, previous telephony offers are being progressively replaced by triple-play 
offers, including services such as internet and television that were not part of the 
traditional telecommunications regulatory regimes focusing on Universal Service and 
interconnection. The law will respond to such a higher degree of complexity of the 
environment by attempting to reduce it to its own code, which may not be possible if 
pre-programmed  images  of  a  simpler  environment  exist.  In  case  of  triple-  or 
quadruple-play offers now widely available in the retail market, EU law, due to the 
643 See registered notifications of measures by Member States' NRAs available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/article_7/index_e
n.htm, 12th May 2008, compared to the overview of telecommunications competition cases handled by 
DG Competition available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/telecommunications/overview_en.htmlh, 22nd August 
2008.
644 See e.g. Green paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information  
technology sectors, and the implications for regulation, COM(97)623, IV.1. Similarly, one should bear 
in mind the political motivation to act that was behind the inclusion of the fair trading condition into 
the BT licence despite criticisms as to the condition’s legal relevance. Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 
2000, p. 153 et seq.
645 Recently, for example, the Commission prevented the Polish NRA UKE from the ex ante regulation 
of the wholesale IP traffic market.
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subsidiarity of ex ante regulation of retail markets, is not likely to be able to impose 
specific ex ante remedies:646 controls of basic voice telephony services were able to 
rely on the legacy of POTS regulation, whereas a complicated wholesale and retail 
markets  analysis  would  be  required  in  the  case  of  more  complex  services.647 
However, some multi-play offers by dominant players could easily be classified as 
abuses of dominant position under general competition law, e.g. due to predatory 
pricing. Accordingly, in the absence of new  ex ante regulation the law is likely to 
resort to competition rules.
However, even if the competition law approach is used, the law as an autopoietic 
system  will  always  invent  its  own  image  of  the  economic  theory  supporting 
intervention648 in order to make its interventions ‘legal’. While competition law has 
traditionally  been  more  cognitively  open  towards  economy,  sector-specific 
telecommunications law has only recently become open enough to be able to absorb 
new economic models on a regular basis. For example, in Deutsche Telekom v. the 
Commission, the Court of First Instance was entitled to follow the Commission in its 
interpretation  of  margin  squeeze  in  relation  to  the  mixture  of  narrowband  and 
broadband  retail  services  when  applying  general  rules  of  Article  82  of  the  EC 
Treaty.649 The old ONP framework contained no ground to address margin squeeze in 
complex  relationships  between  wholesale  and  retail  services,  whereas  the  2002 
Framework now enables margin squeeze evaluation if carefully designed remedies 
had  been  previously  put  in  place  as  a  result  of  market  analysis.650 Of  course, 
borrowing more and more concepts of ex ante regulation from competition law (and 
not  from the  market)  seems  like  a  Sisyphean  task  that  makes  one  re-think  the 
646 See Article 17 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive, see Appendix. Currently, no regulation of 
broadband multi-play retail services is present in the EU.
647 See ibidem. In addition, the NRA attempting this type of regulation would have to persuade the 
Commission in 'Article 7 proceedings'.
648 Teubner, G., 1993, p. 79.
649 Deutsche Telekom v. the Commission, T-271/03, 10 April 2008: “… In those circumstances, the 
Commission was entitled to take the view in the contested decision (recital  111) that, in order to  
calculate the margin squeeze,  the price of  wholesale access  had to be compared to the weighted 
average  of  retail  prices for  all  access  services,  namely  analogue  narrowband  access,  digital 
narrowband access (ISDN) and broadband access in the form of ADSL services …”
650 See e.g. ‘ERG Report on the Discussion on the application of margin squeeze tests to bundles, ERG 
(09) 07, March 2009’ (2009) Available at 
http://erg.ec.europa.eu/doc/publications/2009/erg_09_07_report_on_the_discussion_of_the_applicatio
n_of_margin_squeeze_tests_to_bundles.pdf , 24th October 2009.
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relevance of ex ante regulation. Even in continental Europe, competition law is based 
on a huge body of judge-made case-law, which seems to be creating a much fuller 
legal image of the market situation. EU competition rules, which are based on the 
Treaty of Rome, have also served as a vehicle of harmonisation of Member State 
competition  laws  and  are  unlikely  to  change  politically  overnight.  In  addition, 
competition law has developed its own well-established images of phenomena, such 
as margin squeeze or predatory pricing that have been defined by case-law651 and that 
do  not  need to  be  legally  re-invented  each  time  by means  of  coupling  with  the 
economic science.
However, while competition law possesses the ability to construct legal images of the 
markets that can couple well  with  economic analysis,  one can hardly applaud its 
economic efficiency (in  terms  of  speed  and  flexibility)  when  it  comes  to  curing 
market defects. This has been demonstrated by the Commission’s ruling in Wanadoo 
España v. Telefónica652 as to broadband pricing. First, the Commission had to rely on 
the fact that Telefonica was regulated under ex ante law in order to avoid the strict 
criteria for access to essential facilities set by the Oscar Bronner case.653 Second, the 
Commission decision in Telefonica had only been issued in April 2007, but referred 
to the period from 15 April 1988 to 11 May 2004. Compared to ex ante remedies, this 
is not the speed of proceedings that could be considered close to being synchronised 
in  time  with  the  pace  of  technological  and  business  developments  or  even,  for 
example, the business plans of companies wanting to invest and enter the market.654
Nevertheless,  as  noted  earlier,  calls  for  transition  from  ex  ante regulation  to 
competition law are being made equally both the US and in Europe.655 These calls 
651 See e.g.  Deutsche Telekom v. the Commission, T-271/03, 10 April 2008.
652 Case COMP/38.784.
653 See Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, C-7/97.
654 Luhmann  warns  that  systems  grow older  together  in  the  same  time  frame  without  having  to 
measure time, and in this sense they age  analogously.  On the other hand, they measure their own 
temporal  context  digitally  and  correspondingly  quickly  or  slowly.  Accordingly,  there  can  be  no 
guarantee about time synchronisation and it can easily also be the case with competition law and 
business practice. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 382.
655 See Kahn, A. E., 2006-2007, p. 186 et seq. Interestingly, the position of US general competition 
law is quite different when it comes to the essential questions in the telecoms industry, such as the  
requirement for consumer harm in predation cases, which suggests that the 'transatlantic' idea of the 
need for a 'shift' is more ideological than legal substance-related. See e.g. Melicias, M. J., 2009.
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reject the current and potentially new forms of regulation656 and promote sticking to 
the antitrust law as some kind of a ‘natural state’ of the market. As demonstrated in 
Europe by the Telefónica case,657 US competition law has also not been sufficiently 
expanded to potentially cover the scope of the present  ex ante regulation under the 
1996 Act. In the Trinko case,658 the US Supreme Court held that there was no remedy 
for breaches of telecommunications access rules under the general competition law. 
This deficit  is  also noted by the proponents of the 'shift'  to  ex post  regulation,659 
which suggests a contradictory and even ideological  attitude towards competition 
law: as soon as one calls it ex post intervention, it sounds de-regulatory compared to 
ex ante measures, regardless of content. Indeed, Shelanski does quote an example of 
successful ex post intervention of the FCC in 2005 as to anti-competitive interference 
with the transmission between a telephone company's customers and the customers 
of  the  VoIP  provider  Vonage.660 However,  he  does  not  explain  how  this  case 
fundamentally differs from ex ante regulation, since it involves a specialised sectoral 
regulator  with  the  powers  to  apply  sector-specific  rules  with  a  high  degree  of 
discretion. In this context, one should not be surprised by Larouche's finding that 
European Commission policy documents for the application of competition law in 
telecommunications sector have less solid basis in previously decided cases,661 which 
makes them look more interventionist  and therefore similar to  ex ante regulatory 
rules. 
To  conclude,  systems  theory  can  explain  how  competition  law  concepts  are 
'transplanted'662 as  obvious  solutions  for  lawyers  when  it  comes  to  the  issues  of 
market definition and market power. In addition, competition law concepts couple 
well  with  economic  analysis,  which  can  help  the  law play  a  trick  on  economy, 
persuading  it  that  it  is  some kind  of   'law of  the  economy'.  While  this  may be 
especially appealing to anti-interventionist neo-classical politicians and economists, 
656 E. g. net neutrality. Kahn, A. E., 2006-2007, p. 188.
657 Case COMP/38.784.
658 Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
659 Shelanski, H. A., 2007, p. 101.
660 In re Madison River Commc'ns, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). Shelanski, H. A.2007, p. 104.
661 Larouche, P., 2000, p. 128.
662 See Watson, A., 1993, p. 95.
153
it  is  dangerous  to  mistake  this  coupling  with  economic  science  for  the  actual 
efficiency  of  competition  law  intervention  as  such.  This  essentially  wrong 
philosophy can result in a (highly inefficient) abuse of power by dominant players 
and a lack of rapid  ex ante intervention when the latter may actually be necessary. 
This issue shall be dealt with in the context of local access regulation.
However,  in  2002,  a  shift  to  ('transplanted'  ex  post)  competition  law  concepts 
actually occurred in  ex ante regulation, whereby the coupling of the law with the 
political  system  enabled  extensive  legislative  changes.   In  particular,  market 
definitions  were  based  on  general  competition  law,  using  the  SSNIP  test  for 
substitution.663 Moreover, a new concept of significant market power was introduced, 
which corresponded to the standard of dominance.664 The concept of joint dominance 
has also been introduced to  ex ante  regulation. In addition, the border of  ex ante 
regulation has been established on the basis of the Commission-set 'three criteria' 
test, which includes the criterion of “insufficiency of competition law”.665
Though  these  are  all  autonomous  developments  of  the  law,  they  are  largely  a 
reflexive response to the increased complexity of the economy and technology of 
communications.  Whereas  interconnection  for  the  purposes  of  exchanging  TDM 
voice traffic has been traditionally considered a “cornerstone of competition”666, an 
increasing number of important competition issues have emerged in relation to high-
speed internet. Local infrastructure unbundling, bitstream access, IP interconnection, 
and access to fibre can more easily and quickly be addressed if there is regulatory 
flexibility  that  allows  for  the  regulation  of  new relevant  markets.  However,  one 
should  not  mistakenly  conclude  that  this  flexibility  is  due  to  the  law’s  need  to 
increase the  efficiency of regulation. Instead, one can show that the new and more 
flexible system is a response to the complexity of the economic and technological 
663 See e.g. Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power  
under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services. 11  
July 2002, 2002/C, OJ 165/03.
664  See e.g. Whish, R. , 2009, p. 25 et seq.
665 See  Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC  on relevant product and service markets within  
the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive  
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for  
electronic communications networks and services.
666 Melody W. H. in: Melody, W. H., 1997, p. 53-56.
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environment.  In  order  to  promote  itself  in  this  new  environment  by  means  of 
juridifying  it,  the  law had to  offer  its  most  flexible  solutions.  It  remains  for  the 
judgment of the economists to evaluate whether such flexible regulation has proven 
to be efficient in specific cases.
When  dealing  with  the  complexity  and  rapid  change  of  the  environment  that  is 
demonstrated by the shift to IP-based networks and convergent services, the law will, 
by means of observation of the environment and self-observation, discover that its 
rigid  concepts  cannot  be  applied  to  certain  new  phenomena.  Furthermore,  the 
lawyers will, by studying possible replacements for phenomena in the environment, 
such as convergence, discover that the development of alternative abstract concepts 
in ex ante regulation that would be capable of tackling new competition problems is 
becoming increasingly difficult, due to pace of technological and business changes. 
Accordingly, the application of general competition law-based rules and principles 
that apply to all  activities that can be deemed ‘economic’ is  the most immediate 
universal reaction the law can provide to be able to 'fix' ex ante regulation under the 
conditions of rapid changes in the environment.667
Again,  in  case  of  the  application  of  competition  law-based  concepts  in  ex  ante  
regulation, one can also mistake their autopoietic flexibility and potential reflexivity 
to the market situation for the ability of the law to actually remedy market failures. 
The resort to general competition rules is primarily a re-statement of the EU law's 
well-established  'sticky'  principles.  It  does  not  mean  that  the  law  has  become 
'economic', and can therefore directly and efficiently address all competition issues. 
However, as the case of local access regulation to be presented below shows, it is not 
the  lack  of  sensors  for  economic  issues,  but  rather  the  autopoietic  idea  of  the 
'inevitable'  development towards effectively competitive markets that may prevent 
the law from finding efficient long-term regulatory solutions.
667 EC competition law applies to any 'undertaking', which means any entity engaged in an economic 
activity. See e.g. Hoefner and Elser v. Macroton GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979. In addition, competition 
law with its long tradition may actually be more likely to yield effects in the economic system, which  
is, though regularly coupled with law, primarily based on property and not on legal rules. Deakin, S.,  
2002,  p.  39-40.  One  can,  however,  presume that  the  prohibition  of  cartels  and  of  the  abuse  of 
dominant position that have resulted in severe monetary and structural sanctions in the past are more 
likely  to  be  part  of  the  economic  system’s  internal  regulation  than,  say  detailed  rules  on  VoIP 
interconnection.
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5.4 De-regulatory lock-in and politicisation of NGA 
regulation
Local access regulation has been introduced to the EU law by means of the 2000 
Regulation  on  unbundled  access  to  the  local  loop adopted  by  the  European 
Parliament  and the  Council  of  Ministers.  However,  already in  2002,  it  has  been 
merged with the general concept of ex ante regulation of selected relevant markets. 
Accordingly, the coupling of law with political programme to dismantle the legacy of 
local access monopolies has been replaced by the coupling with economic analysis: 
the law was no longer supposed to regulate a historical bottleneck, but rather just 
another relevant market that was not yet effectively competitive. This may sound like 
a good starting point for  efficient regulation: the market will only be regulated as 
long as it is necessary, which prevents inefficient over-regulation. However, while 
coupling with economic analysis takes place at the time when the decision whether to 
regulate or not is made, the idea that remedies should only be in place for a strictly 
limited period of time until effective competition emerges creates an understanding 
of the economy, within law, which assumes that communications markets as a rule 
develop towards effective competition. This may prevent or obstruct the imposition 
of long-term regulatory solutions, where the latter prove to be necessary in order to 
ensure economically efficient use of facilities, say by means of equivalent access. 
Such a built-in self-destruction mechanism of ex ante regulatory law has created an 
autopoietic lock-in, whereby the law no longer seeks permanent solutions for sharing 
the legacy infrastructures,668 but  rather temporary solutions until  “the competition 
arrives”,669 no matter how unrealistic this might be when it comes to trenching and 
pulling multiple cables to cover essentially all homes and business premises by a 
parallel, brand new network.670
668 See  Recital  1  o  f  the  2002  Framework  Directive:  “The  current  regulatory  framework  for 
telecommunications  has  been  successful  in  creating  the  conditions  for  effective  competition  in  the 
telecommunications sector during the transition from monopoly to full competition.” This view has been 
enhanced in Article 8 of the 2009  Framework Directive:  “imposing ex-ante regulatory obligations only 
where there is no effective and sustainable competition and relaxing or lifting such obligations as soon as 
that condition is fulfilled.”
669 Compare ‘Regulation of  British Telecommunications'  Profitability’ (1983)  Report  by Professor 
Stephen C Littlechild to the Secretary of State for Industry, London, HMSO.
670 This has been demonstrated by the practical experience of the UK duopoly regulation, which never 
resulted in full duplication of access networks by the second market entrant.
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More importantly, while the use of competition law principles generally results in 
copper and fibre access infrastructures being part of the same 'relevant market',671 
broad discretion enjoyed by the NRAs in respect of choosing the remedies means 
that the political system can rather easily couple with legal regulation, protecting the 
investments of the national incumbent operators by imposing weaker remedies in 
respect of fibre unbundling.672 While this can be perceived as a deficiency of the law 
from the perspective of the economic system, it does not stem from the law's own 
unawareness  of  the permanent  infrastructure  bottleneck problem: competition law 
has developed the concept of 'essential facilities', which does couple with economic 
analysis.673  Instead, it stems from the problem of the law being over-politicised, i.e. 
captured by the political system in order to serve the interests of the latter,674  either at 
671 See Market 4 of the ‘Recommendation on relevant markets and e.g. Case FI/2008/0839: Wholesale 
(physical)  network  infrastructure access  (including  shared  or  fully  unbundled  access)  at  a  fixed 
location in Finland, Comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC’ (2008) Available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?
l=/suomifinland/registeredsnotifications/fi20080839_1/fi-2008-0839_enpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d,  21st 
January 2009.
672 See ‘Case PT/2008/0850: Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or 
fully  unbundled access)  at  a  fixed  location;  Case  PT/2008/0851:  Wholesale  broadband  access; 
Comments  pursuant  to  Article  7(3)  of  Directive  2002/21/EC1’  (2009)  Available  at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/portugal/registeredsnotifications/pt20080850-
851/pt-2008-0850-0851/_EN_1.0_&a=d, 21st January 2009.
673 See Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, C-7/97, at 45: “It should be emphasised in that respect that, in 
order to demonstrate that the creation of such a system is not a realistic potential alternative and that 
access  to  the  existing  system is  therefore  indispensable,  it  is  not  enough  to  argue  that  it  is  not  
economically viable by reason of the small circulation of the daily newspaper or newspapers to be  
distributed. For such access to be capable of being regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary at 
the very least to establish, as the Advocate General has pointed out at point 68 of his Opinion, that it is 
not  economically  viable  to  create  a  second  home-delivery  scheme  for  the  distribution  of  daily 
newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the daily newspapers distributed by the existing  
scheme.”
674 Over-socialization  stands  at  one  end  of  the  Teubner’s  ‘regulatory  trilemma’,  which  explains 
regulatory failures as a relationship between the law and the environment, in this case the political  
system. Teubner, G., 1988, p. 311.According to the trilemma, there are three ways legal regulation can 
fail:
• the  regulated  system reacts  by not  reacting,  i.e.  the  law creates  no change  in  behaviour 
outside its  own operations.  For example,  market  liberalisation legislation may be enacted but the 
regulator does not act and the incumbent operator does not respect it;
• over-legalization of society, i.e. the law influences the regulated system so strongly that self-
reproduction  of  the  latter  is  endangered.  Inhibiting  investment  by  means  of  over-regulation  or 
uncertainty as to access obligations is a typical example;
• over-socialization of law, i.e. the law is captured by politics or the regulated subsystem, say 
economy, and is ‘politicized’ or ‘economized’. For example, as Luhmann warns, law may not be able 
to develop its own doctrine due to constant changes in legislative framework and the burden of results  
expected from the politics. Luhmann, N. in Teubner, G.-ed., 1988, Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare  
State, Gruyter, New York, Berlin, p. 124-5.
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the phase of regulatory decision-making,675 or possibly at the level of the legislative 
process.676
Before dealing with specific issues of NGA networks regulation, one should look at 
the underlying rules of the  EU Regulatory Framework that enable or prevent the 
regulation of NGAs. Three sets of rules exist in parallel:
• the  rules  on  defining  and  analysing  the  relevant  markets  and  setting  the 
regulatory remedies;
• the rules on symmetric access regulation; and
• general principles of regulatory activity.677
As indicated above, access to local access networks has first been mandated under 
the  2000  EC Regulation  on unbundled access  to  the local  loop and later  by the 
regulatory measures issued on the basis of the 2003  Recommendation on relevant  
markets, which implied the continuity of wholesale access to the copper (metallic) 
local loops. In 2007 access networks were defined by the European Commission in a 
technology-neutral fashion, i.e. without regard to the type of physical infrastructure 
used.678 The  broader  definition  of  'physical  access  infrastructure'  provides  for  an 
easier inclusion into the regulated market of NGAs, i.e. networks based wholly or 
partly on fibre. Should an operator have the SMP status on this market, the NRAs are 
empowered  to  impose  on  said  operator  various  obligations,  including  access  to 
facilities,  non-discrimination,  transparency  and  certain  pricing  rules,  which  can 
include access remedies to the SMP operator's NGA.679
675 See politically pragmatic exclusion of fibre unbundling from the remedies in ‘Case PT/2008/0850: 
Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a  
fixed location; Case PT/2008/0851: Wholesale broadband access; Comments pursuant to Article 7(3) 
of  Directive  2002/21/EC1’ (2009)  Available  at  http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?
l=/portugal/registeredsnotifications/pt20080850-851/pt-2008-0850-0851/_EN_1.0_&a=d, 21st January 
2009.
676 In addition to the ideas of the MEPs expressed in the 'Trautmann Report', an extreme example from 
the  communications  law are  the  German  'regulatory  holidays',  whereby mandate  is  given  to  the 
regulator not to regulate certain new access technologies even though the requirements of the EU 
Framework have been met.§ 9a of the German TKG 2004, see Appendix.
677 See the 2002 Framework Directive.
678 See Annex to the 2007 Recommendation on Relevant Markets.
679 See Article 8 of the 2002 Access Directive.
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In addition, access to local access networks can also be mandated as a remedy to 
non-SMP operators,  provided that certain criteria are met:  Article 12 of the 2002 
Framework  Directive deals  with  co-location  and  facility  sharing,  stating  that,  in 
particular where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives because of 
the need to protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town 
and  country  planning  objectives,  Member  States  could  impose  the  sharing  of 
facilities or property (including physical co-location) on an undertaking operating an 
electronic communications network or take measures to facilitate the coordination of 
public works only after an appropriate period of public consultation, during which all 
interested  parties  must  be  given  the  opportunity  to  express  their  views680.  Such 
sharing or coordination arrangements could include rules for apportioning the costs 
of facility or property sharing. This type of remedy can act as a symmetrical remedy, 
i.e. can be applicable to both SMP and non-SMP operators, either simultaneously or 
unilaterally. In 2008 a political agreement was reached to broaden the potential for 
imposing this obligation at the EU level. Article 12 (1) of the Framework Directive 
has  been  amended  accordingly:  “Where  an  undertaking  providing  electronic 
communications networks has the right under national legislation to install facilities 
on, over or under public or private property, or may take advantage of a procedure 
for the expropriation or use of property, national regulatory authorities shall, taking 
full account of the principle of proportionality, be able to impose the sharing of such 
facilities or property, including buildings, entries to buildings, building wiring, masts, 
antennae,  towers  and  other  supporting  constructions,  ducts,  conduits,  manholes, 
cabinets.”681 . Although this power of the NRAs still requires an appropriate public 
procedure,  it  comes closer to the general rule of the US  Telecommunications Act 
1996,  which  imposes  access  on  all  'utilities',  which  includes  local  incumbent 
operators,  to  network  elements  such  as  ducts,  conduits  and  poles  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis.682
As to the third set of rules, they refer to the general regulatory policy goals and can 
be  found  in  the  general  guidelines  to  the  NRAs.  Article  8(2)(c)  of  the  2002 
Framework  Directive explicitly  states  that  NRAs  shall  encourage  efficient 
680 See Article 12 of the 2002 Framework Directive.
681 Article 12 (1) of the 2009 Framework Directive.
682 Lee, K.; Prime, J. in: Walden, I.; Angel, J., 2005, p. 543-4.
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investment in infrastructure. However, this goal only comes in as part of the general 
function of NRAs to promote competition. Accordingly, the 2002 Framework does 
not  encourage  infrastructure  investment  that  would  hinder  or  distort  competition. 
However,  there  has  been  a  change  in  the  2008  political  agreement  on  the  new 
Framework Directive, whereby ‘investment risk’ has appeared as a specific category, 
suggesting that it can be used as a reason not to impose access or cost accounting 
obligations.683  These changes indicate a shift from a general pro-competitive policy 
to a more pragmatic approach in favour of incumbent operators. However, they do 
not change the general principle of setting the remedies based on (economic) market 
analysis.
Two  main  observations  can  be  made  about  the  current  EU  Framework  and  the 
transition  to  NGA.  First,  unlike  the  old  ONP  Framework,  where  local  loop 
unbundling  was  a  clear  policy  decision  legally  implemented  by  a  Community 
Regulation,  neither the 2002 Framework nor its  2007 – 2009 reform contained a 
comparable general decision on NGA. Instead, the 2002 Framework treats access to 
local infrastructure as one of the markets that may or may not be susceptible for ex 
ante regulation,  disregarding  the  legacy  element  that  was  present  in  the  2000 
Regulation.684 The later document explicitly referred to former monopoly operators 
who “rolled out their metallic local access infrastructures over significant periods of 
time protected by exclusive rights and were able to fund investment costs through 
monopoly rents,”685 while expressly excluding “new loops with high capacity optical 
683 Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament  and of  the Council  amending Directives  
2002/21/EC  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and  
services, 2002/19/EC on access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks and  
services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services -  
Political agreement, Article 8 (4a): “The national regulatory authorities shall, in pursuit of the policy 
objectives referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, apply objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
proportionate  regulatory  principles  by  inter  alia:  […]  (d)  promoting  efficient  investment  and 
innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures including by taking into account investment risks.” 
See  the  final  version  of  Article  8(5d)  of  the  2009  Framework  Directive:  “promoting  efficient 
investment and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by ensuring that any access 
obligation  takes  appropriate  account  of  the  risk  incurred  by  the  investing  undertakings  and  by 
permitting various cooperative arrangements between investors and parties seeking access to diversify 
the  risk  of  investment,  whilst  ensuring  that  competition  in  the  market  and  the  principle  of  non  
discrimination are preserved.”
684 See Recital 6 of the 2000  Regulation on unbundled access to the local loop: “It would not be 
economically viable for new entrants to duplicate the incumbent's metallic local access infrastructure  
in its entirety within a reasonable time.”
685 See ibidem, Recital 3.
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fibre  directly  to  major  users”  as  a  specific  market  that  is  developing  under 
competitive conditions.686 Second, a policy decision as to unbundled access to NGAs 
would  not  even be  possible  at  the  level  of  the  2002 Framework,687 because  this 
framework sees itself  as a  transitory regime to a world where ex ante regulation 
would no longer be necessary and  ex post competition law would suffice to solve 
market problems.688 
Despite taking note of the economic conditions in the 2000 Regulation recitals,689 one 
should recognise that this idea of transition is the legal framework's own construction 
of  the  environment.  Accordingly,  despite  economic  arguments  in  its  favour,  the 
premise that ex ante regulation could be removed in the future is internal to the legal 
system that  keeps  checking  by  means  of  market  analyses  if  full  competition  is 
already there.690 Recital 27 of the 2002 Framework Directive states that  it is essential 
that  ex  ante  regulatory  obligations  should  only  be  imposed  where  there  is  not 
effective competition, i.e. in markets where there are one or more undertakings with 
significant  market  power,  and  where  national  and  Community  competition  law 
remedies are not sufficient to address the problem. The same Recital further refers to 
regular  testing  of  ‘durability’ of  the  lack  of  effective  competition  in  a  ‘rapidly 
developing market’. It is therefore the law's internal assumption, coupled with the 
political programme from 2002, that the market is progressively ‘evolving’ towards 
effective competition and that the legal procedure should primarily be about the pace 
of this development. As also noted by Walden, one of the main objectives of  the 
2002  regime  was  to  move  from  ex  ante regulatory  intervention  towards  ex  post 
reactive  regulation,  whereby  traditional  market  mechanisms  would  control  anti-
competitive practices,  with competition law rules operating as a backstop against 
abusive situations.691 The Framework therefore sees the ‘choice’ for customers as a 
686 See ibidem, Recital 5.
687 Including its 2009 revision, which left the main principles of imposing remedies essentially the 
same.
688 See Recital 25 of the 2002 Framework Directive: “There is a need for ex ante obligations in certain 
circumstances in order to ensure the development of a competitive market.”
689 See above.
690 See Article 16 (1) of the 2002 Framework Directive: “As soon as possible after the adoption of the 
recommendation or any updating thereof, national regulatory authorities shall carry out an analysis of 
the relevant markets ...”
691 Walden, I. in: Walden, I., Angel, J., 2005, p. 148.
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‘natural’ market condition on all  markets for electronic communications networks 
and services, and only allows intervention following a strictly prescribed procedure 
that has shown the choice to be impaired.692 This is in line with the Commission’s 
expectations that the Framework will  roll  back  ex ante regulation as competition 
becomes  effective.693 This  self-destruction  mechanism of  the  NRF is  not  only  a 
general principle, but is actually applied in the Commission legal practice: the 2007 
Recommendation has  cut  the number of relevant  markets  susceptible  for  ex ante 
regulation from 18 to only 7.694
Wide-spread  roll  out  of  NGAs  only  took  place  after  2006,695 which  makes  it  a 
development not clearly foreseen in 2002. Therefore, it may simply be that the law's 
own concept of the markets'  'natural'  development towards full  competition is no 
longer  suitable  to  deal  with  fibre-based  NGAs696 that  could,  despite  all  the 
expectations of the NRF, prove to be a lasting natural monopoly.697 Of course, as the 
EU Framework is flexible,  its  provisions are unlikely to prevent good short  term 
solutions  based  on  regulatory  analysis.  If  there  are  no  prospects  of  effective 
competition in high-speed infrastructures until the next market analysis is carried out 
by the relevant NRA,698 various access remedies can be applied to NGAs. However, 
as market remedies need to be tested on a regular basis,699 the Framework prevents 
long-term policy decisions that would create  a predictable  set  of regulatory rules 
beyond  the  next  round  of  market  analysis  (e.g.  in  terms  of  wholesale  access 
guarantees and affordable access pricing), which may result in short-term speculation 
692 See Nihoul, P., Rodford, P., 2004, p. 216 and 218.
693 Jones, K., Carlin, F. in: Scherer, J., 2005, p. 101.
694 Compare the 2003 and 2007 Commission Recommendations on relevant markets.
695For developments see e.g. ‘Broadband access in the EU: situation at 1 July 2008, COCOM08-41 
FINAL’ (2008) Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enforcement/broadband_a
ccess/Broadband_data_july_08.pdf, 15th August 2009.
696 For an overview of regulatory responses to NGA investment, see Selvadurai, N., Salter, B., Town, 
G., 1998.
697  Findings on this issue are far from clear. Crocioni, for example, argues that, due to specific NGN  
architecture,  it  may  be  difficult  to  draw  a  dividing  line  between  monopoly  and  non-monopoly 
elements, questioning law’s ability to tackle the monopoly problem by effectively separating them. 
Crocioni, P., 2008.
698 See Article 16 of the Framework Directive.
699 Ibidem.
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by the incumbent operators and hamper investments that require a longer time-frame 
in order to be profitable .700
Going back  to  the  policy of  local  loop unbundling,  which  required  Commission 
intervention in the form of Communication, Recommendation and later Regulation 
proposal in addition to the Oscar Bronner701 ‘essential facilities’ rules, it is obvious 
that politics had to  set  the direction where legal  regulation of (hardly replicable) 
fixed local access networks should go.702 Even though the proposals made by the 
Commission were also based on the finding that copper local loops were built partly 
by means of the public funding of state monopolies of the past,703 Naftel and Spiwak 
warn that this may be irrelevant for the decision whether to mandate access by law 
today.704 The Commission’s actions were therefore clearly political, with the goal of 
fostering  local  competition,  and not  simply a  reference  to  the  Advocate  General 
Jacobs’ opinion  in  Oscar  Bronner  issued  at  the  time.705 In  the  absence  of  said 
historical  justification,  the  Commission’s  economic  argument  that  there  are  no 
‘technical and commercial viable alternatives’ could also apply to, say newly laid 
fibre-based NGA networks built by the incumbents, where they are put in place of 
the existing copper-based networks.706
Indeed,  economic  reasons  for  local  access  regulation  are  more  about  economic 
bottlenecks than about the past 'unjust' advantage of the incumbent operators. Nihoul 
and Rodford list  several arguments that support permanent local loop unbundling 
even  if  parallel  infrastructures  exist.  They  argue  that,  even  if  the  limits707 of 
competition by means of  cable TV networks were all  removed,  having only one 
700 While the 2009 NRF reform foresees 'functional separation' of SMP operators as a remedy, it places 
it alongside other 'temporary'  ex ante remedies, despite a huge cost- and organizational burden that 
could only be justified as a long-term commitment. See e.g. Waters, P., Yuen, A., 2006.
701 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, C-7/97.
702 See Naftel, M., Spiwak, L. J., 2000, p. 312 et seq.
703 See also the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, D-7/97.
704 Naftel, M., Spiwak, L. J., 2000, p. 313.
705 Opinion in case C-7/97.
706 See  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Unbundled  Access  to  the  Local  Loop,  Brussels,  
26.4.2000 COM(2000) 237final.
707 Insufficient regional penetration, limited broadband capacity and sometimes ownership by the same 
entity as PSTN. Nihoul, P., Rodford, P., 2004, p. 199-200.
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parallel  fixed network would result  in a duopoly and therefore a likely collusion 
between the two undertakings involved.708 However, if the latter economic argument 
was equally adopted by law in the case of newly build NGAs, it would conflict with 
another political decision translated into law, i.e. to foster full infrastructure network 
competition. In the light of the duopoly (or oligopoly) argument, the latter no longer 
seems to be a viable option. As a political goal, full NGA infrastructure competition 
seems to be further based on the confusion of liberalisation and regulation,709 as the 
mere right to invest in new access networks and obtain a certain market share does 
not mean that NGA networks will be economically replicable in their entirety. As 
Jones and Carlin argue, there is no necessary contradiction between access-based and 
facilities-based  competition,  and  ‘liberalisation’ would  never  take  place  without 
access  obligations.710 Moreover,  the  idea  that  developments  in  technology would 
progressively  eliminate  the  need  for  ex  ante intervention711 is  very  questionable, 
bearing in mind, for example, the potential capacity of FTTH networks compared to, 
say  wireless  broadband  networks,  including,  say  the  LTE  networks.  Even  the 
construction of NGAs therefore revives the fears already present in 2002 that the 
rules of the Directives were never designed in a way that would ever allow the local 
loop  (and  associated  local  infrastructures,  such  as  ducts)  to  recover  from  the 
historical natural monopoly.712
Whereas these examples  show a potential  discrepancy between the law's  internal 
programme of  de-regulation and the actual  economic  needs,  they also reveal  the 
limits  of  the  law  and  the  role  politics  plays  in  setting  the  course  for  the  legal 
708 Ibidem, p. 199. Contrary to that, Knieps and Zenhausern argue against the expansion of access 
regulation to any new investments, any active products, or even ducts if alternative networks exist. 
Knieps, G., Zenhausern, P., 2010. However, despite their praise for economic reasoning, they seem to 
mistake the mere technological ability to duplicate the network for ‘effective competition’, without  
any  reference  to  actual  costs  of  such  duplication,  probably  also  due  to  technological 
misunderstandings,  as  they  compare  the  effort  of  pulling  fibre  cables  with  that  of  collocating 
DSLAMs and claim that FTTH can be seen as a requirement for VDSL.
709 See  e.g.  Stehmann,  O.,  1995,  p.  291  et  seq.,  an  early  text  on  the  benefits  of  full  network 
competition in Europe, where the overall economic benefits of networks liberalisation are quoted. 
However correct this may be, it does say much about the actual replicability of access networks and  
the potential need for permanent regulation.
710 Jones, K., Carlin, F. in: Scherer, J., 2005, p. 104.
711 Ibidem.
712 Dupuis-Toubol, F., 2002, p. 3.
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framework,  no  matter  how   'proceduralized'  it  becomes.  Economic  regulation713 
should ideally be set by the legislative framework and not during the NRAs' legal 
proceedings. However, practical examples show that, while EU politics lack vision as 
to any major changes of the NRF access philosophy,  the EU communications law 
gives  sufficient  room to  political  interference  by the Commission  and the NRAs 
driven  by,  say  'national  interests'  that  may  correspond  to  European  national 
incumbent  operators'  desire  to  escape  regulation.  In  a  similar  fashion,  European 
incumbent operators would earlier invoke the so-called 'essential requirements' of the 
ONP Framework,714 quoting technology-related arguments in order to block network 
access.
In practice, the Commission can, by means of its veto powers, largely control the 
inclusion of NGAs into the regulated markets. By introducing a technology-neutral 
definition of the 'physical access infrastructure' market in 2007, it has indicated that 
NGAs should in principle be included in the former 'copper local loop' market. This 
view has been reflected in several market analyses carried out in 2008, e.g. by the 
Finish, the Dutch and the French NRA.715 The NRAs may, on the other hand, decide 
not to introduce mandatory access to fibre or to introduce more lenient remedies 
tailored  to  fibre,  even though NGA has  been declared  to  be part  of  the relevant 
regulated market. This was the case, for example, in Finland and Portugal, despite 
the Commission’s warnings that mandatory access to fibre should be considered on 
the basis of the  analysis,716 or that the same remedies should in principle apply to 
713 See Majone, G. in: Hayward, J., Menon, A., 2003, p. 311.
714 See Walden, I., 2009, p. 179-181.
715 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/article_7/index_e
n.htm, 21st  January 2009. In particular, see OPTA analysis available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?
l=/nederland/registeredsnotifications/nl20080826/nl-2008-0826-0827/_EN_1.0_&a=d, 21st January 
2009.
716 “… the Commission notes that ANACOM does not impose any obligations on fibre at this stage.  
[…] However, the Commission draws attention to the fact that fibre-based access products are already 
in the market in Portugal, and that PT Group is already in the process of rolling out fibre (at least for  
the purpose of carrying out trials). It is also important to note that fibre roll-outs may significantly 
change the competitive landscape, especially if MDFs will be closed down. Even as early as in the 
phase of  announcements  and  planning,  these developments  may be liable for  halting competitive 
tendencies. This is especially relevant in the Portuguese situation where the competitiveness of the 
retail broadband market and the WBA market are – to a large extent – conditioned by the availability 
of sufficient inputs in the LLU market. Should wholesale inputs in market 4 necessary to compete on  
the retail market become unavailable, the competitive tendencies might well be reversed. In the light  
of  the above,  the Commission invites ANACOM to impose remedies  on fibre access products as  
165
copper-  and  fibre-based  infrastructures.717 Accordingly,  there  has  been,  despite 
harmonising efforts by the Commission to pursue technological neutrality, sufficient 
discretion  left  to  the  NRAs  as  to  granting  access  to  fibre-based  access 
infrastructures.718 This discretion was obviously used by some NRAs to foster their 
own  political  agenda719 of  facilitating  greater  NGA  deployment  by  incumbent 
operators at the cost of stronger service competition.
On the other hand, the 2002 legal framework itself that was based on competition 
law  and  specific  principles  of  encouraging  competition  could  be,  without  major 
changes politically bent in a way that would eventually make it harder to regulate 
access  to  new  infrastructures.  For  example,  the  European  Parliament  Report 
prepared by the French Socialist  MEP Ms Catherine Trautmann proposed several 
appropriate  following  the  national  NGA consultation.  …”  See  ‘Case  PT/2008/0850:  Wholesale 
(physical)  network  infrastructure  access  (including  shared  or  fully  unbundled  access)  at  a  fixed 
location; Case PT/2008/0851: Wholesale broadband access;  Comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of 
Directive  2002/21/EC’  (2009)  Available  at  http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?
l=/portugal/registeredsnotifications/pt20080850-851/pt-2008-0850-0851/_EN_1.0_&a=d, 21st January 
2009.
717 “The Commission takes note that FICORA proposes to differentiate fibre from metallic local loops 
in respect of the cost orientation obligation, although it considers both forms of access as part of the  
same relevant market. […] According to the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant markets, 
the objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to identify those  
actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of constraining those undertakings' 
behaviour and of preventing them from behaving independently of effective competitive pressure. 
Furthermore,  […]  obligations  imposed  shall  be  based  on  the  nature  of  the  problem  identified, 
proportionate and justified in light of the objectives […] of the Framework Directive, including the 
principle that regulation should be technology neutral. Therefore, given that competitive conditions 
inform the nature of the competition problems identified, any deviation consisting in addressing that 
competition  problem  with  differentiated  remedies  within  a  defined  relevant  market  needs  to  be 
carefully substantiated. In this regard, the Commission notes that according to FICORA all major  
operators  have  been  rolling  out  fibre  networks  to  end-users  with  increasing  speeds  since  2006. 
Investments in fibre networks are significantly above those of metallic or other types of networks. 
Although the overall number of fibre-loops is still  low, these tendencies seem to suggest that this 
situation is changing with an accelerating pace. Thus, the Commission […] invites FICORA to ensure 
that  access  measures  are supplemented by appropriate  costing remedies  and to consider  imposing 
similar  remedies  on  fibre  loops  as  proposed  for  copper  loops”.  ‘Case  FI/2008/0839:  Wholesale 
(physical)  network  infrastructure  access  (including  shared  or  fully  unbundled  access)  at  a  fixed 
location in Finland, Comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC’ (2008) Available at 
http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/library?
l=/suomifinland/registeredsnotifications/fi20080839_1/fi-2008-0839_enpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d,  21st 
January 2009.
718  For specific UK NGA regulation approach in the context of functional separation imposed on BT 
for ‘traditional’ broadband, see Brisby, P., 2011.
719 According to Luhmann, national regulators still belong to public administration as organizations of 
the political  system and are, absent specific legal  instructions, therefore likely to pursue domestic  
political agenda. Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 374. For example, in his speech at the NEREC Regulatory 
Conference in September 2009 in Madrid, Mr Reinaldo Rodriguez, President of the Spanish NRA 
CMT expressed  his  worry about  regulating new infrastructures  to  the  cost  of  investment  by the 
national operator Telefonica.
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seemingly minor modifications of access principles in a way that would give priority 
to  the  need  for  investment  over  the  need  for  competition,  suggesting  that  the 
incumbent operators' investments should be 'protected' from regulatory remedies.720 
In this respect, coupling with economic analysis in the process of SMP designation 
might not be all that relevant, as protectionism could be sustained at the level of 
market remedies.
A similar approach, though at a national level, can be found in the NGA regulation in 
Germany, where the parliament decided to grant the so-called ‘regulatory holidays’ to 
Deutsche  Telekom’s  new technological  developments  in  the  access  network.  The 
provisions of the German communications legislation that were later  successfully 
challenged  by  the  Commission721 enabled  a  general  exemption  as  to  Deutsche 
Telekom's  VDSL  (i.e.  copper-fibre  combined  NGA)  and  other  potential  NGA 
networks  from  competition,  thereby  severely  limiting  the  room  for  ex  ante 
regulation.722 However, while a decision not to regulate the NGAs could be part of 
the NRA procedure, the European Court of Justice ruled that the principle of non-
regulation of new markets,  which might include NGA, provided for in Paragraph 
9a(1) of the  German Telecommunications Act (TKG) limited the discretion of the 
720 In the Article 12(2) of the Access Directive conditions for the imposition of access obligations, the 
Report ,instead of the wording “(c) the initial investment by the facility owner, bearing in mind the 
risks involved in making the investment”, proposed the text “(c) the initial investment by the facility 
owner, bearing in mind the technical and economic viability of sharing this investment with other 
operators  seeking access  and the risks  involved in  making the investment,  including its  adequate 
sharing among the operators benefiting from access to these new facilities”. This places a much larger 
burden upon NRAs who want to justify the imposition of remedies or regulate prices. The Report that 
mentions 'investment' in NGNs in several  places, while neglecting service-based competition over  
these networks also suggests that the central objective of harmonised regulatory accounting in the EU 
should be the calculation of 'investment risk'.  ‘Draft  Report on the proposal for a directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, 
and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and services, and Directive 2002/20/EC 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, (COM(2007)0697 – C6-
0427/2007 – 2007/0247(COD)), Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, 23rd April 2008’ (2008)
Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-398.542+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN , 25th 
June 2009.
721 See ‘Commission launches 'fast track' infringement proceedings against Germany for 'regulatory 
holidays' for Deutsche Telekom, 27 February 2007’ (2007) Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/07/237&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, 30th March 2011.
722 See ‚§ 9a TKG 2004 Neue Märkte’ Available at http://www.jusline.de/index.php?
cpid=f92f99b766343e040d46fcd6b03d3ee8&lawid=28&paid=9a, 30th March 2011, see Appendix. See 
also ‘Infringement proceedings against Germany for granting 'regulatory holidays' (2007) Available at 
http://www.legal500.com/developments/2954, 24th January 2009.
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NRAs  under  the  Framework  Directive to  define  and  analyse  the  markets;  the 
limitation of the NRA’s discretion to submit ‘new markets’ to a definition and to a 
market analysis therefore necessarily involved a failure to comply with EU law.723
Nevertheless, the Commission itself showed a willingness to adapt the law to its own 
political agenda in its draft  Commission Recommendation on NGA. The document, 
different versions of which were subject to a public consultation in autumn 2008 and 
again  before  summer  2009,  departed  in  several  ways  from  the  established 
competition law principles as the grounds for ex ante regulation. The latter version of 
the draft, the preparation of which corresponded to the Chairman of the Commission 
Mr  Baroso's  re-election  activities,724 included  the  instructions  for  NRAs  not  to 
regulate certain market situations by listing “conditions under which the absence of 
SMP would  normally  be  indicated”.725 As  these  conditions  were  describing  co-
investment  and  joint  venture  schemes,  it  came  as  a  surprise  that  they  did  not, 
according to  the  Commission’s  opinion,  instead  of  being  used  as  indicators  of  a 
competitive  market,  raise  concerns  over  potential  joint  dominance,  which  is  a 
concept of both the 2002 Framework726 and general competition law.727  
The above examples show how the law can be ‘socialised’ in order to serve the daily 
political goals or economic interests of individual operators. In this respect, even a 
regular coupling of the law with economic analysis may not prove to be a sufficient 
safeguard.  Looking at  the  Recommendation on Relevant Markets as  a not  only a 
legal,  but also a political  document,  it  is  questionable how far  European  ex ante 
regulation is actually based on economic findings. As McCormack points out, there 
is  an  underlying  tension  between  the  requirement  that  NRAs define  the  markets 
723 Commission v. Germany, Case C-424/07, at. 106.
724 Mr Baroso's was faced with German pressures to legalise certain forms of 'regulatory holidays' at  
the EU level, while Member States' governments' interests were quoted by the Commission's officials 
as the reason for the draft Recommendation.
725 ‘Draft Commission Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks 
(NGA), Annex III,’ (2009) Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/nga_2/090611_nga_
recommendation_spc.pdf , 20th June 2009, see Appendix.
726See the 2002 Framework Directive, Annex II, see Appendix.
727See e.g. Bertelsmannn AG and others, Case C-413/06 P, Judgement of the Court, 10th July 2008, 
Airtours plc v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99, Judgement of the Court of  
First Instance, 6th June 2002.
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according  to  general  competition  law,  and  the  requirement  that  they  must  take 
‘utmost  account’  of  the  markets  defined  in  the  Recommendation  by  the 
Commission.728 This is a further proof of the autopoiesis of law: even if the law tries 
to rely on other social systems, it only does so within its own perception of these 
systems.
It would, however, be wrong to imply that coupling with the economic system makes 
the law less legal and more ‘economic’. As pointed out by Luhmann, in order for 
modern  economy to  function,  the  law must  not  belong  to  the  type  of  goods  or 
services that can be bought in the economic system.729 Equally, economic arguments 
should  not  be  mistaken  for  political  arguments  using  economic  rhetoric.  For 
example, giving ‘infrastructure investment’ priority over ‘competition’, as was the 
case with the emerging 2002 Framework reform in 2008730 is a political and not an 
economic decision. The requirement of the NRAs to perform a market analysis prior 
to introducing regulatory measures means that the law relies on its perception of a 
phenomenon  outside  its  sphere  in  order  to  decide  whether  the  introduction  of  a 
certain measure in a certain moment is legal or illegal. Of course, the analysis must 
reach the results that can be detected and used by the legal system. For this purpose, 
it  must fulfil the  legal criteria set by the legal system, such as the criteria of the 
Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market  
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications  
networks and services.731 These include the use of the SSNIP test that measures the 
reactions of buyers to a  permanent price increase of 5 to 10% , supply- and demand-
side  substitution,  or  the  use  of  market  share  and additional  criteria  to  determine 
whether an operator holds a dominant position.732 Accordingly, it is a legal text that 
says which otherwise economic criteria should be taken into account by the analysis. 
Of course, this also means that an 'economic' analysis will as its starting point use 
728 McCormack, E. in: Walden, I., Angel, J., 2005, p. 494.
729 Luhmann, N., 2004, p. 391.
730 See above.
731 11 July 2002, 2002/C, OJ 165/03.
732 See  Commission  guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power  
under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 11 
July 2002, 2002/C, OJ 165/03, see Appendix.
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legally preset criteria, and not some other economically relevant criteria.  733 While 
this may seem like restraining the economic science, it can also contribute to legal 
certainty by means of preventing the legal rephrasing of quasi-economic political 
criteria, such as the 'TELUS proposal', which suggested, without any reference to the 
state  of  wholesale  competition,734 that  a  certain  retail  market  share  threshold  for 
alternative operators such as 5% should be used as the main criterion of withdrawing 
wholesale regulation.735
The remedies set by NRAs, however, are not necessarily based on detailed economic 
analysis; full discretion as to possible remedies of the 2002 Access Directive applies. 
According  to  Article  8(2)  of  the  2002  Access  Directive,  where  an  operator  is 
designated as having significant market power on a specific market as a result of a 
market analysis, national regulatory authorities are to impose on them one or more of 
the obligations: transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access to, 
and use of, specific network facilities, and price control and cost accounting. If other 
remedies are in question, there is a further procedural safeguard: a request to the 
Commission  and  the  Commission’s  approval  are  required.736 However,  the  same 
procedural safeguard does not apply to the quoted 'toolbox' of remedies.737 In either 
case,  this  safeguard  would  be  a  purely  legal  and  procedural  one.  No  detailed 
economic analysis is required in respect of remedies, as long as general legal rules 
for applying discretion in the relevant Member State are met.738
733 Commission guidelines are not mandatory law and therefore one cannot predict the full extent of  
their application. However, as the Commission has veto powers as to market analyses under Article 7 
of the 2002 Framework Directive, the application of the guidelines can be, despite their ‘soft’ nature,  
de facto enforced.
734 Goodrich  warns that that the notion of ‘economic arguments’, when used in the legal discourse,  
may mean a selective set  of  (neo-liberal)  arguments  and  not  the  entirety of  arguments  economic 
analysis could actually provide. Goordich, P., 1987, p. 202-203. If such limited reasoning becomes 
part of case-law, this means that it will be the law that limits the use of certain economic arguments,  
and not the science of economics.
735 See Kahn, A. E., 2006-2007, p. 161.
736 Article 8(3) of the 2002 Access Directive.
737 Veto on remedies has been subject of broad debate during the 2008 Framework reform procedures.
738 According  to the  2009  Framework  Directive,  there  is  an  additional  harmonising  procedure 
involving the Commission and BEREC in respect of remedies. 
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One should note that certain NRAs, such as Ofcom, do conduct Regulatory Options 
Appraisal  (i.e.  cost-benefit)  analyses  before  opting  in  for  certain  remedies.739 
Nevertheless, as the Portuguese and the Finish cases as to fibre show,740 there can still 
exists a broad differentiation of remedies, even though products are economically on 
the same market. In the absence of specific economic reasoning, this can also be 
interpreted  as  politically  granted  NGA ‘regulatory  holidays’,  similar  to  the  ones 
granted by the German parliament.
It would be wrong to imply that the law needs to free itself from politics, and that it 
should seek safeguards  for performing its  expectation-stabilising function only in 
economic analysis.  On the contrary,  political  intervention is  crucial  in setting the 
principles of regulation and regulatory powers. Whereas one could question the law's 
expectation-stabilising function if particular political interests regularly found their 
way into concrete regulatory decision-making,741 the coupling of law with politics by 
means of legislation could also be the only way of curing the inefficiencies caused by 
the law's existing autopoietic structures.
Two  types  of  ex  ante regulation  that  have  recently  been  (largely  politically) 
introduced both at the level of Member States and at the EU level show that the 
general (legal and political) programme of phasing out all regulatory remedies may 
be neither logical, not sustainable. These two types are:
• functional  separation  between  the  network  and  service  part  of  the 
incumbent operators; and
• symmetrical regulation as to network interconnection and infrastructure 
sharing.
In both cases the phasing out of regulation and its careful regular reviews make no 
sense. In the case of functional separation, one has to deal with the complex task of 
re-structuring a previously unified company into two or more separate divisions with 
very limited links between each other. In the case of infrastructure sharing, lifting 
739 See  e.g.  ‘Requirement  on  BT  to  publish  Key  Performance  Indicators’  (2004)  Available  at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/bt_kpi/statement/statement_directions.pdf,  24th January 
2009.
740 See above fn. 712 and 713.
741 See Majone, G. in: Hayward, J., Menon, A., 2003, p. 311.
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regulatory controls could mean an endless exploitation of the bargaining power by 
the ones who have managed to roll out infrastructure first and are therefore hosting 
later entrants’ infrastructure.
Functional separation has for the first time been tested in Europe in the UK. The idea 
came up as part of Ofcom’s strategic review conducted from 2004 to 2005. Ofcom 
expressly stated that it did not have a statutory obligation to carry out a strategic 
review of telecoms.742 Accordingly, the ideas of the review largely departed from the 
Framework-based regulatory review of the competitiveness of the relevant markets, 
and  can  be  attributed  to  regulatory  innovation,  i.e.  Ofcom's  purpose-specific 
activities.  In  the  review Ofcom specifically  referred  to  the  contrast  between  the 
markets where competition has already removed or will remove the need for ex ante 
remedies, and the enduring economic bottlenecks.743
 
It  is  the  very  endurance  of  local  access  bottleneck  that  suggests  the  need  for 
functional  separation.  As  Ryan  argued  in  2003,  the  progress  towards  the 
establishment of sustainable local competition has been disappointing in both the EU 
and the US.744 With the advent of FTTH or FTTC solutions, prospects across Europe 
do not seem to be improving. The former incumbents are  normally the strongest 
market  players  also  in  fibre-based  solutions  (e.g.  KPN  in  the  Netherlands  or 
Telefonica in Spain).  On the other hand, where new entrants had the first  mover 
advantage (e.g. T-2 in Slovenia), this often resulted in an inefficient duplication of 
FTTH infrastructures in lucrative urban areas, while leaving a huge percentage of the 
population without any access to fibre. It is therefore difficult to argue that there is 
effective competition in access networks  due to new access technologies. Quite on 
the  contrary,  it  seems  that  bottlenecks  with  newly  laid  fibre-based  access 
infrastructures  remain  the  same as  those  with  metallic  local  loops  of  the  PSTN. 
Accordingly,  the  ‘legacy’ argument  linked  to  copper  local  loops  may indeed  no 
longer be relevant in order to decide upon mandating access.745   
742 ‘Final statements on the Strategic Review of Telecommunications, and undertakings in lieu of a 
reference under the Enterprise Act 2002 Statement, 22 September 2005’ (2005) Available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/statement_tsr/statement.pdf, 25th January 2009, p. 3
743 Ibidem.
744 Ryan, M. H., 2003.
745 See e.g. Naftel, M., Spiwak, L. J., 2000, p. 313.
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Looking at the Framework reform from 2007 to 2009, however, the EU legislation 
does not seem to admit that functional separation is a remedy for durable bottlenecks 
that  may  never  be  cured,  at  least  not  by  technologies  known  today.  Instead, 
functional separation has been addressed as yet another access remedy that can be 
imposed by the NRAs, provided that the Commission agrees and the same effect 
cannot be reached by other remedies.746 In order to impose the remedy, one needs to 
fulfil the standard that there is “little or no prospect of infrastructure competition 
within a reasonable timeframe after recourse to one or more remedies previously 
considered to be appropriate”.747 This means that infrastructure competition is still 
considered  as  an  essential  element,  and  that  it  is  only  the  'timeframe'  for  its 
introduction that calls for the 'temporary' remedy of functional separation. Bearing in 
mind  the  Commission  experts'  concerns  that  even  two  fully  rolled-out  parallel 
networks  would  create  a  duopoly,  which  easily  leads  to  collusion  between  the 
operators,748 this  persistence  upon infrastructure  competition  reflects  not  only the 
beliefs of certain politicians that European incumbent operators should be protected 
from  overly  intrusive  regulation,  but  also  the  autopoietic  nature  of  the  EU 
Framework's legal grounds for regulation.   
As enacted in  2009,  functional  separation is  far  from being a  policy goal  of the 
reformed EU Framework.749 Instead, it is treated as a last resort remedy. The latter is 
rather unusual bearing in mind that the UK, that was the first in Europe to introduce 
this  remedy,  is  also  the  country  with  the  longest  tradition  in  liberalisation  and 
746 ‘Review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services: 
Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Directives 
2002/21/EC  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications  networks  and 
services, 2002/19/EC on access to and interconnection of electronic communications networks and 
services, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services –
Political agreement’ (2008) Available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17006.en08.pdf, 26th January 2009, Article 13a, 
see Appendix.
747 See ibidem, Recital 43.
748  Nihoul, P., Rodford, P., 2004, p. 200.
749 See  Article  13a  (1)  of  the  2009  Access  Directive:  “Where  the  national  regulatory  authority 
concludes that  the appropriate  obligations imposed  under  Articles  9  to  13 have failed to  achieve 
effective competition and that there are important and persisting competition problems and/or market 
failures identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain access product markets, it may, as  
an exceptional measure, in accordance with the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 8(3),  
impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale 
provision of relevant access products in an independently operating business entity.”
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regulation.750 In  addition,  it  seems  that  Commissioner  Viviane  Reding  saw  the 
remedy of functional separation as a broader policy perspective, but had to face the 
constraints of political power when introducing it to the Framework.751
Symmetrical obligations, on the other hand, have so far not been in the centre of 
regulatory attention.  For example,  European NRAs are granted powers to impose 
interconnection obligations in order to ensure end-to-end connectivity.752 However, 
since operators controlling access and terminating voice traffic to their end-users are 
already  regulated  as  SMP  operators,  such  regulatory  actions  are  not  generally 
necessary. This is interesting bearing in mind Shelanski's arguments that a shift to 
competition law would not necessarily make specific interconnection rules as to the 
(mutual) exchange of traffic obsolete,753  which could also be applied to access and 
other  infrastructure  bottlenecks.  For  example,  in  parallel  to  SMP  remedies, 
obligations of new access infrastructure sharing were mandated upon market players 
in  France by means of statute.  In 2008 the French Parliament  adopted a law on 
'modernising  the  economy',  which  includes  a  chapter  on  telecommunications, 
imposing among others, the obligation to meet reasonable requests for access to in-
building  fibre-optic  lines  coming  from  operators  wishing  to  provide  electronic 
communications services to end-users.754 Subsequently,  ARCEP, the French NRA, 
published  its  preliminary  non-binding  recommendations  on  access  to  in-building 
750 This does not in any way undermine the argument that functional separation may only work with 
operators who have already started 'equalising' treatment of wholesale and retail channels, bearing in 
mind that they would inevitably lose retail customers and that there are gains to be made in wholesale  
markets. Waters, P., Yuen, A., 2006, p. 15.
751 See  comment  in  ‘Brussels  split  on  functional  separation’  (2007)  Available  at 
https://publicaffairs.linx.net/news/?p=704, 26th January 2009: “EU Competition Commissioner Neelie 
Kroes and Industry Commissioner Günter Verheugen have united to  attack telecoms Commissioner 
Viviane  Reding’s  plans  to  increase  functional  separation  in  telecoms  incumbents.  Functional  
separation requires dominant companies to separate – but not sell – their network infrastructure from 
their services division, and give competing providers access to the infrastructure on equivalent terms. 
Viviane Reding has cited the experience of functional separation by BT in the UK as a model for the 
rest of Europe. Kroes and Verheugan believe Reding’s proposals would create bureaucracy and harm 
investment, saying that functional separation 'is not only superfluous but also damaging. Functional 
separation does not prevent discrimination of alternative operators'.”
752Article 5 of the 2002 Access Directive: “... In particular, without prejudice to measures that may be 
taken regarding undertakings with significant market power in accordance with Article 8, national 
regulatory authorities shall be able to impose: (a) to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-to-end 
connectivity, obligations on undertakings that control access to end-users, including in justified cases 
the obligation to interconnect their networks where this is not already the case; ...”
753 Shelanski, H. A., 2007, p. 99.
754 ‘Cullen  International Cross-country  analysis,  November  7,  2008’  (2008)  Available  at 
http://www.cullen-international.com/documents/cullen/prindex.cfm, 26th January 2009.
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wiring. The French example shows that politics in Europe can intervene by means of 
setting more durable  and general  solutions  than  those  contained in  the EU 2002 
Framework.  
 
To conclude, the environment can produce situations that cannot be adequately, say 
efficiently, tackled by the instruments of autopoietic EU law due to its general view 
that  ex ante regulation can only be temporary and that there is, at least in the long 
run,  a  prospect  of  infrastructure  competition.  This  can  create  anomalies  when 
innovative regulatory concepts must be legally tailored to this autopoietic mantra: 
due to their complexity and costs, remedies such as functional separation only make 
sense as strategic policy decisions. Nevertheless, European politics had been during 
the  2007-2009  period  primarily  obsessed  with  preserving  the  'incentives'  for 
incumbent  operators  to  invest.755 These  political  views  were  reinforced  by  the 
stickiness of the NRF mantra that saw the transition to pure EU competition law as 
the ultimate goal for regulation. Therefore,  the functional separation option could 
only fit into the legislative picture as a compromise and not as an approach worth 
promoting, as earlier suggested by Commissioner Viviane Reding.  
755 See the 'Trautmann Report'.
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6 CONCLUSION
Exploring the European communications law and its evolution by means of 'systems 
theory' has revealed how the law keeps relying on its own images of economy (e.g. 
competition law) and technology (e.g. public telephony), while attempting to make 
these images more receptive towards the environment in order to promote them. As 
experience  with  NGN  shows,  these  attempts  have  resulted  in  increased  legal 
reflexivity in relation to the environment: the law has managed to deal with VoIP 
thoroughly in the context of its own image of voice telephony, whereas the issues of 
access  to  NGN networks  have  by means of  the  legal  idea  of  the  'markets'  been 
addressed within the scope of regulatory market analysis. In many ways, bearing in 
mind its autopoietic nature, the law has proven to be highly receptive of the new 
technological and business phenomena. The principle of technological neutrality has 
put technology-related questions in the context of legal 'equality': the provision of 
voice  services  by  means  of  IP  protocol,  for  example,  is  now  neither  legally 
discouraged, nor excluded from public interest obligations in respect of emergency 
calls,  whereby the  ERG and  regulators  like  Ofcom have  shown a  great  deal  of 
innovation in finding adequate interim and permanent solutions for the migration of 
telephony to IP protocol.756  Furthermore, competition law-based regulatory measures 
have enabled  and added to the reflexivity of law in respect of economic transactions 
taking place in the communications services and infrastructure markets. Accordingly, 
wholesale  access  services  have  been  defined  on  the  basis  of  their  commercial 
substitutability, without explicit limitation to copper-based solutions, which enables 
the inclusion of fibre-based NGAs into the legal scheme.757 This reflexivity of EU 
communications law is further enhanced by the institutional framework, whereby the 
Commission and the ERG, now transformed to BEREC, are mandated to produce 
harmonised legal regulatory solutions for market developments, which in practice 
also means the reactions to the NGN developments mentioned above.
756 See the chapter on VoIP.
757 See Recommendation 2007/879/EC.
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Accordingly, unlike, say WTO law758 that does not regularly couple with its business 
and technological environment, EU law has largely evolved based on its coupling 
with the outside triggers, but not in a way that would make it ‘less legal’. Instead, it  
has sought legal solutions that could capture the complexities of the environment on 
its ‘internal screen’, which resulted in a huge and complex body of legal responses. 
Of course, these responses necessarily take time, which will always be perceived as 
the lagging behind of the legal system, even if the legal reforms are implemented 
with a much faster pace than today. In addition, as is the case with the Commission 
and the ERG,759 legal  reactions  to technologies can be largely determined by the 
internal institutional and legal triggers, and not economy or technology.
However, the reflexivity of EU law evolution in relation to NGN has not only been 
limited by the gap due to inter-system synchronisation, but also by means of the law's 
own programmes. Both the law and the institutional activities described above are 
autopoietic,  which  means  that  the  NGN  environment  cannot  exercise  any direct 
influence upon them. Legal regulatory measures are therefore always founded on the 
laws previously enacted. Therefore, the observation whether new technologies and 
business models have been dealt  with adequately,  say in a neutral  way,  will  also 
remain  internal  to  the  legal  system.  Even  if  the  law  decides  in  certain 
communications,  say market analysis,  to couple with economic principles,  it  will 
ultimately use its internal understanding of these principles, based on the decision-
making of the European Commission or the NRAs, which is highly unlikely to be 
either fully accepted or synchronised with its economic environment. As experience 
shows, say with SMP remedies,760 even the changes in legislation, whereby the law 
has to couple with (potentially new) political ideas, primarily seek to re-use or re-
shape the law's existing autopoietic concepts.
This thesis has identified two main areas in EU communications law where the law is 
caught between its internal attempts to pursue reflexivity of the environment in order 
to  promote  itself,  and  its  autopoietic  concepts  that  essentially  determine  the 
758 See the chapter on VoIP.
759 See the chapter on the institutional framework.
760 See the chapter on access and interconnection.
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phenomena  to  be  legally  addressed:  end-user  services  and  wholesale  access 
regulation.
As to end-user services regulation, huge efforts have been made by the Commission 
and the NRAs not only to properly classify VoIP according to the law, but also to 
enable its  full  technological  potential,  e.g.  by  allowing nomadicity,  whereby the 
ERG  has  in  its  purpose-specific  approach  clearly  departed  from  the  initial 
classification approach.761 However, the quantity of legal communications focusing 
on voice telephony regulation is not the function of, say the rationally defined public 
interest  formula or  the economic efficiency of this  type of  regulation.  Instead,  it 
stems from the legacy of the legal concept of public telephony that was already one 
of the key concepts in market liberalisation and protection of end-users under the 
ONP regulatory  framework.  Notwithstanding  the  purpose-specific  efforts  of  the 
NRAs to ease the market entry for VoIP providers, these concepts have been the legal 
reason for, say Ofcom's interim forbearance policy for emergency calls, or the ERG's 
activism in respect of nomadicity. Without a statutory concept that sees public voice 
telephony as a phenomenon that deserves to be regulated, there would also be no 
need  for  a  'lighter  touch'  regulation.  It  is  the  law  and  not  the  'needs  of  the 
environment' that has known a highly complex regulation of voice services, which 
has been only gradually dismantled by the 2009 review.762 Accordingly, the law has 
itself  created a potentially conflicting situation whereby VoIP could be deemed a 
'publicly available telephone service' based on the equality principle. Of course, the 
law can choose  to  apply the  principle  of  'technological  neutrality'  as  its  internal 
concept, as was the idea of the 2002 Directives,763 which can with the help of (again, 
the law's internal)  criteria such as the 'function'  or 'market substitution'  create an 
internally equal or unequal legal image of a certain service. However, this does not 
say anything about the 'neutrality'  of the legal treatment of technologies from the 
perspective of other social systems. Whereas the coupling with the economic concept 
of  'market  substitutes'  can  create  the  illusion  of  an  'economic  law'  and  possibly 
761 ‘ERG common position on VoIP ERG (07) 56rev2’ (2007) Available at 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/publications/erg_07_56rev2_cp_voip_final.pdf, 31st January 2009, p. 18.
762 See  above.  The 2009  Universal  Service  Directive has  partially shifted  the  focus  from 'public 
telephony' to 'public communications', but obligations tailored for traditional voice services largely 
remain in place.
763 See Article 8 (1) of the 2002 Framework Directive.
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legitimise the treatment of VoIP services in the context of the legal idea of 'PATS', the 
autopoietic  closure  of  the  law  becomes  more  apparent  when  taking  a  broader 
perspective: there is no way the law could compare the social or economic relevance 
of 'PATS' regulation with, say net neutrality rules as long as the latter are not (yet)  
part of the law or are not subject to the same type of legal criteria or procedure. In 
this  respect,  despite  the  alleged  neutrality,  legal  arguments  as  to  which  services 
should or should not be subject to regulation do not in any way guarantee efficiency 
or other socially relevant effects of this regulation.
As European regulation of access and interconnection shows, this is the case even if 
the 'market situation' is perceived by the law as the universal criterion as to whether 
regulation is required or not. Defining the markets susceptible to ex ante regulation 
based on the list and the criteria set by the Commission, and subjecting remedies to 
NRA discretion  moves  regulatory  measures  away  from coupling  with  economic 
analysis and into the law's internal 'best practices', sometimes coupled with specific 
political interests of the NRAs or the Commission.764 In addition, market regulation 
is subject to the law's internal de-regulatory programme, whose economic sense is 
questionable  when  it  comes  to  permanent  bottlenecks  or  'essential  facilities'.765 
Furthermore,  especially  when  it  comes  to  the  efficiency  of  measures,  general 
competition  law,  i.e.  the  most  immediate  legal  alternative  to  ex  ante regulation, 
applies its remedies rarely and on the basis of lengthy proceedings, which makes its 
economic  efficiency  questionable,  despite  its  structural  coupling  with  economic 
analysis.  Unlike  the  unbundling  of  legacy  copper  local  loops,  where  the  legal 
programme  of  open  access  has  been  clearly defined  by means  of  a  Community 
Regulation,766  the example of NGA regulation reveals a mixture of a reluctance to 
regulate new technologies,767 coupled with political interference on the part of the 
764 See above the chapter on NGA.
765 Ironically,  these  are  already  dealt  with  by  general  competition  law.  See  Oscar  Bronner  v. 
Mediaprint, C-7/97.
766  Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop.
767 For  example,  when  it  comes  to  co-investment  arrangements  according  to  Commission 
Recommendation on NGA or access to fibre in the Portuguese case. See above the chapter on access 
regime.
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NRAs,768 Member States769 and the Commission alike.770 The flexibility of the present 
legal approach to access networks can still be questioned, especially when it comes 
to the legal system's ability to impose functional separation as a durable solution. 
Therefore, bearing in mind both the legal limits and the political irritations, the legal 
system's actual economic efficiency in respect of NGA would be surprising.
Subjecting the legal system to regular outside irritations, especially absent guarantees 
as to its economic performance, may be seen as disturbing, bearing in mind that the 
law  provides  for  'goods  and  services'  that  cannot  be  'bought'  in  the  economic 
system,771 among them legal certainty. Whereas one could invoke mandatory public 
consultations  of  the  2002  Framework  Directive  as  the  type  of  coupling  that 
neutralises political or lobbying interference, this mechanism is largely undermined 
by the autopoietic and often purpose-specific functioning of institutions such as the 
Commission, the ERG, now BEREC, and of course individual NRAs. Theoretically, 
although irritations from the environment remain essential for its evolution, the law 
only benefits  as  a  system when it  frees  itself  from constant  interferences  of  the 
environment.772 This can be achieved by means of firmer provisions in the legislation, 
which, ironically, again require the coupling of the law with politics.
Experience shows, however, that the autopoiesis of the legal regulatory system goes 
beyond  the application of laws, and that the existing concepts are likely to remain 
central to the legislation even following its political reviews, as demonstrated by the 
2002 reform in respect of interconnection. This self-perpetuation of the law has again 
been demonstrated during the 2008-2009 Framework Review process, whereby only 
minor changes of the NRF have been proposed and later adopted in 2009,773  despite, 
for example, rather protectionist ideas clearly expressed by European MEPs in the 
Trautmann Report. While contributing to the law's expectation-stabilising function, 
legally described as 'legal certainty', this also makes it more difficult for alternative 
768 See e.g. the Portuguese case dealt with in the chapter on NGA.
769 E.g. German regulatory holidays.
770 See the chapter on access  regime.
771 See Luhmann, N., 2004, p.391.
772 Teubner, G., Law as an Autopoietic System, p. 33.
773 See the 2009 Better Regulation and Citizens' Rights Directives.
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regulatory  solutions  not  fitting  into  the  complex  and  self-sufficient  regulatory 
scheme  to  be  adopted.  Accordingly,  it  was  not  possible  to  introduce  functional 
separation as a lasting strategic solution, a legal preference for 'Bill and Keep' as a 
possible future charging mechanism, or more prescriptive rules on net neutrality to 
the 2009 Framework. These ideas had to face the autopoiesis of the existing legal 
concepts on an unequal footing, as the existing legal solutions could be presented as 
legal arguments in itself against them. The priorities of the law have already been set 
as infrastructure competition, cost-based call termination, and the protection of end-
users  as  to  telephony  services,  whereas  a  supposedly  flexible  system of  market 
analysis could be used to tackle new market problems.774 Of course, one could point 
at the economic arguments against said new solutions, but this would largely miss the 
point:  the  solutions  already  present  in  the  law,  e.g.  on  public  voice  telephony 
regulation, do not in their application require economic justification.
However, the neo-classical mantra of de-regulation is often presented as an argument 
in  itself  against  any  new  regulatory  approaches,775 including  the  ones  described 
above. There is a disappointment attached to it, though: the presence of regulation 
does not say much about the economic impact of this regulation. For example, huge 
regulatory attention given to VoIP on both sides of the Atlantic, which originated in 
previous  heavy regulation  of  POTS,  has  resulted  in  large  amounts  of  regulatory 
discussions and documents,776 in most cases lacking regulatory appraisal as to how 
efficient  or at  least  relevant  this  regulation has been in respect of  the use of IP 
telephony.777  Notwithstanding these  effects,  the  production  of  regulatory rules  is 
further  amplified  by the  EU institutional  framework based on competing  powers 
coupled with the regulators' 'will to survive'778, whereby the coupling with economic 
analysis comes second to the essentially legal function of 'harmonisation'. In such 
774 Crawford, S. ‘Ed Richards of Ofcom on Net Neutrality’ (2007) Available at
     http://www.circleid.com/posts/ed_richards_of_ofcom_on_net_neutrality/  , 3rd May 2009.
775 Yoo, C. S. ‘Would mandating broadband network neutrality help or hurt competition?’ (2004-2005) 
3 Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law, p. 188.
776 See the chapter on VoIP.
777 See the chapter on VoIP.
778 See also Hall, C., Scott, C., Hood, C., 2000, p. 209. The same can be observed in the context of the  
previous  Commission – ERG relationship.
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circumstances,  a  shift  to  'simple,  short  new  statutes'  as  proposed  by Atkinson779 
seems  highly  unlikely.  One  is  more  likely  to  expect  a  further  proliferation  of 
regulatory  norms,  without  any guarantee  that  the  right rules  required  to  achieve 
economic efficiency and end-user welfare are actually there. This may well become 
the case, bearing in mind that policy goals in respect of NGN are, unlike in the case 
of the unbundling of legacy copper local loops, expected to remain vague due to the 
lack of political consensus as to the contemporary issues, such as open access to 
NGAs, net neutrality, or the shift to 'Bill and Keep'.
779 Atkinson, R. C. ‘Telecom Regulation for the 21st Century: Avoiding Gridlock, Adapting to Change’ 
(2005-2006) 4 Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law 408.
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APPENDIX: EXTRACTS FROM THE RELEVANT 
LEGISLATION
Article 4 of the 2002 Framework Directive:
1. Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level  
under which any user or undertaking providing electronic communications networks  
and/or services who is affected by a decision of a national regulatory authority has  
the right of appeal against the decision to an appeal body that is independent of the  
parties  involved.  This  body,  which  may  be  a  court,  shall  have  the  appropriate  
expertise available to it to enable it to carry out its functions. Member States shall  
ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an  
effective appeal mechanism. Pending the outcome of any such appeal, the decision of  
the  national  regulatory  authority  shall  stand,  unless  the  appeal  body  decides  
otherwise.
2. Where the appeal body referred to in paragraph 1 is not judicial in character,  
written reasons for its decision shall always be given. Furthermore, in such a case,  
its decision shall be subject to review by a court or tribunal within the meaning of  
Article 234 of the Treaty.
Article 7a of the 2009 Framework Directive:
1.  Where  an  intended  measure  covered  by  Article  7(3)  aims  at  imposing,  
amending or withdrawing an obligation on an operator in application of Article 16  
in conjunction with Article 5 and Articles 9 to 13 of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access  
Directive), and Article 17 of Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), the  
Commission may, within the period of one month provided for by Article 7(3) of this  
Directive,  notify  the  national  regulatory  authority  concerned  and  BEREC of  its  
reasons for considering that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single  
market or its serious doubts as to its compatibility with Community law. In such a  
case, the draft measure shall not be adopted for a further three months following the  
Commission's notification. [...]
5. Where BEREC does not share the serious doubts of the Commission or does not  
issue an opinion, or where the national regulatory authority amends or maintains its  
draft  measure pursuant  to  paragraph 4,  the  Commission may,  within  one  month  
following the end of the three month period referred to in paragraph 1 and taking  
utmost account of the opinion of BEREC if any:
(a) issue a recommendation requiring the national regulatory authority concerned  
to amend or withdraw the draft measure, including specific proposals to that end and  
providing reasons justifying its recommendation, in particular where BEREC does  
not share the serious doubts of the Commission;
(b) take a decision to lift its reservations indicated in accordance with paragraph 
Article 8 of the 2002 Framework Directive:
[…] 2.  The  national  regulatory  authorities  shall  promote  competition  in  the  
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provision  of  electronic  communications  networks,  electronic  communications  
services and associated facilities and services by inter alia:
(a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms  
of choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of  
competition in the electronic communications sector;
(c) encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation;  
and
(d)  encouraging efficient  use  and ensuring  the  effective  management  of  radio  
frequencies and numbering resources.
3. The national regulatory authorities shall contribute to the development of the  
internal market by inter alia:
(a) removing remaining obstacles to the provision of electronic communications  
networks, associated facilities and services and electronic communications services  
at European level;
(b) encouraging the establishment and development of trans-European networks  
and the interoperability of pan-European services, and end-to-end connectivity;
(c)  ensuring  that,  in  similar  circumstances,  there  is  no  discrimination  in  the  
treatment  of  undertakings  providing  electronic  communications  networks  and  
services;
(d)  cooperating  with  each  other  and  with  the  Commission  in  a  transparent  
manner  to  ensure  the  development  of  consistent  regulatory  practice  and  the  
consistent application of this Directive and the Specific Directives.
4. The national regulatory authorities shall promote the interests of the citizens of  
the European Union by inter alia:
(a) ensuring all citizens have access to a universal service specified in Directive  
2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive);
(b)  ensuring  a  high  level  of  protection  for  consumers  in  their  dealings  with  
suppliers,  in  particular  by  ensuring  the  availability  of  simple  and  inexpensive  
dispute resolution procedures carried out by a body that is independent of the parties  
involved;
(c)  contributing  to  ensuring  a  high  level  of  protection  of  personal  data  and  
privacy;
(d)  promoting  the  provision  of  clear  information,  in  particular  requiring  
transparency  of  tariffs  and  conditions  for  using  publicly  available  electronic  
communications services;
(e) addressing the needs of specific social groups, in particular disabled users;  
and
(f) ensuring that the integrity and security of public communications networks are  
maintained.
Article 19 of the 2002 Framework Directive:
1. Where the Commission, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in  
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Article  22(2),  issues  recommendations  to  Member  States  on  the  harmonised  
application of the provisions in this Directive and the Specific Directives in order to  
further the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8, Member States shall  
ensure  that  national  regulatory  authorities  take  the  utmost  account  of  those  
recommendations in carrying out their tasks. Where a national regulatory authority 
chooses not to follow a recommendation, it shall inform the Commission giving the  
reasoning for its position.
2. Where the Commission finds that divergence at national level in regulations  
aimed  at  implementing Article  10(4)  creates  a  barrier  to  the  single  market,  the  
Commission  may,  acting  in  accordance with  the  procedure referred to  in  Article  
22(3), take the appropriate technical implementing measures.
Article 19 of the 2009 Framework Directive:
1. Without prejudice to Article 9 of this Directive and Articles 6 and 8 of Directive  
2002/20/EC (Authorisation Directive), where the Commission finds that divergences  
in the implementation by the national regulatory authorities of the regulatory tasks  
specified in this Directive and the Specific Directives may create a barrier to the  
internal market, the Commission may, taking the utmost account of the opinion of  
BEREC, issue a recommendation or a decision on the harmonised application of the  
provisions  in  this  Directive  and  the  Specific  Directives  in  order  to  further  the  
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8.
2. Where the Commission issues a recommendation pursuant to paragraph 1, it  
shall act in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 22 (2).  
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  national  regulatory  authorities  take  the  utmost  
account  of  those  recommendations  in  carrying  out  their  tasks.  Where a national  
regulatory authority chooses not to  follow a recommendation,  it  shall  inform the  
Commission, giving the reasons for its position.
3.  The  decisions  adopted  pursuant  to  paragraph  1  may  include  only  the  
identification  of  a  harmonised  or  coordinated  approach  for  the  purposes  of  
addressing the following matters:
(a) the inconsistent implementation of general regulatory approaches by national  
regulatory authorities on the regulation of electronic communication markets in the  
application of Articles 15 and 16, where it creates a barrier to the internal market.  
Such  decisions  shall  not  refer  to  specific  notifications  issued  by  the  national  
regulatory authorities pursuant to Article 7a; In such a case, the Commission shall  
propose a draft decision only:
–  after  at  least  two  years  following  the  adoption  of  a  Commission  
Recommendation dealing with the same matter, and;
– taking utmost account of an opinion from BEREC on the case for adoption of  
such a  decision,  which  shall  be  provided by  BEREC within  three  months  of  the  
Commission's request;
(b) numbering, including number ranges, portability of numbers and identifiers,  
number and address translation systems, and access to 112 emergency services.
4.  The  decision  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  designed  to  amend  non-essential  
elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with  
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the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 22(3).
5. BEREC may on its own initiative advise the Commission on whether a measure  
should be adopted pursuant to paragraph 1.”
2002 Framework Directive, Annex II: 
Criteria to be used by national regulatory authorities in making an assessment of  
joint  dominance  [...]  Two  or  more  undertakings  can  be  found  to  be  in  a  joint  
dominant  position  within  the  meaning  of  Article  14  if,  even  in  the  absence  of  
structural or other links between them, they operate in a market the structure of  
which is considered to be conducive to coordinated effects. Without prejudice to the  
case law of the Court of Justice on joint dominance, this is likely to be the case  
where the market satisfies a number of appropriate characteristics, in particular in  
terms of  market  concentration,  transparency and other  characteristics  mentioned  
below:
• mature market,
• stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side,
• low elasticity of demand,
• homogeneous product,
• similar cost structures,
• similar market shares,
• lack of technical innovation, mature technology,
• absence of excess capacity,
• high barriers to entry,
• lack of countervailing buying power,
• lack of potential competition,
• various kinds of informal or other links between the undertakings concerned,
• retaliatory mechanisms,
• lack or reduced scope for price competition
The above is not an exhaustive list, nor are the criteria cumulative. Rather, the list is  
intended  to  illustrate  only  the  sorts  of  evidence  that  could  be  used  to  support  
assertions concerning the existence of joint dominance.”
Article 17 of the 2002 Universal Service Directive:
Member States shall ensure that, where:
(a) as a result of a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 16(3) a  
national  regulatory  authority  determines  that  a  given  retail  market  identified  in  
accordance with Article 15 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive) is not  
effectively competitive, and
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(b) the national regulatory authority concludes that obligations imposed under  
Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive), or Article 19 of this Directive would not  
result  in  the  achievement  of  the  objectives  set  out  in  Article  8  of  Directive  
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive),
national regulatory authorities shall  impose appropriate regulatory obligations  
on  undertakings  identified  as  having  significant  market  power  on  a  given  retail  
market …
2008 draft of the ‘Commission Recommendation of on regulated access to Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGA)’, pricing principles:
1. General principles. All usage prices for ducts, other civil engineering works  
and other elements which are not active, should be based on a volume measure for  
physical capacity used (such as m3). Usage prices for ducts, other civil engineering  
works and other elements which are not active, should not be bound by the principle  
of  geographic  averaging  in  the  presence  of  substantial  cost  differences  between  
various areas.
2.  Pricing of  existing ducts,  other  civil  engineering works  and other  elements  
which  are not  active.  The usage price  for  existing  ducts,  other  civil  engineering  
works and other elements which are not active, should be based on cost estimates  
contained  in  the  regulatory  accounts  of  the  SMP operator.  These  cost  estimates  
should  be  historical  costs  minus  depreciation,  or,  where  this  information  is  not  
available,  current  costs  minus  depreciation.  Where these  are not  yet  included,  a  
proportionate share of the common costs of an efficient operator should be added to  
these cost estimates.
3. Pricing of new ducts, other civil engineering works and other elements which  
are  not  active  (Greenfield  projects).  The  usage  price  for  new  ducts,  other  civil  
engineering works and other elements which are not active should be based on costs  
plus a project-specific risk premium to be included in the costs of capital for the  
investment  risk  incurred  by  the  operator.  The  risk  premium should  be  estimated  
according to the methodology set out […]
2008 draft  of  the  ‘Commission  Recommendation  of  on  regulated  access  to  Next 
Generation Access Networks (NGA)’, co-investment principles:
Joint  deployment  of  FTTH networks  by  several  co-investors  under  the  following  
conditions would normally be indicative of absence of SMP:
• At least three operators in addition to the operator having been designated  
SMP at the time of the market review or, in markets where an alternative operator  
competes at retail level on the basis of its own network (such as a cable operator), at  
least two operators in addition to the operator having been designated SMP at the  
time of the market review, jointly deploy and control FTTH networks; and
• The FTTH networks are based on multiple fibre lines; and
• Each  co-investor  enjoys  equivalent  and  cost-oriented  access  to  the  joint  
infrastructure (the non-SMP operator(s) on the same terms and conditions as the  
SMP operator); and
• The co-investors are effectively competing on the downstream market; and
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• The co-investors install sufficient duct capacity for third parties to use and  
grant cost oriented access to such capacity; and
• The co-investors enable third parties currently enjoying unbundled access to  
the local  loop to migrate to comparable NGA wholesale products in  case of de-
commissioning of currently used points of interconnection.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directives  2002/21/EC  on  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  electronic 
communications  networks  and  services,  2002/19/EC  on  access  to  and 
interconnection  of  electronic  communications  networks  and  services,  and 
2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services 
– Political agreement’ (2008), Article 13a, Functional separation:
1.  Where  the  national  regulatory  authority  concludes  that  the  appropriate  
obligations  imposed  under  Articles  9  to  13  have  failed  to  achieve  effective  
competition  and  that  there  are  important  and  persisting  competition  
problems/market failures identified in relation to the wholesale provision of certain  
access products, it  may, as an measure, in accordance with the provisions of the  
second subparagraph of Article 8(3), impose an obligation on vertically integrated  
undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant these  
access products in an independently operating business entity. That business entity  
shall  supply access products and services to all  undertakings,  including to other  
business  entities  within  the  parent  company,  on  the  same  timescales,  terms  and  
conditions, including with regard to price and service levels, and by means of the  
same systems and processes.
2.  When  a  national  regulatory  authority  intends  to  impose  an  obligation  for  
functional separation, it shall submit a proposal to the Commission that includes:
(a)  evidence justifying the  conclusions  of  the national  regulatory  authority  as  
referred to in paragraph 1;
(ab) […] a reasoned assessment that there is no or little prospect of effective and  
sustainable infrastructure-based competition within a reasonable timeframe;
 (b)  an  analysis  of  the  expected  impact  on  the  regulatory  authority,  on  the  
undertaking, and on incentives to investment in a sector as a whole, particularly with  
regard  to  the  need  to  ensure  social  and  territorial  cohesion  and  on  other  
stakeholders including in particular the expected impact on […] competition and  
any potential entailing effects on consumers …
Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 11 July 2002, 2002/C, OJ 165/03
• overall size of the undertaking,
• control of infrastructure not easily duplicated,
• technological advantages or superiority,
• absence of or low countervailing buying power,
• easy or privileged access to capital markets/financial resources,
203
• product/services diversification (e.g. bundled products or services),
• economies of scale,
• economies of scope,
• vertical integration,
• a highly developed distribution and sales network,
• absence of potential competition,
• barriers to expansion.
1997 Interconnection Directive, Annex I:
Organizations  providing  the  public  telecommunications  networks  and/or  publicly  
available services identified below which have significant market power are subject  
to specific obligations with regard to interconnection and access.
1.  Organizations  which  provide  fixed  and/or  mobile  public  switched  
telecommunications  networks  and/or  publicly  available  telecommunications  
services,  and  in  so  doingcontrol  the  means  of  access  to  one  or  more  network  
termination  points  identified  by  one  or  more  unique  numbers  in  the  national  
numbering plan …
2. Organizations which provide leased lines to users’ premises.
3. Organizations which are authorized in a Member State to provide international  
telecommunications circuits between the Community and third countries, for which  
purpose they have exclusive or special rights.
4. Organizations providing telecommunications services which are permitted in  
this  category  to  interconnect  in  accordance  with  relevant  national  licensing  or  
authorization schemes.
1997 Interconnection Directive, Annex II: Organizations with Rights and Obligations 
to Negotiate Interconnection with Each Other in Order to Ensure Community-Wide 
Services:
1.  Organizations  which  provide  fixed  and/or  mobile  public  switched  
telecommunications  networks  and/or  publicly  available  telecommunications  
services,  and  in  so  doingcontrol  the  means  of  access  to  one  or  more  network  
termination  points  identified  by  one  or  more  unique  numbers  in  the  national  
numbering plan. [...]
2. Organizations which provide leased lines to users’ premises.
3. Organizations which are authorized in a Member State to provide international  
telecommunications circuits between the Community and third countries, for which  
purpose they have exclusive or special rights.
4. Organizations providing telecommunications services which are permitted in  
this  category  to  interconnect  in  accordance  with  relevant  national  licensing  or  
authorization schemes.
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Article 11 of the 95/62/EC Voice Telephony Directive:
1.  National  regulatory  authorities  shall  ensure  that  reasonable  requests  for  
interconnection with the fixed public telephone network from the organizations listed  
below are met, in particular to ensure Community-wide provision of voice telephony  
services:
(a) telecommunications organizations providing fixed public telephone networks  
in other Member States, whose names have been notified in accordance with Article  
26 (3);
(b) operators of public mobile telephony services in the same Member State.
No  request  for  interconnection  shall  be  refused  by  a  telecommunications  
organization  without  the  prior  agreement  of  its  national  regulatory  authority.  
Interconnection  with  the  fixed  public  telephone  network  of  operators  of  public  
mobile telephony services in other Member States, whose names have been notified  
in accordance with Article 26 (3), may also be agreed between the parties involved.  
No  request  for  such  interconnection  shall  be  refused  by  a  telecommunications  
organization without the prior agreement of its national regulatory authority.
2. Technical and commercial arrangements for interconnection shall be a matter  
for agreement between the parties involved, subject to intervention by the national  
regulatory authority as laid down in Article 10 (3) and (4).
3.  National  regulatory  authorities  shall  ensure  that  telecommunications  
organizations  adhere  to  the  principle  of  non-discrimination  when they enter  into  
interconnection agreements with others.
4. If interconnection agreements include specific compensation provisions for the  
telecommunications organization in situations where different operating conditions,  
e.g. price controls or universal service obligations, are imposed upon the respective  
parties,  such  compensation  provisions  shall  be  cost-oriented,  non-discriminatory  
and  fully  justified,  and  shall  only  be  applied  with  the  approval  of  the  national  
regulatory authority acting in accordance with Community law.
5. Details of interconnection agreements shall be made available, upon request, to  
the national regulatory authorities concerned.
§ 9a TKG 2004 Neue Märkte:
(1)  Vorbehaltlich  des  nachfolgenden  Absatzes  unterliegen  neue  Märkte  
grundsätzlich nicht der Regulierung nach Teil 2.
(2) Wenn Tatsachen die Annahme rechtfertigen, dass bei fehlender Regulierung  
die Entwicklung eines nachhaltig wettbewerbsorientierten Marktes im Bereich der  
Telekommunikationsdienste  oder  -netze  langfristig  behindert  wird,  kann  die  
Bundesnetzagentur  einen  neuen  Markt  abweichend  von  Absatz  1  nach  den  
Bestimmungen der §§ 9, 10, 11 und 12 der Regulierung nach Teil 2 unterwerfen. Bei  
der  Prüfung der  Regulierungsbedürftigkeit  und der Auferlegung von Maßnahmen  
berücksichtigt  die  Bundesnetzagentur  insbesondere  das  Ziel  der  Förderung  von  
effizienten Infrastrukturinvestitionen und die Unterstützung von Innovationen.
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